State of Arizona v. Adriel Guevara-Enriquez

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

ADRIEL GUEVARA-ENRIQUEZ,
Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2024-0054
Filed July 25, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20191616001
The Honorable Christopher C. Browning, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals
By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson and Joseph E. Begun,
Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellee

Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender
By David J. Euchner, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. GUEVARA-ENRIQUEZ
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Vásquez authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge
Eckerstrom and Judge Sklar concurred.

V Á S Q U E Z, Judge:

¶1 Adriel Guevara-Enriquez appeals his convictions and
sentences for sexual conduct with a minor. He argues the trial court erred
by failing to remove a disqualified juror and allowing the jury to see the
victim’s facility dog. He also argues the court violated his confrontation
rights by permitting a DNA analyst to testify about statements made by
other non-testifying lab team members. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts. State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, ¶ 30 (App. 2015). In 2019,
Guevara-Enriquez and his girlfriend were visiting his girlfriend’s family in
Tucson. One morning, Guevara-Enriquez forcefully undressed
nine-year-old M.R. before attempting to penetrate her vagina with his
penis. He then performed oral sex on her while she begged him to stop.

¶3 Guevara-Enriquez was charged with two counts of sexual
conduct with a minor under fifteen.1 After a six-day jury trial, he was
convicted of both counts. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive life
sentences without the possibility of release for thirty-five years. This appeal
followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031,
and 13-4033(A)(1).

Discussion

I. Juror 5’s Qualification to Serve as a Juror

¶4 Guevara-Enriquez argues Juror 5 was disqualified from
sitting on the jury under A.R.S. § 21-211 because of her husband’s
employment with the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, the agency that

1The state also charged Guevara-Enriquez with one count of
kidnapping, but the trial court dismissed that charge on the state’s motion
before trial.

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Opinion of the Court
had investigated the case.2 We review issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, ¶ 7 (2023).

¶5 The United States and Arizona constitutions afford a criminal
defendant the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. See Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726 (1992) (due process clauses of United States
Constitution’s Sixth and Fourteenth amendments independently guarantee
trial by impartial jury); Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24 (accused in criminal
prosecutions guaranteed right to “an impartial jury”). “When there is
reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial
verdict, the court, on its own initiative, . . . shall excuse the juror from
service in the case.” State v. Bush, 244 Ariz. 575, ¶ 42 (2018) (quoting Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.4 (2011)); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b) (2022).

¶6 Under § 21-211(2), a person who is “interested directly or
indirectly in the matter under investigation” is “disqualified to serve as [a]
juror[] in any particular action.” This bar “serves at least three goals:
(1) preserving the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors, (2) ensuring that
jurors derive their knowledge about the case solely from information
presented at trial to the jurors collectively, and (3) protecting the
appearance of fairness, which helps instill public confidence in the judicial
system.” State v. Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, ¶ 8 (2011); see also Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 18.4(b) (requiring trial court to excuse prospective jurors for cause “if
there is a reasonable ground to believe” they “cannot render a fair and
impartial verdict”). Our supreme court has concluded that “[t]he working
relationship between the prosecution and the investigating agency is the
type of interest § 21-211(2) is meant to cover.” Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, ¶ 18.

¶7 In Eddington, the court addressed “whether a peace officer
employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated a criminal case”

2Guevara-Enriquez argues the alleged error was structural because

“Arizona’s elimination of peremptory challenges leaves the defendant with
no way to rectify a trial court’s error in failing to disqualify a biased juror.”
Because we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion by not sua
sponte striking Juror 5 for cause, we need not address this argument. See
State v. Diaz, 223 Ariz. 358, ¶ 11 (2010) (“Regardless of how an alleged error
ultimately is characterized, . . . a defendant on appeal must first establish
that some error occurred.”).

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Opinion of the Court
has a disqualifying interest under § 21-211(2).3 228 Ariz. 361, ¶ 1. The court
held that “a peace officer currently employed by the law enforcement
agency that investigated the case is an ‘interested person’ who is
disqualified from sitting as a juror.” Id. Here, the Pima County Sheriff’s
Department investigated Guevara-Enriquez’s case. And during voir dire,
Juror 5 stated that her husband “works for the Pima County Sheriff’s
Department” in the “Correctional Department.” Guevara-Enriquez
maintains that whether Juror 5’s husband was a peace officer is “of no
consequence” because the “logic [in Eddington is not] restricted to peace
officers.” Relying on Eddington, he argues that, if Juror 5’s “husband could
not serve on this jury because he could potentially feel pressure from
coworkers, then he could receive the same pressure based on his wife’s
service.” Guevara-Enriquez claims that “[a]ny potential harm to his
employment with the Pima County Sheriff’s [Department], therefore,
necessarily harms Juror 5 equally.” But any potential harm to the
employment of Juror 5’s husband stemming from Juror 5 serving on the
jury is mere speculation.

