Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561.

39 citing documents.

  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
    (“If part of an act is unconstitutional, but by eliminating the unconstitutional portion the balance of the act is workable, only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance will be left intact.”); Gherna, 16 Ariz. at 350 , 146 P. at 501 (“It is well settled
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
    See, , (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); , (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the pr
  • Andrews v. Willrich 29 P.3d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • Andrews v. Willrich 29 P.3d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    Prentiss, 163 Ariz. at 85 , 786 P.2d at 936 .; , (legislature cannot constitutionally give prosecutor authority after conviction to decide punishment; that is judicial function).
  • State v. Donald 10 P.3d 1193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • In Re Isaac G. 944 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • In Re Isaac G. 944 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    (“[W]hen the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature....”).
  • State v. SUPERIOR COURT, NAVAJO COUNTY 884 P.2d 270 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. SUPERIOR COURT, NAVAJO COUNTY 884 P.2d 270 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    at 413 , 831 P.2d at 412 ( , ).
  • Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court 882 P.2d 1285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court 882 P.2d 1285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Garcia 860 P.2d 498 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Garcia 860 P.2d 498 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State Ex Rel. Bowers v. Superior Court 839 P.2d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State Ex Rel. Bowers v. Superior Court 839 P.2d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
    See, , (legislature may not grant to prosecutor authority to make or withhold recommendation of alternative sentencing under A.R.S.
  • State v. Ramsey 831 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Ramsey 831 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • McDonald v. Campbell 821 P.2d 176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • McDonald v. Campbell 821 P.2d 176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    defendant claimed that designation of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor is an exclusively judicial function, and that placing this responsibility in the hands of the prosecutor violates the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.
  • State v. Boudette 791 P.2d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Boudette 791 P.2d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., , 235 P. 137 (1925)
  • State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 Ariz. 1989
  • State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 Ariz. 1989
    302 [sic] [ ] (App.1984), makes clear that it is unconstitutional to limit a judge’s ability to impose a mitigated sentence to instances in which the prosecutor makes a post-trial “recommendation.” Jones is not, however, dispositive of the difficult question presented in this case— the constitutionality of a statute requiring a p
  • Clay v. Town of Gilbert 773 P.2d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • Clay v. Town of Gilbert 773 P.2d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • State v. Larson 764 P.2d 749 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
  • State v. Larson 764 P.2d 749 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
  • State v. Olsen 760 P.2d 603 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
  • State v. Olsen 760 P.2d 603 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
    is directly on point However, in the recent case of State v. Prentiss, Ariz. (App.1988) 2 CA-CR 87-0419 (filed Feb.
  • State v. Brooks 753 P.2d 1185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
  • State v. Brooks 753 P.2d 1185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
    in which this court found a DUI statute unconstitutional to the extent that the prosecutor had the power to control sentencing.
  • State v. Prentiss 775 P.2d 1129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
  • State v. Prentiss 775 P.2d 1129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
    we held that the legislature could not, without violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, “give the prosecuting attorney the authority, after a conviction, to decide what the punishment shall be.” Accordingly, we found unconstitutional that portion of A.R.S.
  • State v. Rambeau 730 P.2d 883 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Rambeau 730 P.2d 883 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986