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controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable except on a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.” (emphasis added)); ¶ 12 (App. 2015) (“Generally, legal or equitable grounds for revoking any contract include allegations that the contract is void for lack of mutual consent, consideration or capacity or voidable for fraud, duress, lack of capacity, mistake, or violation of a public purpose.” (citation modified, emph

¶ 12 (App. 2015); A.R.S.

¶22 “Under direct benefits estoppel, a nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate only when the nonsignatory (1) knowingly exploits the benefits of an agreement containing an arbitration clause, or (2) seeks to enforce terms of that agreement or asserts claims that must be determined by reference to the agreement.”

-11, ¶ 34 (App. 2015) (when appeal involved superior court’s ruling denying motion to compel arbitration no decision on the merits had been made so parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S.

Under this concept, “a nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate only when the nonsignatory (1) knowingly exploits the benefits of an agreement containing an arbitration clause, or (2) seeks to enforce terms of that agreement or asserts claims that must be determined by reference to the agreement.” ¶ 29 (App. 2015).

§§ 25-318 and -319, Husband concedes the post-nuptial agreement is governed “by case law, such as” [In re] Harber’s Estate, []

“Generally, legal or equitable grounds for revoking any contract include allegations that the contract is void for lack of mutual consent, consideration or capacity or voidable for fraud, duress, lack of capacity, mistake or violation of a public purpose.” ¶ 12 (App. 2015) (cleaned up).

v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2003)); –09 ¶ 23 (App. 2015).

¶ 20 (“[T]his court is bound by the decisions of our supreme court and must apply the law it has declared.”).

§§ 25-318 and - 319, Husband concedes the post-nuptial agreement is governed “by case law, such as” Harber’s Estate, 2 Those cases require the court to determine that the post-nuptial agreement was both fair and equitable.

¶ 20 (App. 2015), in which we applied that rule when a wife challenged a joint operating agreement of a limited liability company the couple formed to hold and manage her property.

¶13 We agree with Husband, however, that the superior court improperly considered the transfer under the analysis applicable to postnuptial agreements discussed in ¶ 20 (App. 2015).

Although we normally “will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief,” ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2015) (citation omitted), we exercise our discretion to resolve the issue on its merits.

In contrast, “[a] postnuptial agreement is defined as ‘[a]n agreement entered into during marriage to define each spouse’s property rights in the event of death or divorce.’” –07, ¶ 14 (App. 2015) (second alteration in original) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1356 (10th ed. 2014)).

Although we are sympathetic to the dissent’s reservations regarding the origins of this extreme deference, we are “bound by the decisions of our supreme court and must apply the law it has declared.” ¶ 21 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 8 (App. 1999)).

Although the relationship between spouses is confidential and fiduciary, n.4, ¶ 13 (App. 2015), Arizona applies the standard of unconscionability used in commercial and contract law, Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 580, ¶ 9; see also UPAA § 6, cmt (applying the same standard of unconscionability used in commercial law).

¶ 2 ( 246- 47, ¶¶ 8, 16 (App. 2005)).

at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract,’” quoting A.R.S.