Cited by

See, ¶¶ 19- 20 (App. 2016) (treating fee requests under § 25-324(A) and (B) as separate issues).

See ARFLP 48(d); ¶ 11 (App. 2016) (due process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard).

¶16 ¶ 16 (App. 2016), to argue he had no opportunity “to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner” before the court modified legal decision-making authority and parenting time.

See, e.g. , Cruz v. Garcia , , 235, ¶ 1, , 1030 (App. 2016) ("Because we agree Cruz was denied due process [when the court made its ruling on legal decision-making and parenting time], we vacate the order and remand the case for such a hearing.").

This court has previously held “[d]ue process requires that when there are disputed issues of fact as to a child’s best interests, ‘the court must allow 10 JAMES S. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court the parties to present evidence before it makes its finding.’” 6 ¶ 16 (App. 2016) ( ¶ 18 (App. 2016)); -20, ¶¶ 11-15 (App. 1999) (holding a mother’s procedural due process rights were violated when the juvenile court held a restitution hearing and ordered her to pay restitution on her son’s behal

A party must at least have “a chance to offer evidence and confront adverse witnesses.” ¶ 11 (App. 2016).

"The court's authority to impose 'restrict[ions]' on parenting time sua sponte under § 25-411(J) is limited to placing conditions on the exercise of parenting time, such as supervision or geographical restrictions," Cruz v. Garcia , , 238, ¶ 18, , 1033 (App. 2016), and the standard should be no different when restrictions are requested by a parent or recommended by a custody evaluator.