In Re the Marriage of Wichansky

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF

MARC AARON WICHANSKY,
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

and

ALEXIS HALEY WICHANSKY,
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0192-FC
Filed October 29, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2015009035
The Honorable Kevin Wein, Judge
The Honorable James Drake, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix
By Diane M. Johnsen and Victoria L. Romine

and

Rai Duer PC, Phoenix
By Peter B. Swann
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Tempe
By Keith Berkshire and Alexandra Sandlin

and
 IN RE MARRIAGE OF WICHANSKY
Opinion of the Court

Jared Family Law PLLC, Scottsdale
By Colin N. Jared
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge Eppich authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Sklar and Judge O’Neil concurred.

E P P I C H, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Marc Wichansky appeals from the trial court’s order granting
his former wife Alexis Wichansky’s motion to divide undivided assets, as
well as its denial of his motion to compel attorney communications and
several post-judgment motions. Alexis cross-appeals from the court’s order
denying her motion to amend. Marc argues the court erroneously
concluded he had not disclosed his interest in a business, Team Select, to
Alexis, failed to enforce the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) as
written, and wrongly awarded over $3.68 million in attorney fees. On
cross-appeal, Alexis asserts the court erred by not awarding her a higher
amount of attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Marc and Alexis married in 2002. Marc petitioned for
dissolution of marriage in November 2015. During dissolution proceedings,
Marc and Alexis came to a settlement and filed a PSA with the trial court in
September 2017. The language of the PSA, in relevant part, is as follows:

2. Disposition of Property. . . . This
agreement intends and does eliminate any and
all claims made by wife to husband’s
business(s) interest, whether past, present or
future.

....

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9. Release of Claims. Subject to the
provisions of this Agreement and the custody
agreement each Party hereto:

(a) Releases the other Party from all
further claims, rights, liabilities or obligations,
arising out of or associated with their marriage,
the Dissolution Action, or the division of their
property or obligations. Specifically, wife
waives any claims to any interest husband may
have or has in any business, except as outlined
below regarding the judgment for the MGA
funds. Husband waives any claims for monies
given to wife since the filing and
reimbursement of any fees paid to wife’s
counsel or charged to any community credit
card now known to husband and paid by
husband currently.

For Wife’s waiver of these claims, wife
shall receive a portion of the net funds collected
due to husband’s judgment for his separate
business interest known as the MGA judgment
which business was sold during the marriage of
the parties. . . .

(b) Both parties further release any
and all rights, interests, or claims that he or she
may now or hereafter have in any earnings or
property . . . now owned or hereafter acquired
by or on behalf of the other Party.

....

15. Full Disclosure. The parties hereby
warrant and represent to one another that each
has made a full, fair, and complete disclosure of
all assets and liabilities known to them. This
agreement divides all community, common or
joint property or property to which either party
claims an interest, either directly or indirectly.

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Each party does hereby intend that this
Agreement shall be and is a full and complete
resolution of all issues between the parties. Each
party hereby waives the right to any further
disclosure and acknowledges that the right to
seek further disclosure or discovery of any
assets and/or liabilities is forever waived by
this provision. Each party has made an
undisputed decision to resolve all issues
relating to their marriage, based upon the
disclosure made available to each party and the
other parties warranting of good faith and fair
dealing in the disclosure of all property and
debts.

¶3 The trial court entered the consent decree of dissolution that
same month, incorporating the PSA by reference. In October 2018, Alexis
filed a motion to set aside the initial decree of dissolution and then amended
her motion to divide undivided assets. Afterward, the court permitted the
issue to go forward and allowed Alexis to conduct discovery. Marc moved
to vacate this order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and also filed a
motion to set aside the consent decree. The court denied both motions.
After continued litigation, the court granted Alexis’s motion to divide
undivided assets in August 2021. Marc filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the court denied. The court then ordered Marc to pay Alexis a
judgment of $23,199,378.59 as well as $3,684,510.81 in attorney fees. Both
parties filed motions to amend, which the court denied. Marc appealed,
and Alexis cross-appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

Discussion

I. Team Select Disclosure

¶4 On appeal, Marc argues the trial court erroneously concluded
he had not disclosed his interest in Team Select to Alexis. “We review a
trial court’s findings of fact for abuse of discretion and reverse only when
clearly erroneous.” In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, ¶ 6 (App. 2011).
“Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports
them.” In re $26,980 U.S. Currency, 199 Ariz. 291, ¶ 9 (App. 2000). Evidence
is substantial if it permits a reasonable person to reach the court’s result. Id.

