Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Boldrey, 861 P.2d 663.

34 citing documents.

  • State v. Termini Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Termini Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    (“Multiple sexual acts that occur during the same sexual attack may be treated as separate crimes.”).
  • State v. Petkovic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Petkovic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    A colorable claim has “the appearance of validity,” one that, if the allegations are true, would have probably changed the outcome, ¶ 11 (2016).
  • State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    A colorable claim has “the appearance of validity,” one that, if the allegations are true, would have probably changed the outcome, ¶ 11 (2016).
  • State v. Campos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Campos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    “To be colorable, the claim must have the appearance of validity, a determination that the trial court is in a better position to make than this court.”
  • State v. Curry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Curry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    A claim is colorable when “if the allegations are true, [they] might have changed the outcome.”
  • State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    It is well established that “[m]ultiple sexual acts that occur during the same sexual attack may be treated as separate crimes.” (citation omitted).
  • State v. Benjamin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Benjamin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    “To be colorable, the claim must have the appearance of validity, a determination that the trial court is in a better position to make than this court.”
  • State v. Swindle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Swindle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    at 85- 86 (noting that it is immaterial that punishable acts occur within a very short time span); -64 (App. 1995) superseded in part by rule (holding that multiple acts of sexual assault occurring in very rapid succession during a single episode can be considered separate offenses which does not prohibit consecutive sentences); -83 (App. 1993) (holding that imposing consecutive sentences for multiple acts of sexual abuse and molestation, including intercourse, occurring on one occasion does not
  • State v. Espino-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Espino-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    3 STATE v. ESPINO-TORRES Decision of the Court of validity, a determination that the trial court is in a better position to make than this [C]ourt.” ().
  • State v. Lomeli Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Lomeli Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Thus, “[m]ultiple sexual acts that occur during the same sexual attack may be treated as separate crimes.”
  • State of Arizona v. Phillip Gregory Speers 361 P.3d 952 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
  • State of Arizona v. Phillip Gregory Speers 361 P.3d 952 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
    A colorable claim is one that has “the appearance of validity,” —“one that, if the allegations are true, might have changed the outcome,”
  • State of Arizona v. Maxamilano Paredes-Solano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Maxamilano Paredes-Solano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    expose[s the child] to a separate harm.” (holding constitutional mandatory consecutive sentences for multiple criminal acts occurring during single “sexual episode” with minor); see also § 13-705(P)(1)(g).
  • State v. Brown 159 P.3d 553 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Brown 159 P.3d 553 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    -83 , -68 (App.1993) (concluding it unnecessary to reach third prong if first two prongs suggest defendant committed separate acts); see also Carreon, 210 Ariz. at 74-75 , ¶ ¶ 105-106, 107 P.3d at 920-21 (refraining from third-prong analysis after initial two prongs revealed defendant committed se
  • State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    see also Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101 , 854 P.2d at 134 (discussing offenses constituting dangerous crimes against children).
  • State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    382 n. 3, , 667 n. 3 (App.1993) ("In the case of a single episode involving several sexual crimes against a child Gordon is difficult, if not impossible, to apply.").
  • State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    -41 , -08 (App.1993); -83 , -68 (App.1993).
  • State v. Arnoldi 860 P.2d 503 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
  • State v. Arnoldi 860 P.2d 503 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
    In applying that test to the facts here, we presume that the charge of sexual conduct with a person under fifteen constitutes the “ultimate crime” contemplated by Gordon because it involved an act of sexual intercourse although, , 382 n. 3, , 667 n. 3 (App.1993), “[i]n the case of a single episode involving several sexual crimes against a child Gordon is difficult, if not impossible, to apply.” Based on that presumption then, we examine the evidence that supports the charge of engaging in sexual