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He argued Rule 36(b) required a showing of actual prejudice to justify barring Nunez from withdrawing his deemed admissions.

Owners Ass’n v. Jenkins, –78, ¶ 6 (App. 2019); ¶ 9 (App. 2013).

¶ 9 (App. 2013); ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (noting that the child’s best interests trump the discretionary doctrine of waiver).

¶31 Nonetheless, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we decline to hold that the deficiencies in Stefanie’s opening brief effect a waiver of her right to appellate review of her claims.

¶ 9 (App. 2013); ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (the best interests of a child trumps the discretionary doctrine of waiver).

is obsolete.” Even less comprehensible is Danam’s assertion that “Walt Disney, Dr. Seuss aka Theodor Seuss Geisel, Charles Schulz, Mr. Rogers aka Fred McFeely Rogers, and Stan Lee provide direct inferences for precise application of abuse of power, discrimination and bigotry.” ¶14 Nevertheless, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we will address the substance of the cognizable arguments presented and preserved for review to the extent they are developed a

¶10 Nonetheless, because Ameika never moved to strike Danko’s opening brief under ARCAP 25 and, more important, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we decline to hold that Danko has waived appellate review of all of the arguments raised in his brief.

5 DANKO v. JACKSON Decision of the Court ¶18 Nonetheless, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we will, in the exercise of our discretion, address the substance of the arguments presented to the extent they are developed sufficiently for us to do so, ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficien

¶17 Nevertheless, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we will, in the exercise of our discretion, address the substance of Christine’s arguments to the extent they are developed sufficiently for us to do so.

¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2013) (discussing “the prejudice prong” of Rule 36(c)).

“Arizona courts recognize that an overriding purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to dispose of cases on the merits where errors in procedure can be characterized as harmless and non-prejudicial.” ¶ 10, ¶ 16

P.3d 39 (App. 2013), they argue that “[w]hen upholding admissions ‘would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case,’ it is an abuse of discretion to not allow a party to file late answers.” In response, Estrada points out that “at no time, prior to the entry of Judgment” did the Figaris see