State of Arizona v. Kalill Stubblefield

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

KALILL STUBBLEFIELD,
Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2025-0068
Filed December 22, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20134843001
The Honorable Michael Butler, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals
By Kyle Fields, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee

Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender
By David J. Euchner, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. STUBBLEFIELD
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Sklar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge
Eppich and Judge O’Neil concurred.

S K L A R, Judge:

¶1 A.R.S. § 13-3821(G) imposes conditions under which trial
courts “may order the termination” of a probationer’s
sex-offender-registration requirement. They may do so if the probationer
committed the offense that resulted in the registration requirement before
turning eighteen, upon “successful completion of probation.” This case
requires us to determine whether the “successful completion” language
requires courts to assess the probationer’s performance on probation or
whether it is synonymous with the probation’s expiration.

¶2 Kalill Stubblefield argues for the latter interpretation. He
argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had not successfully
completed probation. It reached that conclusion in part because
Stubblefield had been convicted of a separate offense during the probation
term. We disagree with Stubblefield and conclude that the court correctly
applied the statute. We therefore affirm its decision to require Stubblefield
to remain on the sex-offender registry.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In December 2014, Stubblefield was placed on ten years of
probation for one count of sexual conduct with a minor. He committed the
offense in August 2013, when he was seventeen years old. Under the
standard probation terms, Stubblefield was required to “obey[] all laws.”
In addition, the trial court ordered mandatory sex-offender registration
under A.R.S. § 13-3821(C). Because Stubblefield was a minor when he
committed the offense, his plea agreement contemplated the possibility of
terminating his sex-offender registration under Section 13-3821(G).

¶4 In 2016, the state filed a petition to revoke probation and
charged Stubblefield with new offenses. Stubblefield then pleaded guilty
to three more felonies—one count of aggravated assault and two counts of
disorderly conduct. The trial court, Judge Michael Butler, sentenced him to
3.5 years in prison and imposed three years of probation to run

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Opinion of the Court

concurrently with the original probation. Although Judge Butler found that
Stubblefield had violated the conditions of his initial probation, he did not
revoke that probation. Instead, he extended its term with a new
termination date of November 2025.

¶5 In 2024, the state filed a second revocation petition, this time
alleging, among others, a speeding violation. At a hearing before Judge
Casey McGinley, Stubblefield admitted to this violation. Judge McGinley
reinstated his original probation, with a new expiration date of January
2025.

¶6 Once that term expired, Judge McGinley discharged
Stubblefield from probation. Stubblefield also moved to terminate his
registration requirement. At a hearing, Judge Butler determined that
Stubblefield had not successfully completed probation, due to his 2016
convictions and 2024 violation. He therefore denied the motion.
Stubblefield appealed.

JUDGE BUTLER’S AUTHORITY IN LIGHT OF PRIOR COMMENTS
FROM JUDGE MCGINLEY

¶7 Stubblefield first makes an argument concerning comments
that Judge McGinley made when reinstating his probation for the final time.
Specifically, Stubblefield asserts that Judge McGinley “stated
unequivocally” that his probation would be considered “successful” upon
expiration of the term, ninety-two days after the hearing. In Stubblefield’s
view, this was an order that became final when Judge McGinley discharged
him from probation. Although Stubblefield does not say so explicitly, he
seems to suggest that Judge Butler lacked authority to disagree with Judge
McGinley.

¶8 Judge McGinley’s comments were as follows:

If you successfully complete that 92 days,
they’re going to file a petition, they’re going to
show that it’s expired, and you’re going to show
that you have successfully completed
probation. If you violate, you’re going to have
to convince me that I shouldn’t show that it was
unsuccessful. Fair?

Moments earlier, though, Judge McGinley also stated, “That’s going to be
another question for another day, by the way, whether you meet the criteria

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Opinion of the Court

to not have to register. But I don’t want to put you in a position where you
can’t argue it.”

¶9 Taken together, Judge McGinley’s statements are better
understood as simply advising Stubblefield that after those ninety-two
days, he could argue that he had successfully completed probation. It was
not a final order, nor did it bind Judge Butler. See State v. Dixon, 216 Ariz.
18, ¶ 14 (App. 2007) (“Appeals lie from findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgments, not from ruminations of the trial judge.” (quoting United
Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 308 (App. 1983))). We
therefore turn to the merits.

“SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION” OF PROBATION UNDER
A.R.S. § 13-3821(G)

¶10 A defendant convicted of certain offenses must register as a
sex offender. See A.R.S. § 13-3821. Outside of certain exceptions,
registration is a lifelong requirement. State v. Trujillo, 248 Ariz. 473, ¶ 11
(2020). One such exception allows a trial court to terminate any duty to
register upon “successful completion of probation if the person was under
eighteen years of age when the offense . . . was committed.” § 13-3821(G).
If the defendant meets these requirements, the court “may order the
termination of any duty to register.” Id.

¶11 Because “successful completion” is not statutorily defined,
this case requires us to determine its meaning, an issue of first impression.
Stubblefield argues that once a probation term has expired, its completion
was necessarily successful. We review issues involving interpretation and
application of statutes de novo. State v. Bryson, 256 Ariz. 511, ¶ 9 (App.
2023).

I. The rules of statutory interpretation support giving independent
meaning to the word “successful”

¶12 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the words of the
statute. State v. Serrato, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 9, 568 P.3d 756, 759 (2025). We
consider the language in relation to the entire text, considering context and
related statutes on the same subject. Id.; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 24 (2012) (“Context
is a primary determinant of meaning.”). We give the terms effect “in
accordance with their commonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature
has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context
that a special meaning was intended.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v.

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Opinion of the Court

Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, ¶ 16 (2024) (quoting State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233,
234 (1992)).

¶13 Where statutes are unambiguous, we interpret them based on
their plain language in the context of the law that grants the authority. Id.
¶ 15; In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, ¶ 5 (2024)). But “if the statutory language
is ambiguous—if ‘it can reasonably be read in two ways’—we may use
alternative methods of statutory construction, including examining the
[statute’s] historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and
consequences of competing interpretations.” Serrato, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 9, 568
P.3d at 759 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 257 Ariz. 137, ¶ 17).

¶14 Beginning with the plain language of Section 13-3821(G),
“successful completion” involves two concepts—that probation was
completed, and that it was successful. This is significant because a
“cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if
possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is
rendered superfluous.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, ¶ 11 (2019). This
principle counsels against Stubblefield’s proposed interpretation, which
renders the word “successful” superfluous by concluding that any
“completion” of probation is necessarily successful.

¶15 In his reply brief, Stubblefield argues that the term “successful
completion” should be read as a single phrase. He correctly points out that
we do not read words hyper-literally. See Serrato, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 15, 568
P.3d at 760. That rule, however, simply discourages ignoring textual and
contextual clues about a particular term’s meaning. Id. ¶¶ 15-16
(literalism—involving “a narrow, crabbed reading of a text”—is not
textualism); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021) (courts should
“exhaust ‘all the textual and structural clues’ bearing on [a statute’s]
meaning” (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 275 (2018))).
And here, Stubblefield has pointed to no clues allowing us to, in essence,
read “successful” as synonymous with “completion.” Nor do we discern
any. We therefore conclude that the statute is not ambiguous in context.

¶16 Stubblefield, however, suggests that we apply the rule that
counsels against creating absurd results. See Carson v. Gentry, ___ Ariz. ___,
¶ 56, 574 P.3d 205, 218 (2025) (“If a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous,
it controls unless it results in an absurdity or a constitutional violation.”).
He argues that if “successful completion” is not read to encompass all
completion, “no probationer may apply for termination of registration
requirements unless they complete every single requirement of probation

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with a perfect score.” But not even the state argues for that interpretation
of the statute.

¶17 Like the state, we do not read “successful” as synonymous
with perfection. Indeed, another probation-related statute points to a
different meaning. That statute, A.R.S. § 13-604, requires certain offenses to
be designated as misdemeanors when the “defendant successfully fulfills
the conditions of probation.” It reads:

The court shall designate an undesignated
offense as a misdemeanor on the defendant’s
successful fulfillment of the conditions of
probation and discharge by the court. The
defendant successfully fulfills the conditions of
probation if, in the discretion of the court, the
defendant has satisfied the conditions of
probation.

By providing a trial court with discretion to evaluate a probationer’s
compliance with the conditions, this statute recognizes that “successful”
need not mean perfect.

¶18 We recognize that the language of Section 13-604 is not
identical to that of Section 13-3821. The former uses the phrase
“successfully fulfills the conditions” of probation, while the latter uses the
phrase “successful completion.” We do not suggest that the analyses
contemplated by the two statutes are identical. See Egan v. Fridlund-Horne,
221 Ariz. 229, ¶ 37 (App. 2009) (“[W]e presume that when the legislature
uses different wording within a statutory scheme, it intends to give a
different meaning and consequence to that language.”). But the language
of Section 13-604 nevertheless demonstrates that there is nothing absurd
about requiring courts to evaluate a probationer’s success on probation.

