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We will not reweigh the evidence, ¶ 9 (App. 2013), and a second reasonable interpretation of the evidence does not mean there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, ¶ 5 (App. 2012).

Sufficient evidence may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate” to “support a conclusion of [a] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted).

¶ 9 (App. 2013) (cleaned up).

“Sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury can convict may be direct or circumstantial and ‘is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate’ to ‘support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” ¶ 8 (App. 2023) ( ¶ 9 (App. 2013)).

10 STATE v. COOKE Opinion of the Court ¶36 We “do not reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” ().

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

Sufficient evidence on which a 3 STATE v. AGUIRRE Opinion of the Court reasonable jury can convict may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate” to “support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and “do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶ 9 (App. 2013) (When evaluating claims of insufficient evidence, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.”) (quotation and citation omitted); Zmich, 160 Ariz. at 111 (“The fact that only one expert testified that the defendant was not .

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

But such evidence is not necessary for a lawful conviction; circumstantial evidence alone is “sufficient to support a conviction as long as reasonable jurors could find it permits the inference of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

Sufficient evidence of burglary may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate” to “support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013).

Sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury can convict may be direct or circumstantial, and “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶38 Sufficient evidence may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate” to “support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted).

to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).

Sufficient evidence may be direct or circumstantial and “is such proof that ‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of [a] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” ¶ 9 (App. 2013) ().