Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Arnoldi, 860 P.2d 503.

39 citing documents.

State v. Difilippantonio Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Difilippantonio Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Wright Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Wright Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Brock Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Brock Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
The statutes “were adopted as a response to the increase in the number of sexual offenses reportedly committed against children and constitute an attempt to punish severely those persons who commit such crimes, particularly recidivist child molesters.” overruled on other grounds, Jones, 235 Ariz. at 503 ¶ 10.
State v. Zeitner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Zeitner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Resolving the conflict in favor of § 13–705(M), the more recent statute, which referred to § 13–116 as “paramount in the statutory scheme of sentencing.” Jones, 235 Ariz. at 503, ¶¶ 10-11.
State v. Nash Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Nash Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(overruled on 5 ¶ 10 (2014)).
State v. Ward Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Ward Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis 340 P.3d 415 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis 340 P.3d 415 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State v. Gonzalez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Gonzalez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
In doing so, P.2d 503 (App. 1993), which had adopted a contrary approach.
State of Arizona v. Shawnte Shuree Jones 334 P.3d 191 Ariz. 2014
State of Arizona v. Shawnte Shuree Jones 334 P.3d 191 Ariz. 2014
¶9 But the court of appeals in this case declined to apply this principle, P.2d 503 (App. 1993).
State v. Jones 306 P.3d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Jones 306 P.3d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
¶ 9 This court has previously resolved the apparent conflict between § 13-116 and § 13-705(M)
State v. McDonagh 304 P.3d 212 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. McDonagh 304 P.3d 212 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
§ 13-116, which states “[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” “Section 13-116 traces its roots to 1901” and “is paramount in the statutory scheme of sentencing.” 242 , 509 (App.1993).
State of Arizona v. Luis Enrique Ortega Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Luis Enrique Ortega Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
the molestation is not a lesser included offense of the sexual conduct with a minor in this case.” (multiple convictions permissible where evidence showed defendant had rubbed victim’s vagina separately from digital penetration).
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
See State v. Arnoldi, 176 Ariz. 236, 239, - 12 - (holding that a trial judge can rely on personal observations in determining competency) ( 107, 585 (1989)).
State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Tsinnijinnie 80 P.3d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Maldonado 78 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Maldonado 78 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(Section 13-116 is "paramount in the statutory scheme of sentencing.").
State v. Sepahi 78 P.3d 732 Ariz. 2003
State v. Sepahi 78 P.3d 732 Ariz. 2003
Neither party has briefed this issue on appeal, and we therefore remand to the court of appeals to consider the State’s argument.4 4 As the court of appeals noted, held that “§ 13- 116 is paramount in the statutory scheme of sentencing,” and prohibits consecutive sentences under § 13-604.01(K) P.2d 1204 (1989).
State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
[3] We do not address the state' s , in which we concluded that "§ 13-116 is paramount in the statutory scheme of sentencing" and that former § 13-604.01(J), now (K), "require[s] a trial court to impose consecutive sentences, but only in the event that those sentences do not violate § 13-116."
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
(recognizing impossibility of penetrating vagina without touching private parts).
State v. Lujan 911 P.2d 562 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
-41 , -08 (App.1993); -83 , -68 (App.1993).