Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ramirez Enriquez, 737 P.2d 407.

34 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Charlie Conley Jr. 523 P.3d 976 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
  • State of Arizona v. Charlie Conley Jr. 523 P.3d 976 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
  • State v. Hanley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Criticized State v. Hanley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    (reversing sale of marijuana conviction; criticizing admission of evidence, to “complete[] the story, ” of other times when defendant sold marijuana where a limiting instruction was “incomprehensible”).
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    ¶11 Third, to admit another act as evidence of a common scheme or plan pursuant to Rule 404(b), the other act must be “part of ‘a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.’” ( ).
  • State of Arizona v. Rohan Livingston Butler 286 P.3d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State of Arizona v. Rohan Livingston Butler 286 P.3d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    is part of a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.’” He relies on State v. Ives, in which the court concluded the defendant’s four acts of child molestation, “separated in time by as much as seven years or more, [were] not acts of ‘a particular plan of which the charged crime [was] part.’” -09, -69 (1996), -33, -09 (App. 1987).
  • State v. Connor 161 P.3d 596 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Connor 161 P.3d 596 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Aguilar 97 P.3d 865 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Aguilar 97 P.3d 865 Ariz. 2004
    at 108, 927 P.2d at 768 (-33, -09 (App. 1987)).
  • State v. Vigil 986 P.2d 222 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Vigil 986 P.2d 222 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    ( , (defining “common scheme or plan” in the *193 context of Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evict))
  • State v. Harrison 985 P.2d 513 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Harrison 985 P.2d 513 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    -433 , -409 (App.1987); -74 , -51 (App.1989).
  • State v. Garland 953 P.2d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Garland 953 P.2d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    at 106 , 927 P.2d at 766 (-33 , -09 (App.1987) (citation omitted)).
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
    “Common scheme or plan” as used in Rule 13.3(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and as referenced in Rule 404(b), Arizona Rules of Evidence, must be a “particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.” Ives, 187 Ariz. at 108 , 927 P.2d at 768 (-33 , -09 (App. 1987)).
  • State v. Hughes 938 P.2d 457 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Hughes 938 P.2d 457 Ariz. 1997
    See Morris K. Udall et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 84, at 185-86 (3rd ed. 1991) (“[T]he distinction [for 404(b) purposes] is between proving a specific plan embracing the charged crime and proving a general commitment to criminality____”); -33 , -09 (App.1987).
  • State v. Ives 927 P.2d 762 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Ives 927 P.2d 762 Ariz. 1996
    According to this narrower definition, the state must demonstrate that the other act is part of “a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.” , (defining “common scheme or plan” in the context of Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evid.)
  • State v. Kiper 887 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Kiper 887 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Salman 897 P.2d 661 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Salman 897 P.2d 661 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Simms 863 P.2d 257 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Simms 863 P.2d 257 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
    is not within any relevant non-hearsay rule, the court erred in admitting it.”); , , (why undercover investigation undertaken immaterial).
  • State v. Torres 781 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • State v. Torres 781 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
    the defendant was charged with selling marijuana.
  • State v. Weaver 762 P.2d 1361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
  • State v. Weaver 762 P.2d 1361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
    The state claims that all the surveillance evidence was necessary to “complete the story of the crime.” , “[this] phrase does not mean that the prosecution is entitled to complete the defendant’s criminal history.” Nor should a defendant’s criminal history be suggested by evidence that has either no probative value, or has probative value that is substantially outweighed by the danger