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¶5 Marc sent Alexis an email in September 2015, two months
before filing his petition for dissolution. In this email, he acknowledged
that Team Select was valuable and that they may need to hire a valuation
expert in preparation for separating their community property. However,
despite Alexis’s continued questions throughout the dissolution
proceedings as to his interest in Team Select, Marc and his attorneys
expressly and repeatedly denied that he held any interest in it.1 Alexis
signed the PSA, which did not specifically mention Team Select, and the
PSA was incorporated into the decree of dissolution on September 15, 2017.
Marc received $10 million from the sale of Team Select a little over two
weeks later, with future payments to follow. Still, Marc continued to assert
he did not have any interest in Team Select.

¶6 Alexis filed a motion to divide undivided assets, and at trial
she testified that Marc had not informed her of his ownership interest in
Team Select. She presented numerous statements from Marc and his
attorneys to support her testimony.

¶7 On appeal, Marc claims that his interest in Team Select was
only an “ambiguous handshake agreement, and a hope,” of which Alexis
was aware. He also argues the 2015 email sufficiently disclosed his interest
in Team Select, despite his numerous subsequent denials to her and to the
trial court of any interest in the asset.

¶8 Marc’s arguments on appeal lack merit. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by finding the 2015 email was insufficient disclosure
because Marc repeatedly denied any ownership in Team Select instead of
providing Alexis with information that would assist her in evaluating his
interest in the company. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 49(g)(6). His next
assertion, that Alexis was informed of his “handshake agreement, and a
hope,” is contradicted by the record. We do not reweigh the credibility of
witnesses on appeal, see In re Ghostley, 248 Ariz. 112, ¶ 21 (App. 2020), and
the court found credible Alexis’s testimony, supported by ample evidence,
that Marc had denied having any interest in Team Select. A reasonable
person could thus conclude Marc did not disclose his interest in Team

1Some examples include, “At no time has [Marc] ever had an interest

in the company,” “Marc does not own [Team Select] now or ever,” “As far
as [T]eam [S]elect, [Marc] has never owned, nor does he now, have any
ownership interest in the business . . . He is not an owner, he has no stock
. . . He has nothing,” “He received no interest in the business,” “[H]e
doesn’t have ownership in it,” and, “He does not own anything.”

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Select. See $26,980 U.S. Currency, 199 Ariz. 291, ¶ 9. Therefore, the court’s
finding was not clearly erroneous. See Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, ¶ 6.

II. Motion to Compel

¶9 Marc next contends the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to compel discovery because Alexis impliedly waived her
attorney-client privilege by stating that her understanding of what was
included in the PSA was based on communications with her attorney. We
review whether a party has impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege
de novo, as this poses a mixed question of law and fact. Empire W. Title
Agency, L.L.C. v. Talamante, 234 Ariz. 497, ¶ 8 (2014).

¶10 Before trial, Marc deposed Alexis and she testified that she
understood any asset not included in the PSA to be an “omitted asset”
under A.R.S. § 25-318(D). When asked where her understanding of § 25-
318(D) came from, she replied, “My lawyer at the time.” Marc moved to
compel discovery of these communications between Alexis and her
attorney, arguing that Alexis had “made this case about her understanding
and intent regarding the PSA.” The trial court denied his request,
concluding Alexis’s motion to divide undivided assets did not depend on
the substance of the privileged communications.

