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Generally, “[i]t is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on and enforceable against a litigant who was not a party or a privy, and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.” Specialty Cos. Grp., LLC v. Meritage Homes of Ariz., Inc., ().

235 Ariz. at 538 ¶¶ 1–2 (emphasis added) ( ¶ 37 (App. 2004)).

We uphold the superior court’s factual findings as to the Morris Agreement unless they are “clearly erroneous, but we review any legal conclusions de novo.” ¶ 107 (App. 2004).

(describing law of the case as discretionary, procedural doctrine, rather than substantive limitation).

¶20 Law of the case is when a court “refuse[s] to reopen questions previously decided in the same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” ().

-83, ¶¶ 19, 23 (2017); Assoc’ ¶ 155 (App. 2004).

That conclusion would be contrary to the directive that, in construing text like the ordinance, we “give meaning to all the language used in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders a term either duplicative or meaningless.” ¶ 141 (App. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted).

¶ 141 (App. 2004) (courts must avoid interpretation of statutes that renders a term meaningless).

We are mindful of the general rule that “[i]t is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on and enforceable against a litigant who was not a party or a privy, and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.” ¶ 151 (App. 2004) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979)).

¶ 147 (App. 2004) () (we “disfavor hypertechnical arguments” and “prefer to dispose of cases on their merits”).

¶ 147 (App. 2004) (“Arizona courts disfavor hypertechnical arguments”) (quotation omitted).

(noting disfavor of hypertechnical arguments and preference for disposing of cases on merits); (court of appeals has “independent duty to examine whether we have jurisdiction over matters on appeal”).

eview: Whether a default judgment against insured-defendants that was entered pursuant to a Damron agreement that stipulated facts determinative of both liability and coverage has (1) collateral estoppel effect and precludes litigation of that issue in a subsequent coverage action against the insurer, as held in Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood, [209 Ariz. 137,] or (2) no preclusive or binding effect, as suggested in United Services Automobile Association v. Morris, []

¶ 147, (“Arizona courts disfavor hyper-technical arguments, and instead prefer to dispose of cases on their merits.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).

¶ 37 , (insurer bound by “legal and factual issues that underlie” stipulated judgment entered pursuant to Morris).

¶ 37 , (insurer bound by “legal and factual issues that underlie” stipulated judgment entered pursuant to Morris).

¶13 Our post-statehood case law confirms that every judgment continues to give rise to an “action to enforce it, called an action upon a judgment.” ¶ 150, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

And the term "action on a judgment" refers to a specific common law cause of action, the main purpose of which is "`to obtain a new judgment which will facilitate the ultimate goal of securing the satisfaction of the original cause of action.'" Associated Aviation Underwriters, , quoting Burshan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.

-11 , -29 (App.1990) (abuse of discretion standard); ¶ 107 , (clear error applied as to factual determination of reasonableness of settlement).

(“In construing statutes, ‘courts should give meaning to all the language used in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders a term either duplicative or meaningless.’”), quoting Phoenix Newspapers, (App. 19