¶8 Guevara-Enriquez identifies several considerations that, in
his view, are sufficient to extend the statutory bar preventing an interested
person from serving on a jury to that interested person’s spouse. He claims
that Juror 5 had “no less financial ‘interest’ in her husband’s employment”
than him because, under the community property statute, most property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage is community property. See
A.R.S. § 25-211. Guevara-Enriquez thus contends that “[a]ny potential
harm to his employment with the Pima County Sheriff’s [Department],
therefore, necessarily harms Juror 5 equally because lost earnings are
community property.” Relatedly, he asserts that the potential pressure
from Juror 5’s husband’s coworkers based on his spouse’s service could
potentially impact his future working relationships. Guevara-Enriquez
therefore claims that if Juror 5’s husband were fired from the investigating
agency and then sued for wrongful termination, that Juror 5 would be
required to join as a plaintiff in the case.

¶9 Guevara-Enriquez’s argument assumes that Juror 5’s
husband would be categorically disqualified from jury service under the
criteria set forth in Eddington. But Guevara-Enriquez has not provided this
court with an adequate record to assess whether, as an employee of the
investigating agency who does not serve in a division tasked with criminal
investigation, that criteria would logically apply in the instant case. This

3The court noted that it was using the term “peace officer” as it is

defined in A.R.S. §§ 1-215(28) and 13-105(29). Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, n.1.

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Opinion of the Court
court has no factual record whatsoever describing her husband’s level of
interaction with the investigations unit, his level of access, by formal or
informal means, to details of the investigation, or his dependence on the
good will of those overseeing investigations for any promotion. See
Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, ¶¶ 11-13. We therefore cannot conclude on the
record before us that the husband’s employment as a corrections officer
would create an “interest” in Guevara-Enriquez’s case such that his service
on the jury would raise the type of concerns contemplated by § 21-211(2).
See id.

¶10 But even assuming Juror 5’s husband would be disqualified
as a juror in this case under § 21-211(2), we decline to expand Eddington to
include such person’s spouse to protect against speculative risks
unsupported by the evidence in this case. By their terms, neither § 21-211(2)
nor Eddington apply to a spouse of an employee of the investigating agency.
And we are unpersuaded by Guevara-Enriquez’s argument that
Eddington’s logic necessarily extends to spouses. Guevara-Enriquez
correctly argues that spouses have financial interests in their spouses’
continued employment. But jury service poses a more attenuated risk to
those interests than the risks that underlie Eddington’s categorical
prohibition on jury service by peace officers of the investigating agency. To
the extent that such risks exist in individual cases, the court is equipped to
address those during voir dire. The trial court thus did not err by
concluding that Juror 5 was not disqualified from serving on the jury as an
interested party under the statute.

¶11 Aside from § 21-211, a trial court must excuse prospective
jurors for cause “if there is a reasonable ground to believe” they “cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b). “[E]xcusing
jurors is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and we will
not set aside a court’s decision whether to strike a juror for cause “absent
clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion.” State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118,
122 (1993); see also State v. Colorado, 256 Ariz. 97, ¶ 23 (App. 2023). By not
excusing Juror 5, the court implicitly determined she could serve as a fair
and impartial juror. The record supports that determination.

¶12 During voir dire, the trial court explained that law
enforcement officers must be “treated just the same [as other witnesses],
and their testimony [is] to be evaluated by the exact same standards as any
other witness.” It then asked if any of the prospective jurors had any
experience with law enforcement that “might make [them] tend to believe
or disbelieve, even to a small degree, the testimony of a law enforcement
officer more or less than the testimony of someone who is not a law
enforcement officer.” None of the jurors raised their hands. Then, the court

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Opinion of the Court
asked if anyone had a relative or close friend who was ever “law
enforcement affiliated.” Juror 5 was one of several people who answered
affirmatively, but she stated that she would “judge [deputies’ testimony]
by the same standards as anyone else.” She also confirmed it “wouldn’t be
a problem” for her not to talk about the case with anyone, including her
husband, until it was over. Juror 5 expressly stated that she and her
husband “made an agreement at the start, he doesn’t bring work home.”
As Guevara-Enriquez acknowledges, neither he nor the state moved to
strike Juror 5. Although he argues Rule 18.4(b) required the court to remove
Juror 5 sua sponte, on this record, we disagree. See State v. Jimenez, 255 Ariz.
550, ¶¶ 8-10, 13. For all these reasons, Guevara-Enriquez has not
established error related to Juror 5. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 21
(2018).

