Cited by

Finally, “[a]n amendment nonetheless is permitted absent a showing of ‘prejudice, i.e., surprise.’” ¶ 51 (App. 2013) (discussing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)) (quoting McCauley, 101 Ariz. at 18).

¶48 Although Smith did not formally amend its pleadings to assert a constructive trust claim against Gamma, Rule 15(b)(2) provides that “[w]hen an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings.” ¶ 51 (App. 2013) (affirming Rule 15(b) automatically amends pleadings to conform to the evidence and to raise additional issues when such issues are tried by the parties’ express or impli

highly probable or reasonably certain.’” (alteration in Parker) ().

); ¶ 24 n.9 (App. 2013).

This Court has held that “petitions containing false certifications by circulators are void, and the signatures on such petitions may not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the number of signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.” Id.; ¶ 47 (App. 2013).

¶9 “Evidence is clear and convincing if it makes ‘the thing to be proved highly probable or reasonably certain.’” ¶ 39 (App. 2013) (-85, ¶ 25 (2005)).

And if you haven’t met your burden, then the burden doesn’t shift and there’s nothing that the defendants need to do.” ¶48 In contesting this ruling, Plaintiffs argue that the burden shifted to the Committee because it “had superior access to the information that formed the basis for Plaintiffs’ objections.” ¶ 24 n.9 (App. 2013) (“[T]here is support for the notion that a party with superior knowledge about and access to evidence regarding certain facts should bear the burden of producing that ev

§ 8-538(A), and render Rule 66(F)(2)(a) meaningless, see Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 20 (2018) (“We will not interpret statutes or rules in a manner that renders portions of their text superfluous.”) ( ¶ 11 (2003)); ¶ 20 (App. 2013) (“We will not rewrite statutes to effectuate a meaning different than the one the legislature intended.”).

P. 15(b)(1); ¶ 51 (App. 2013).

P. 15(b); Bujanda v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., -16, -86 (App. 1980) (stating that amendment of pleading to conform to the evidence permitted unless amendment would cause prejudice); ¶¶ 51-52, (finding no prejudice when amendment did nothing to change the theory of the case and the issue had been raised and addressed by the parties).

But it is not for the courts to “rewrite statutes to effectuate a meaning different than the one the legislature intended.”

We also “review de novo the legal question of whether the court applied the proper burden of proof.”

They also challenge the application of a strict compliance standard to referenda, suggesting the statute is vague on its face or as applied here.3 ¶7 “We review a trial court’s decision on a request for injunctive or mandamus relief under § 19-122 for an abuse of discretion.”

¶7 “Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.”

See Parker v. City of Tucson, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 12, (primary purpose in interpreting statute to give effect to legislature’s intent).