Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Waggoner, 679 P.2d 89.

44 citing documents.

Kemper v. Pinnacle Dental, Pllc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
– 50 (1983) (recognizing that subjective intent is “a question of fact to be determined after listening to the testimony”).
Quihuis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 334 P.3d 719 Ariz. 2014
(adopting Restatement § 58).
Colorado Casualty Insurance v. Safety Control Co. 288 P.3d 764 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 58 (1982)).
Colorado Casualty Insurance v. Safety Control Co. 269 P.3d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 58 (1982)).
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance 151 P.3d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
(holding the subjective intent of the insured to be a question of fact when insured “threw an elbow” in a basketball game).
Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood 98 P.3d 572 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
C. Conflict of interest issues ¶ 42 Relying primarily on the Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 58 (1982), and Farmers Insurance Co. v. Vagnozzi , AAU also argues conflict of interest principles permitted it to litigate liability and damage issues in phase I of this DRA and required Intervenors to establish coverage by proving actual bodily injuries were sustained and were caused by TAA/City’s tortious acts or omissions during AAU’s policy
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire v. A.P.S. Rent a Car & Leasing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(“[W]here there is a conflict of interest between an insured and his insurer, the parties will not be estopped from litigating in a subsequent proceeding those issues as to which there was a conflict of interest, whether or not the insurer defended in the original tort claim.”).
Parking Concepts, Inc. v. Tenney 83 P.3d 19 Ariz. 2004
Morris, 154 Ariz. at 118 , 741 P.2d at 251 (citing Vagnozzi and holding that the insurer “properly reserved its rights to later assert the policy’s intentional act exclusion”).
Paradigm Insurance v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A. 24 P.3d 593 Ariz. 2001
K.B. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 941 P.2d 1288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Ohio Casualty Insurance v. Henderson 939 P.2d 1337 Ariz. 1997
Ohio Casualty Insurance v. Henderson 927 P.2d 815 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Morgan 918 P.2d 1051 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Republic Insurance v. Feidler 875 P.2d 187 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Co. v. Vagnozzi , Safeco Ins.
St. Paul Property & Liability Insurance v. Eymann 802 P.2d 1043 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
our supreme court recognized the Steinmetz-Clark presumption, but held it inapplicable on the facts before it.
Phoenix Control System, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America 796 P.2d 463 Ariz. 1990
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 792 P.2d 749 Ariz. 1990
Independent National Bank v. Westmoor Electric, Inc. 795 P.2d 210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Doe 797 P.2d 718 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
Phoenix Control Systems, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America 778 P.2d 1316 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
see generally 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1716 (2d ed. 1983).
Matter of Marquardt 778 P.2d 241 Ariz. 1989
(litigated facts necessary to a prior valid judgment are binding in subsequent proceeding).
Continental Insurance v. McDaniel 772 P.2d 6 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
or striking a potential burglar who by mistaken identity later turns out to be one’s brother-in-law.
Anderson v. Martinez 762 P.2d 645 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Scottsdale Memorial Health Systems, Inc. v. Clark 759 P.2d 607 Ariz. 1988
(“a stranger to a litigation may not be bound by a determination made therein for purposes of subsequent litigation”)
Smith v. Payne 753 P.2d 1162 Ariz. 1988
Busch Development, Inc. v. American Insurance 760 P.2d 560 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 742 P.2d 277 Ariz. 1987
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Morris 741 P.2d 246 Ariz. 1987
Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Helme 735 P.2d 451 Ariz. 1987
Vairo v. Clayden 734 P.2d 110 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
Snow v. Western Savings & Loan Ass'n 730 P.2d 204 Ariz. 1987
Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc. 733 P.2d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Dunn v. Progress Industries, Inc. 734 P.2d 604 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Hirsch v. Cooper 737 P.2d 1092 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Wetzel v. Arizona State Real Estate Department 727 P.2d 825 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Casillas v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 739 P.2d 800 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Pearce v. Stone 720 P.2d 542 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
EMP. ADMIN. SERV. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. 709 P.2d 559 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Employer's Administrative Services, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 709 P.2d 559 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
On review of a summary judgment decision we consider the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment:
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray 694 P.2d 191 Ariz. 1984
184 , 313 N.W.2d 636 (1981)
Transamerica Insurance Group v. Meere 694 P.2d 181 Ariz. 1984
McGough v. Ins. Co. of North America 691 P.2d 738 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
we conclude that INA has clearly shown the requisite interest under Rule 24(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.
Green Acres Trust v. London 688 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1984
Matusik v. Arizona Public Service Co. 684 P.2d 882 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
“Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the determination of a litigated fact or law which is essential to a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the parties or their privies in a subsequent claim.” , , No. 15687-PR, slip op.