II. Constitutionality of Facility Dog Statute

¶13 Guevara-Enriquez challenges the facial constitutionality of
A.R.S. § 13-4442, as well as its validity as applied to him. Under that statute,
a trial court must allow a facility dog to accompany a minor victim while
he or she is testifying in court. Id. We review alleged constitutional
violations de novo. State v. Sanders, 245 Ariz. 113, ¶ 89 (2018). To prevail
on a facial challenge, Guevara-Enriquez must demonstrate there are no
circumstances under which the statute could be found valid. State v. Wein, 244 Ariz. 22, ¶ 34 (2018). “An ‘as-applied’ challenge assumes the standard
is otherwise constitutionally valid and enforceable, but argues it has been
applied in an unconstitutional manner to a particular party.” Korwin v.
Cotton, 234 Ariz. 549, ¶ 32 (App. 2014). “Because there is a strong
presumption in favor of a statute’s constitutionality, the challenging party
bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality.” State v. Arevalo, 249
Ariz. 370, ¶ 9 (2020); see State ex rel. Napolitano v. Gravano, 204 Ariz. 106, ¶ 11
(App. 2002) (presumption of constitutionality and challenging party’s
burden both exist in “as-applied” constitutional challenge).

¶14 Guevara-Enriquez argues § 13-4442 is facially
unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers by “infring[ing]
on the judicial rulemaking authority and the trial judge’s duty to manage
the courtroom.” This court considered and rejected this claim when
Guevara-Enriquez previously raised it by special action. See State v.
Browning, 256 Ariz. 565 (App. 2023). Guevara-Enriquez does not present a
sufficient basis for reconsidering that decision, and we decline to do so. See
State v. Wilson, 207 Ariz. 12, ¶ 9 (App. 2004) (court has discretion under law
of the case doctrine to refuse to reopen questions previously decided in
same case by same court).

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Opinion of the Court
¶15 Guevara-Enriquez next argues § 13-4442 “is applied in an
unconstitutional manner when the jury is caused to see the facility dog.”
The majority of his “as-applied” argument was presented and decided in
the special action. In this appeal, we will limit our discussion to addressing
the one argument not already decided in Browning. See Wilson, 207 Ariz. 12,
¶ 9. Specifically, Guevara-Enriquez argues that Browning’s application of
§ 13-4442 required the trial court to “take actions that the statute did not
require.” He points to a pretrial discussion about how the state “intend[ed]
to use the facility dog.” During that discussion, the court denied
Guevara-Enriquez’s request that the “dog and [M.R.] be seated prior to the
jury entering” in order to “minimize prejudice to [him].” In denying this
request, the court stated it interpreted Browning as permitting the jury to
see the dog. At trial, the court ordered that M.R. be “up on the stand with
the dog before the jury [came] in.” But at oral argument in this court, the
parties agreed that at the end of M.R.’s trial testimony, the jurors saw the
dog when she stepped down from the witness stand. These facts belie
Guevara-Enriquez’s assertions that the court “believed it had no discretion
on the issue of the jury seeing the dog.”

¶16 Moreover, during voir dire, the trial court asked jurors if there
was “anything about just the fact of the presence of a dog in a room that is
going to affect [their] ability to be fair and impartial?” No one raised their
hand in response to this question. And during preliminary and final
instructions, the court reminded the jury that the “dog’s presence is not and
should not be a reflection on the truthfulness or credibility of any testimony
that is offered by the witness” and that the “presence of the dog should not
influence [their] deliberations in any way.” See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389,
¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s
instructions.”). We conclude there was no error.4

III. DNA Analyst

¶17 Guevara-Enriquez argues that, because the state’s testifying
expert provided DNA analysis that “depended on the validity, accuracy,
and truth” of the “work and conclusions” of other lab team members who
did not testify, his confrontation right was violated. “We review de novo

4We will not separately address Guevara-Enriquez’s argument that

the trial court committed an error of law and thus abused its discretion by
“reading Browning to require the jury to see the facility dog,” which relies
on the same factual basis from which we determined the court did not err.

