State of Arizona v. Marcos Isaac Danner

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Respondent,

v.

MARCOS ISAAC DANNER,
Petitioner.

No. 2 CA-CR 2025-0126-PR
Filed October 22, 2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20234992001
The Honorable Kathleen A. Quigley, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney
By J. William Brammer Jr. and James W. Rappaport, Tucson
Counsel for Respondent

Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender
By Ian M. McCloskey, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Petitioner

STATE v. DANNER
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge
Staring and Vice Chief Eppich concurred.

E C K E R S T R O M, Judge:

¶1 Marcos Danner seeks review of the trial court’s order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant
to Rule 33, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We grant review, and, because the court erred
in rejecting Danner’s claim under Rule 33.1(h), we grant relief.

¶2 In March 2024, Danner pled guilty to solicitation to possess a
deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor based on his possession of a
firearm in November 2023. The trial court suspended the imposition of
sentence and placed Danner on a three-year term of probation.

¶3 Danner sought post-conviction relief, arguing his conviction
violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution because
“there is no historical tradition of disarming similarly situated non-violent
offenders,” citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
(2022). He later filed an amended petition adding a claim under Rule
33.1(h) that he was not, in fact, a prohibited possessor on the date of the
offense because his right to possess a firearm had been automatically
restored under A.R.S. § 13-907(A) based on amendments to that statute
effective in September 2022. He explained that he had been convicted in
2020 of solicitation to commit organized retail theft—a nondangerous and
nonserious offense, see A.R.S. §§ 13-706, 13-704—and that he thus met the
criteria for automatic reinstatement under the current version of
§ 13-907(A). In response, the state acknowledged that Danner’s probation
term in the retail theft case had ended in 2021 but argued that the automatic
restoration provisions of § 13-907(A) did not apply because his probation
had ended before the statute was amended and the statute was not
expressly retroactive.

¶4 The trial court summarily dismissed Danner’s petition. It
concluded he had waived his constitutional challenge by pleading guilty
and that the amendment to § 13-907(A) was not retroactive. As to the latter,
the court reasoned that the amendment to § 13-907(A) was substantive—as

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STATE v. DANNER
Opinion of the Court

opposed to procedural, which may be applied retroactively—because it
would require “a reversal of convictions for prohibited possessors in
qualifying cases.” The court also denied Danner’s motion for rehearing.
This petition for review followed.

¶5 On review, Danner reurges his claims. Because we agree that
his right to possess a firearm was automatically restored when the
amendments to § 13-907 took effect, he is entitled to relief under Rule
33.1(h), and we need not reach his constitutional arguments.

¶6 At the time Danner completed his probation in 2021,
§ 13-907(A) provided that, “[o]n final discharge, any person who has not
previously been convicted of a felony offense shall automatically be
restored any civil rights that were lost or suspended as a result of the
conviction if the person pays any victim restitution imposed.” 2022 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 199, § 2. Subsection (C) excluded the right to possess a
firearm from the automatic restoration of rights, providing a defendant
could instead apply for restoration pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-910.

¶7 As amended, § 13-907(A) provides that the automatic
restoration of rights is triggered “[o]n completion of probation . . . or
absolute discharge from imprisonment.” And the statute now allows for
the automatic restoration of the right to possess a firearm unless the
underlying offense was dangerous or serious. § 13-907(C). The question
before us, then, is whether that amendment applies to an individual—like
Danner—who completed probation before the amended statute’s effective
date in September 2022 but would unquestionably qualify for the automatic
restoration of the right to possess a firearm if he had completed it later.1

¶8 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In re
Chalmers, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 12, 571 P.3d 885, 888 (2025). “Statutory
interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of the words the
legislature chose to use. We do so neither narrowly nor liberally, but rather

1It is undisputed that Danner was a prohibited possessor before the

statute was amended and would not have been permitted to possess a
firearm before the statute’s effective date. A defendant is held to the law in
effect at the time the crime was committed. See State v. Hamilton, 177 Ariz.
403, 406 (App. 1993) (“In the context of criminal law, an offender must be
punished under the law in force when the offense was committed and is
not exempted from punishment by a subsequent amendment to the
applicable statutory provision.”).

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STATE v. DANNER
Opinion of the Court

according to the plain meaning of the words in their broader statutory
context, unless the legislature directs us to do otherwise.” Id. (quoting
S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, ¶ 31 (2023)).

¶9 Danner argues that he need not demonstrate that the
amended statute operates retroactively because the revisions to § 13-907(A)
changed his status—from a prohibited possessor to a person with restored
Second Amendment rights—prospectively from 2022 onward. The state,
conversely, asserts that because Danner’s constitutional rights were
automatically restored—save his right to possess a firearm—when his
probation terminated in 2021, the 2022 amendments to § 13-907(A) do not
apply to him unless we conclude the statute operates retroactively.

¶10 “A statute applies retroactively when it ‘attaches new legal
consequences’ to events completed before the effective date of the statute.”
Zuther v. State, 199 Ariz. 104, ¶ 15 (2000) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 & 270 (1994)). But “[a] statute is not necessarily
retroactive because it ‘relate[s] to antecedent facts.’” Id. ¶ 17 (first alteration
added, second alteration in Zuther) (quoting Tower Plaza Invs. Ltd. v. DeWitt, 109 Ariz. 248, 250 (1973)). A substantive statute may not be applied
retroactively absent an express directive by the legislature. Krol v. Indus.
Comm’n of Ariz., 259 Ariz. 261, ¶ 25 (2025); A.R.S. § 1-244. But a procedural
statute has no such restriction if it “does not affect an earlier established
substantive right.” In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8 (2000) (quoting Bouldin
v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 78 (1979)); see also Krol, 259 Ariz. 261, ¶ 31.

