Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 181 P.3d 219.

173 citing documents.

State Bar v. Lang 323 P.3d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State Bar v. Lang 323 P.3d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 51
Steinberger v. McVey 318 P.3d 419 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Steinberger v. McVey 318 P.3d 419 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 51 , ("An injunction is an equitable remedy____”) However, most of the allegations in these two counts plead a cause of action to vacate the substitution of trustee, the assignments of the deed of trust, and notice of the trustee's sale.
MM&A PRODUCTIONS, LLC v. YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION 316 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
MM&A PRODUCTIONS, LLC v. YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION 316 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., -34 (App. 2008).
The ESTATE OF JOSEFA U. DeCAMACHO v. LA SOLANA CARE AND REHAB, INC. 316 P.3d 607 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
The ESTATE OF JOSEFA U. DeCAMACHO v. LA SOLANA CARE AND REHAB, INC. 316 P.3d 607 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
“[W]e must construe the statute so as to fulfill legislative intent.” City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
Rash v. Town of Mammoth 315 P.3d 1234 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Rash v. Town of Mammoth 315 P.3d 1234 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
Parker, Springer Jr., Anderson v. Committee for Sustainable Retirement in Support of Initiative 314 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Parker, Springer Jr., Anderson v. Committee for Sustainable Retirement in Support of Initiative 314 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
Bennigno R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 312 P.3d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Bennigno R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 312 P.3d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
App. P., applies to juvenile appeals); City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (appellate court will not address issues or arguments waived by party’s failure to develop them adequately); Watahomigie v. Ariz. Bd.
First Credit Union v. Courtney 309 P.3d 929 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
First Credit Union v. Courtney 309 P.3d 929 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
RSP Architects, Ltd. v. Five Star Development Resort Communities, LLC 306 P.3d 93 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
RSP Architects, Ltd. v. Five Star Development Resort Communities, LLC 306 P.3d 93 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 , (phrase “structural alteration” used in one section of statute means something different than “structural change” as used in another section).
In Re BOND FORFEITURE IN COCHISE COUNTY 307 P.3d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
In Re BOND FORFEITURE IN COCHISE COUNTY 307 P.3d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
14 (2003); accord City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (“We avoid an interpretation that makes ‘any language superfluous or redundant.’”), quoting Thomas & King, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 208 Ariz. 203, ¶ 9
State of Arizona v. Joseph Lawrence Dixon 294 P.3d 157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Joseph Lawrence Dixon 294 P.3d 157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
The best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statute’s language and, if it is plain and unambiguous, we will “look no further.” Id.; see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (when statutory language unambiguous “a court should not look beyond the language but rather ‘simply apply it without using other means of construction, assuming that the legislature has said what it means’”), (20
Walsh v. Walsh 286 P.3d 1095 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Walsh v. Walsh 286 P.3d 1095 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 16
Sierra Tucson Crc Health Group v. Louise Litwack 282 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Sierra Tucson Crc Health Group v. Louise Litwack 282 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
National Bank v. Schwartz 283 P.3d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
National Bank v. Schwartz 283 P.3d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 5 , (statutory construction is a matter of law); Grosvenor Holdings, L.C.
Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson 278 P.3d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Stagecoach Trails MHC, L.L.C. v. City of Benson 278 P.3d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
§§ 9-462.02(0) (municipality may issue citation for structure zoning violation up to two years after discovery), 9-462.05(B) (authorizing municipality to prevent, restrain, correct, or abate zoning violations); cf. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶¶ 67-68 , (government may be estopped from enforcing zoning ordinance “ ‘only when the public interest will not be unduly damaged and when [estoppel] will not substantially and adversely affect the exercise of governmental powers’ ”), qu
Kaz Construction, Inc v. Sierra Cobre Estates, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Kaz Construction, Inc v. Sierra Cobre Estates, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
And, although the term “reputed construction lender” is not defined by statute or case law, that language would serve no purpose if it had no different meaning than “construction lender.” See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (we avoid interpretation that makes statutory language superfluous).
Alliance Trutrus, L.L.C. v. Carlson Real Estate Co. 270 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Alliance Trutrus, L.L.C. v. Carlson Real Estate Co. 270 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 5
Tdb Tucson Group, L.L.C. v. City of Tucson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Tdb Tucson Group, L.L.C. v. City of Tucson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather „simply apply it without using other means of construction, assuming that the legislature has said what it means.‟” City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
Tumacacori Mission Land Development, Ltd. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Tumacacori Mission Land Development, Ltd. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 10; see City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (appellate court will avoid interpretation rendering “„any language superfluous or redundant‟”), quoting Thomas & King
City of North Oaks v. Sarpal 797 N.W.2d 18 Minn. 2011
Freeman v. Sorchych 245 P.3d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Freeman v. Sorchych 245 P.3d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 16
Cristall v. Cristall 242 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Cristall v. Cristall 242 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 5
Little v. State 240 P.3d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Little v. State 240 P.3d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., , (appellate court will not address issues or arguments waived by party’s failure to develop them in briefs).
In Re Search Warrant No. 08 Sw 1417 233 P.3d 618 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
In Re Search Warrant No. 08 Sw 1417 233 P.3d 618 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
Estate of DeSela v. Prescott Unified School District No. 1 228 P.3d 938 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010