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 STATE v. GUEVARA-ENRIQUEZ
Opinion of the Court
whether the admission of evidence violates the Confrontation Clause.”
State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz. 296, ¶ 7 (2012).

¶18 As a threshold matter, Guevara-Enriquez did not object to the
DNA analyst’s testimony at trial. Generally, the failure to raise a
Confrontation Clause challenge in the trial court forfeits review for all but
fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, ¶¶ 15, 34 (2022).
Guevara-Enriquez argues, however, that he preserved this issue for
appellate review. He maintains that any objection to the admission of the
DNA analyst’s testimony at trial would have been “frivolous” at the time
because this court had found no confrontation violation in State v. Ortiz, 238
Ariz. 329 (App. 2015). He argues that, since his trial and conviction, Smith
v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), has “overrule[d] this precedent,” thereby
“constitut[ing] a significant change in the law.” See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,
16 (1984) (“[W]e hold that where a constitutional claim is so novel that its
legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for
his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state
procedures.”).

¶19 The state argues that Reed only applies when “the state of the
law at the time . . . did not offer a ‘reasonable basis’ upon which to
challenge” the evidence. 468 U.S. at 16-17. It contends this occurs when
“the Supreme Court explicitly overrules one of its precedents; ‘overturn[s]
a longstanding and widespread practice to which [the] Court has not
spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has
expressly approved’; and when the Supreme Court disapproves of a
practice it has ‘arguably . . . sanctioned in prior cases.’” Id. at 17. The state
asserts that none of these scenarios apply to Smith. Instead, it claims two
other Supreme Court cases, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), are the “state of
the law” and those cases were expressly not overruled in Smith. Therefore,
Smith was not a change in the law but a “clarif[ication of] a recurring issue
that was frequently litigated.” In Smith, the Court explained that not
having the original “maker of the statements,” meaning the original expert,
in the courtroom available for questioning would “make our decisions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming a dead letter, and allow for easy evasion of
the Confrontation Clause.” 602 U.S. at 798. Therefore, the state claims an
objection would not have been “futile” here, and it would have at least
allowed for proper development of the record to review the claims
Guevara-Enriquez now raises on appeal.

¶20 Relying on Smith, Guevara-Enriquez claims that the testifying
DNA analyst’s “opinions depended on the truth and accuracy of the
samples being what they purported to be in the case notes and the truth and

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Opinion of the Court
accuracy of the profiles purportedly obtained and developed from those
samples.” He therefore argues that the analyst’s testimony could not be
admitted unless the state also provided “testimony from the sampler and
technician.” In Smith, the analyst who had tested the drug substance did
not testify at trial. 602 U.S. at 789-90. Instead, a substitute expert with no
prior connection to the case reviewed the lab reports and analyst’s notes,
told the jury what those records conveyed about the analyst’s testing of the
items, and offered an “independent opinion” of the chemical nature of
those items. Id. at 791. The Supreme Court determined that the analyst’s
statements had been admitted for their truth. Id. at 798. And the Court held
it is improper for a substitute expert to introduce the testimonial
out-of-court statements of a forensic analyst at trial, unless the analyst is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the
analyst. Id. at 802-03.

¶21 Here, the state’s expert witness worked as a DNA analyst at
the same lab that processed the forensic evidence. The lab uses a
“technician based system” in which “different teams” perform the
“different steps of the DNA analysis,” rather than one person “doing every
step of the work.” At trial, the analyst testified extensively as to the lab’s
processes, from the “moment [they] receive evidence” through publishing
of the report.5 The testifying analyst’s role in this case was to “review
anything that[ had] been done in [the] case file, take ownership of it,
examine the DNA profiles obtained from evidence, make comparisons,
calculate statistics, generate reports, and then testify in court proceedings
to those reports.”

¶22 The testifying analyst stated that, in every case, the DNA
analyst assigned to testify must review “all of the documentation”
generated by others at “every single” prior step and perform an

5In this case, four reports were generated. The testifying analyst
authored three of those four. Typically, the lab requires that whoever
“authored the first report” will also author “every corresponding report
from there on after” for the “purposes of . . . the testimony in [court]
proceedings.” However, the author of the first report stopped working at
the lab. Before completing the subsequent reports, the testifying analyst
was “required to go back and review and confirm that [she] agree[d] with
everything that was in that first report.” This review included checking
that the quality assurance steps had been properly followed, and that the
testifying analyst would have independently come to the same conclusions
as the initial analyst. The testifying analyst had also “complete[d] some of
the lab work that was part of [the first] report.”

