Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State of Arizona v. David J. Waller, 333 P.3d 806.

25 citing documents.

State v. Diaz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Klokic, 219 Ariz. at 244, ¶ 12; ¶ 33 (App. 6 STATE v. DIAZ Decision of the Court 2014) (“A duplicitous charge exists when the text of an indictment refers only to one criminal act, but multiple alleged criminal acts are introduced to prove the
State v. Carter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Carter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
¶ 64 (2003) (); ¶ 19 (App. 2013); ¶ 34 (App. 2004); ¶¶ 18-20 (2018) (discussing three types of fundamental error).
State v. Cameron Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Cameron Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
“A defendant who fails to request express findings concerning a Rule 403 determination waives any allegation on appeal that the court erred by not making such findings.” ¶ 40 (App. 2014).
State v. Conchola Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Conchola Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 22 (App. 2014) (a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
State v. Laws Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Laws Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
By contrast, “[t]he three types of assault are distinct offenses with different elements, not merely different manners of committing the same offense,” ¶ 29 (App. 2014), with each subsection addressing a different type of harm, see A.R.S.
State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
“Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and whether the interviewee was released at the end of the questioning.” ¶ 10 (App. 2014).
State v. De Anda 421 P.3d 670 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. De Anda 421 P.3d 670 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Waller , , ¶ 5, , 810 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).
State v. Foster Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Foster Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).
State v. Belvin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Belvin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Because these three types of aggravated assault “are distinct offenses with different elements, not merely different manners of committing the same offense,” ¶ 29 (App. 2014) (citations omitted); ¶¶ 31-33 (App. 2003) (concluding A.R.S.
State v. R.W. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. R.W. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
-08, ¶ 80 (2013) ( ¶ 76 (2009)); ¶¶ 33-34 (App. 2014).
Claudia Patricia Higuera v. State of Arizona 383 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Claudia Patricia Higuera v. State of Arizona 383 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
7 Higuera also argues the respondent judge “had no authority to enter rulings on [her] 10.2 Notice.” She contends that upon her filing of the notice, the respondent was required to transfer the matter to the presiding judge for reassignment.
State v. Adkins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Adkins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Cabrera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cabrera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
The two subsections of the simple (non-aggravated) assault statute, § 13-1203, on which these convictions were based – assault causing physical injury under (A)(1) and reasonable apprehension assault under (A)(2) – comprise distinct offenses, “not merely different manners of committing the same offense.” ¶29, ¶¶16-20