II. Our analysis is not affected by case law that prohibits courts from
terminating probation early as “unsuccessful”

¶19 Stubblefield also seeks support for his argument in the case
law applying A.R.S. § 13-901(E). That statute allows trial courts to
terminate probation early “if in the court’s opinion the ends of justice will
be served and if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.”
The case law explains that early termination is permissible even where the
probationer has “been unsuccessful in fulfilling all conditions of probation
within the original term.” State v. Lewis, 226 Ariz. 124, ¶ 14 (2011). In

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Opinion of the Court

reaching this conclusion, our supreme court observed that “no term of
probation is successfully completed until it expires.” Id. ¶ 12. It also
explained that its decision was consistent with a prior opinion from this
court, which had concluded that Section 13-901(E) did not allow courts to
terminate a probation early as “unsuccessfully completed.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13
(citing State v. Moore, 149 Ariz. 176, 177 (App. 1986)).

¶20 This case law does not affect our analysis. It is specific to the
authority to grant early termination, and its application of Section 13-901
does not purport to address a trial court’s power to extend or terminate a
sex-offender-registration requirement under Section 13-3821. According to
Moore, a court cannot terminate probation early because of a violation, but
it may do so only “if the defendant’s conduct is such as to indicate
rehabilitation.” 149 Ariz. 176, 177. Lewis clarifies that a court may
nonetheless terminate probation early even when not all terms are
complete, so long as the ends of justice and the conduct of the defendant
warrant it. 226 Ariz. 124, ¶¶ 14-17. It is perfectly plausible that a court
would be prohibited from granting early termination for “unsuccessfully”
completing probation while retaining discretion for registration purposes
to evaluate whether the defendant has completed probation successfully
when the original term ends. As noted, courts must already undertake a
similar analysis in the context of Section 13-604.

III. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that
Stubblefield did not successfully complete probation

¶21 Having rejected Stubblefield’s argument that all
“completion” of probation is “successful,” we must still evaluate whether
the trial court properly applied Section 13-3821. The state suggests that this
analysis requires considering whether Stubblefield completed probation
while achieving its goals, which are reducing offender recidivism,
promoting rehabilitation, and protecting the community.

¶22 We agree that trial courts may evaluate “successful
completion” against this backdrop. But measuring success solely against
these broad purposes is not sufficiently moored to the probation statutes,
which form part of the context for Section 13-3821. See Serrato, ___ Ariz.
___, ¶ 9, 568 P.3d at 759 (requiring statutes to be interpreted in context).
That statutory context allows courts to impose probation “on such terms
and conditions as the law requires and the court deems appropriate.”
§ 13-901(A).

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Opinion of the Court

¶23 Thus, a probationer’s success should also be measured
against satisfaction of the terms and conditions imposed. In that sense, the
analysis overlaps with that required by Section 13-604(C), which looks to
the fulfillment of probation conditions. But because Section 13-3821 does
not reference those conditions, we agree with the state that courts may also
look more broadly at the public-policy goals of probation. This is especially
true because, while probation and the sex-offender registry do not serve
identical policy goals, both are intended to protect the community. See
Trujillo, 248 Ariz. 473, ¶2 (registry serves “important civil regulatory
purpose of making offender information ‘accessible’ to the public so that
they ‘can take the precautions they deem necessary’ for their own safety”
(quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003))).

¶24 In general, trial courts are best positioned to evaluate the
probationer’s satisfaction of the probation conditions in light of probation’s
public-policy goals. See State v. Patton, 120 Ariz. 386, 388 (1978) (trial court,
in most instances, more able than appellate courts to evaluate defendant
and his circumstances). We will not second-guess their decisions unless
they abuse that discretion. See id. We also remind courts that the
determination of whether probation has been successfully completed is a
precursor to the separate determination of whether to terminate the
registration requirement. See § 13-3821(G) (providing that court “may
order” termination of registration requirement upon “successful
completion” of probation). Courts may reach that issue only after
concluding that probation was successfully completed. Id.

¶25 In this case, Stubblefield’s probation terms required him to
obey all laws. Yet he pleaded guilty to several new offenses and admitted
to speeding violations during his time on probation. Stubblefield also failed
to attend required drug tests, sex-offender treatments, and
anger-management programs. These failures support the trial court’s
conclusion under Section 13-3821(G) that Stubblefield had not successfully
completed probation.

DISPOSITION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Stubblefield’s motion to terminate his sex-offender-registration
requirement.

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