¶11 In order for there to be an implied waiver of attorney-client
privilege, there must be an assertion of the privilege; the asserting party
must put the protected information at issue; and application of the privilege
must deny the opposing party access to information vital to his or her
defense. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 199 Ariz. 52, ¶ 10 (2000)
(quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975)). When a party
uses the privilege as both a “sword and a shield,” the privilege has been
waived. Id. ¶ 18. However, “neither the ‘relevance nor pragmatic
importance alone [of the information sought] will support a finding that the
attorney-client privilege has been waived.’” Empire W. Title Agency,
234 Ariz. 497, ¶ 10 (alteration in Empire W. Title Agency) (quoting Twin City
Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, ¶ 22 (2003)). The party asserting the
privilege must have affirmatively put his or her mental state or subjective
knowledge at issue. Id. ¶ 14.

¶12 An important preliminary question is to determine Alexis’s
position in asserting her case. In her motion to divide undivided assets,
Alexis asked the trial court to grant relief on the ground that Team Select
was an omitted asset that Marc had failed to disclose during dissolution
proceedings. In concluding that “the parties did not intend for the PSA to

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apply to [Marc]’s ownership interest in Team Select,” the court found that
he had repeatedly failed to disclose that asset in violation of the PSA’s
good-faith disclosure requirement. Based on that finding, the court
determined that Marc could not benefit from the release provision
contained in section fifteen of the PSA, and thus Team Select was an omitted
asset under that contract. None of this reasoning suggests that Alexis’s
subjective interpretation of the contract was at issue. Instead, Marc’s failure
to disclose his interest in Team Select caused the court to find it to be an
omitted asset that he and Alexis equally owned as tenants in common
under § 25-318(D).

¶13 The lone case Marc cites to support his position, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee, is distinguishable. In that case, the
party claiming attorney-client privilege was defending against a bad-faith
claim and asserted that its communications with its attorneys was proof of
i subjective good faith. Lee, 199 Ariz. 52, ¶ 15. Here, Alexis’s claim did not
rely on her subjective interpretation of the contract or her reliance on her
attorney’s advice when signing the PSA. Instead, her claim relied on Marc’s
repeated misrepresentations to her that he did not have any ownership
interest in Team Select. Therefore, because Alexis did not put the privileged
information at issue, she did not waive her attorney-client privilege. See
Empire W. Title Agency, 234 Ariz. 497, ¶¶ 8, 14.

¶14 Even if we were to conclude Alexis had put her subjective
interpretation of the contract at issue, Marc fails to show how application
of the privilege denied him access to information vital to his defense. See
Lee, 199 Ariz. 52, ¶¶ 10, 23. Marc questioned Alexis concerning her
understanding of the PSA at her deposition and at trial. Alexis’s
discussions with her attorneys about her understanding of the PSA is not
vital to his claim that he had disclosed his interest in the asset. See Twin City
Fire Ins. Co., 204 Ariz. 251, ¶ 22.

III. Extrinsic Evidence

¶15 Marc next asserts that because the PSA was unambiguous, the
trial court erred by allowing extrinsic evidence at trial to help interpret it.
We review de novo whether contract language is ambiguous so that
extrinsic evidence is permitted. See In re Estate of Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246,
¶ 21 (App. 2005). But we review the court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. See Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, ¶ 6 (App. 2000); see also
Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 155 (1993) (trial court
has discretion to decide when to admit extrinsic evidence because it is “in
the best position to decide how to proceed”).

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¶16 Before trial, Marc filed a motion to set aside the consent
decree. He argued that the PSA was “clear and unambiguous” as to
Alexis’s waiver of her interest in Team Select. The trial court denied the
motion and found the language of the release to be ambiguous. Marc later
filed a motion for summary judgment, where he again claimed the PSA was
unambiguous. The court denied this motion, and “continue[d] to find the
PSA ambiguous.” At trial, the court considered extrinsic evidence in the
form of Alexis’s testimony that she did not believe Team Select was covered
by the PSA because Marc had denied owning it.

