Cited by

We defer to the superior court’s “factual findings and will overturn them only if they are clearly erroneous.” , 406, ¶ 13

¶ 13 (App. 2001) (citing Citibank (Ariz.) v. Bhandhusavee, and Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (N.D.

¶ 37 (App. 2001) (“A trial court retains ‘continuing jurisdiction to enforce its orders for [child] support and [spousal] maintenance, by means of a petition for contempt proceedings to enforce the order,’ regardless of a pending appeal from the underlying order that had imposed the support and maintenance oblig

¶ 19, –70, –13 (App. 1997).

§ 12-120.21(A)(4) (providing court of appeals has “[j]urisdiction to hear and determine petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions, without regard to its appellate jurisdiction.”); ¶ 35, 1 Unless otherwise specified, we cite the current versions of statutes and rules when no material revisions have been enacted since the events in question.

¶ 35, (after finding appellate jurisdiction lacking, court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction).

¶ 32, (holding that reallocation in view of husband’s reduction in retirement benefits, of which wife had been awarded a percentage, was infeasible because it would be difficult or impossible to identify, trace, and locate parties’ community property eight years after their divorce).

See, Palmer v. Palmer, 217 Ariz. 67, ¶ 7, -79 (App. 2007); (when court interprets ambiguous decree of other court, review of interpretation de novo).

¶ 4 , ¶ 35 , (after finding appellate jurisdiction lacking, court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction).

See, Lloyd v. State Farm Mut.

Danielson v. Ev *563 ans, ¶ 13 , Huskie v. Ames Bros. Motor & Supply Co.

406, ¶ 13, , 754 (App.2001); State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 29 (Iowa 2005).

v. Burton, ¶¶ 17-18 , (no appeal from contempt order for failure to make child support payments); ¶¶ 34-35, 37 , (no appellate jurisdiction over contempt order related to failure to make property settlement payments in dissolution action); ¶¶ 26, 30 , (no appeal from contempt finding for failure to make support payments); Pace v

Though not “ ‘absolutely bound’ ” by Gum , we adopt its reasoning and result here because we cannot say the decision rests “ ‘upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render [it] inapplicable.’ ” , quoting Castillo v. Indus.

¶ 25 We review contempt orders for an abuse of the superior court’s discretion, ¶ 40 , and conclude that finding a party in contempt for failing to follow orders to which that party was not subject is an abuse of discretion.

Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., ¶ 24 , (applying de novo standard when reviewing issues of statutory interpretation); ¶ 11 , (applying same standard regarding interpretation *70 of dissolution decree); ¶ 13 , (same).

Lloyd v. State Farm Mut.

See Danielson v. Evans , , ¶ 35, , 759 (App. 2001) (after determining it lacked appellate jurisdiction, appeals court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction); Lloyd v. State Farm Mut.

¶ 36 , our holding does not create an avenue for potential mischief by generally sanctioning reopening of decrees for subsequent changes in financial circumstances.

¶ 40, (superior court’s contempt order reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Moreover, "[a]lthough we are not `absolutely bound' by [ Samano ], we consider it `highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that [it is] based upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render [it] inapplicable.'" , quoting Castillo v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ariz.App.

Although we are not bound by Gross , we may find it persuasive “ ‘unless we are convinced that [it is] based upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render [it] inapplicable.’” , quoting Castillo v. Industrial Comm’n, 21 Ariz.App.