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Opinion of the Court
independent series of checks to ensure the accuracy of the testing process.
The analyst testified that this involves “check[ing] the chemicals,” “how the
instrumentation work[ed],” “what instrument was used,” and “[w]hat was
generated” in terms of “[t]he numbers” and “[t]he profiles.” These checks
exist “to ensure that when [she or another analyst] g[e]t to the ending
results of all of the DNA profiles . . . that they are all correctly, exactly how
they should be.” She testified that this review process allows her, as DNA
analyst or reporting analyst, to “take ownership of it, as if [she] was the one
to physically do it [her]self.”

¶23 However, the DNA analyst further testified that she did not
“physically do[] the [lab] work” but instead “review[ed] all of the
documentation that the[ lab team members] generate at every single one of
the steps.” Her work included “actually look[ing] at the DNA profiles,
determin[ing] if it’s suitable for comparison,” “mak[ing] comparisons,” and
“calculat[ing] statistics.” The record, therefore, is undeveloped as to
(1) whether the other lab team members made any statements relating to
their tasks, (2) whether—or to what extent—the testifying analyst relied on
such statements in forming her own opinion, and (3) whether any such
statements were testimonial.

¶24 But even assuming there was error, it would be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶ 38 (2008).
“In deciding whether error is harmless, the question ‘is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, ¶ 25
(2015) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). “We must be
confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no influence on the
jury’s judgment.” Id. (quoting State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993)).

¶25 We disagree with Guevara-Enriquez’s claim that the “DNA
evidence was central to the convictions.” M.R. provided direct testimony
identifying Guevara-Enriquez as the perpetrator and describing the details
of the sexual offenses. It was M.R.’s trial testimony that was central to the
state’s case, and the state urged the jury to convict based on her “testimony
in light of [the] other evidence.” See State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶¶ 31-35
(2002) (finding error harmless where DNA evidence was corroborated by
other evidence implicating defendant).

¶26 M.R.’s account was further corroborated by four witnesses.
Of particular note, M.R.’s sister, who was Guevara-Enriquez’s girlfriend at
the time, testified that when she confronted him about the incident, he
asked her, “[W]hat did I do? Did I ruin my life?” He further stated that “he

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Opinion of the Court
couldn’t believe he was going to lose [his girlfriend and their children]
because of what he did.” Guevara-Enriquez also repeatedly told M.R.’s
sister to “get [M.R.] checked.” Shortly after being confronted,
Guevara-Enriquez went to Mexico, which reflected his consciousness of
guilt.

¶27 Although the state referred to the DNA evidence during
closing argument, it framed the evidence as corroborative of M.R.’s
testimony and responsive to Guevara-Enriquez’s third-party culpability
defense. The state explicitly described it as circumstantial evidence rather
than independent proof of guilt. Contrast State v. Gomez, 250 Ariz. 518,
¶¶ 30-31 (2021) (inconclusive DNA evidence can circumstantially establish
defendant committed crime when corroborated by other evidence), with
State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, ¶¶ 61, 63 (2016) (DNA evidence alone can
“overwhelmingly establish” defendant committed crime (quoting United
States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). The state
acknowledged the complexity of DNA evidence, remarking that “DNA
evidence [will never] tell us the answer, 100 percent,” thereby signaling to
the jury that the forensic evidence was not conclusive.

¶28 Moreover, to the extent the DNA analyst’s testimony was
improper, it was as much helpful to Guevara-Enriquez as it was harmful.
The DNA evidence served as the foundation for Guevara-Enriquez’s
third-party culpability defense. He repeatedly emphasized that there was
sperm from an unknown male on M.R.’s underwear and DNA evidence
from an unknown male contributor on her external genitals. He argued
that this evidence does not require any credibility determinations because
“DNA is what it is.” Given the broader context for the DNA evidence and
in light of the other properly admitted evidence, we conclude the DNA
evidence did not contribute to the verdict, largely because it supported both
the state’s theory and Guevara-Enriquez’s defense. See Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516,
¶ 25.

Disposition

¶29 We affirm Guevara-Enriquez’s convictions and sentences.

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