¶11 Much of Danner’s argument centers on this court’s decision
in State v. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242 (App. 2017). There, the defendant asserted
that his right to possess a firearm was not automatically suspended under
A.R.S. § 13-904(A)(5) because that provision was added in 1994, several
years after his 1987 conviction. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, ¶ 1. The statute
provides that “[a] conviction for a felony suspends” certain “civil rights of
the person sentenced.” § 13-904(A). The 1994 amendment added to the list
of suspended rights “[t]he right to possess a . . . firearm.” 1994 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 200, § 5.

¶12 Nixon argued that applying § 13-904(A)(5) to him was an
improper retroactive application of the law. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, ¶ 1. We
determined, however, that it was not necessary for the statute to be
retroactive to suspend Nixon’s right to possess a firearm. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. His
conviction was not the trigger for the suspension of his gun rights but
instead merely an antecedent fact, and the statute did “not change the
consequences of Nixon’s past acts.” Id. ¶ 7. Instead, “[t]he only effect that

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the statute had on Nixon was to change his status as a felon to a prohibited
possessor from 1994 onward.” Id. ¶ 8. Thus, we concluded, the statute
“prospectively applies to convicted felons who had yet to have their civil
rights restored when it became effective, regardless whether the conviction
occurred before or after its effective date.” Id.

¶13 Danner interprets Nixon to mean that “statutes related to the
loss of rights and restoration of rights upon conviction” apply prospectively
“at the moment the statute becomes effective,” regardless of when the
conviction occurred. We agree that much of Nixon’s reasoning applies
here. Section 13-907(A) refers to a specific event—the completion of
probation or absolute discharge from imprisonment—to trigger the
automatic restoration of rights. But, under Nixon, that does not necessarily
mean the statute is improperly retroactive if that event has already
occurred. As noted above, § 13-904(A) also refers to a specific triggering
event—the conviction for a felony. Nonetheless, the addition of subsection
(A)(5) suspending the right to possess a firearm did not alter the legal
consequences of that previous event.

¶14 The state correctly observes, however, that Danner’s rights
had already been restored at the time the statutory amendments took effect,
unlike Nixon’s. It focuses on the statement in Nixon that the modified
statute applies only to “convicted felons who had yet to have their civil
rights restored.” Id. According to the state, then, the key event is not the
effective date of the statute but the restoration of rights. But the state’s
argument overlooks the difference between § 13-904(A) and § 13-907(A).
The former suspends rights, and the latter explains how they are restored.
It is one thing to conclude the legislature may restore additional rights to a
felon whose rights have already been partially restored. It is another to
conclude the legislature may again suspend the rights of a felon whose
rights have been restored.

¶15 Additionally, the state’s interpretation could lead to arbitrary
results, as the following hypothetical illustrates. Two defendants convicted
of identical crimes are subsequently placed on identical probation terms,
which would begin before the effective date of the revisions to § 13-907(A)
and end afterwards. The first defendant, however, is terminated from
probation early under Rule 27.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P. The other is not.
According to the state, only the second defendant would automatically
regain the right to possess a firearm. We cannot agree Arizona law compels
this outcome.

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¶16 Even were we to read the amendment to § 13-907(A) as
creating new legal consequences, that is, the restoration of Danner’s right
to possess a firearm, based on events completed before the amendment—
his completion of probation, see Zuther, 199 Ariz. 104, ¶ 15, we would
nonetheless conclude Danner is entitled to relief. As noted above, the
presumption against retroactivity applies only to statutes affecting vested
substantive rights. “Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights.”
Krol, 259 Ariz. 261, ¶ 32 (quoting Aranda v. Indus. Comm’n, 198 Ariz. 467,
¶ 12 (2000)). “Conversely, a procedural law ‘prescribes the method of
enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.’” Id. (quoting Hall v. A.N.R.
Freight Sys., Inc., 149 Ariz. 130, 138 (1986)). In other words, a “procedural
law relates to the manner and means by which a right to recover is enforced
or provides no more than the method by which to proceed.” Aranda, 198
Ariz. 467, ¶ 12. In the criminal context, a law is substantive if it defines a
crime or the parameters of punishment. Carson v. Gentry, ___ Ariz. ___,
¶ 78, 574 P.3d 205, 221 (2025).

¶17 Section 13-907(A) neither creates nor defines the right to
possess firearms. Nor does it regulate that right—§ 13-904(A)(5) mandates
the suspension of the right to possess firearms. Section 13-907, in contrast,
provides the procedure for restoring those rights. Under subsection (A),
the rights are restored automatically to qualified defendants, and the statute
refers defendants who do not meet its requirements to appropriate
additional procedures. See § 13-907(B), (D). Moreover, the suspension of
the right to possess a firearm is not punishment. See State v. Olvera, 191
Ariz. 75, 77 (App. 1997). It instead reflects a legislative determination of
“unfitness to engage in the future activity of possession of a firearm.” Id.
Thus, because § 13-907(A) does not create, define, or regulate rights nor
punish defendants, it is procedural, and there is no barrier to applying its
amendment retroactively to those who completed their probation before
the amendment’s effective date.

¶18 Danner’s right to possess a firearm was restored
automatically on the effective date of the amendments to § 13-907(A),
September 24, 2022. Thus, he was not prohibited from possessing a firearm
on the date of his arrest in November 2023. He is entitled to relief under
Rule 33.1(h).

¶19 We grant review and relief. We direct the trial court to enter
an order vacating Danner’s conviction for solicitation to commit prohibited
possession and the resulting disposition.

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