¶17 Arizona law adopts a permissive approach to the parol
evidence rule. Long v. City of Glendale, 208 Ariz. 319, ¶ 27 (App. 2004).
Before the trial court can admit extrinsic evidence when interpreting a
contract, it must first consider the offered evidence, and if the contract is
“reasonably susceptible” to the proponent’s interpretation, the evidence is
admissible. Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, ¶ 22 (quoting Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 154).
If the asserted interpretation is unreasonable, or the offered evidence is not
persuasive, the court need not admit the extrinsic evidence. Taylor,
175 Ariz. at 155.

¶18 Here, the trial court correctly concluded Alexis’s
interpretation of the PSA was reasonable. While section two of the PSA
broadly waives “any and all” of Alexis’s claims to Marc’s business interests,
and section nine contains a similar release provision, these waivers are not
unqualified. The entire agreement is subject to section fifteen’s full-
disclosure requirement, with which the court concluded Marc did not
comply. As explained above, we defer to the trial court’s finding of fact if
it is not clearly erroneous. Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, ¶ 6. As such,
Alexis’s interpretation of the PSA was reasonable, and the court did not err
by considering extrinsic evidence in its interpretation of the contract.
See Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 155.

IV. Team Select Waiver

¶19 Marc next argues Alexis waived any interest she may have
had in Team Select by signing the PSA, and because the PSA provided for
Team Select, the trial court erred by granting her motion to divide an
undivided interest under § 25-318(D). We review the trial court’s
interpretation of contracts such as the PSA de novo. See Rinegar v. Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, ¶ 14 (App. 2012); In re Marriage of McCulloch & Parker, 257 Ariz.
195, ¶ 34 (App. 2024).

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¶20 Before trial, Marc filed a motion to set aside the consent
decree, claiming, as he does on appeal, that Alexis waived any interest she
may have had in Team Select by signing the PSA. The trial court denied
this motion, finding Team Select was not identified in the PSA, and
therefore it was not clear if Alexis had waived her interest in that particular
asset. Marc later filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he again
claimed the PSA included a waiver of her interest in Team Select. The court,
following its prior reasoning, denied this motion, finding neither the PSA,
divorce decree, nor settlement negotiations made any mention of Team
Select and therefore the PSA did not clearly contain a release of interest in
Team Select.

¶21 Marc asserts sections two and nine of the PSA include
catch-all provisions where Alexis waived her interest in any business he
may have had an interest in at the time of signing, including Team Select.
Therefore, Marc contends, Team Select was provided for by the PSA and
cannot be an omitted asset divisible by § 25-318(D). Alexis argues Team
Select is not included in the catch-all provision because Marc did not
comply with the full-disclosure provision of the agreement in section
fifteen, and thus is not provided for by the PSA.

¶22 A PSA incorporated into the decree of dissolution is an
independent contract and is governed by the principles of contract law.
MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, ¶ 15 (App. 2011). “[A] court will
attempt to enforce a contract according to the parties’ intent.” Taylor,
175 Ariz. at 152. Under § 25-318(D), any community property that is not
provided for in the decree is held by the parties as tenants in common. This
statute does not apply when all of the parties’ assets are explicitly disposed.
Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2. Additionally, § 25-318(F) requires the decree
to specifically describe any property affected.

¶23 Here, Alexis’s contention that Team Select was not included
in the PSA, despite the catch-all waiver provision, was correct considering
Marc’s repeated claims he had no interest in the asset. The PSA includes a
provision requiring full disclosure of all assets by both parties. Alexis’s
testimonial extrinsic evidence demonstrated that Marc did not comply with
this provision. The trial court found her testimony that the PSA was not
intended to cover Team Select to be “credible and supported by the
evidence.” We defer to the court’s findings of credibility, Ghostley, 248 Ariz.
112, ¶ 21, and similarly conclude the PSA did not provide for Team Select,
cf. Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, ¶¶ 25-26 (an unqualified catch-all provision

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applies to any and all property not otherwise identified in the agreement
and the property is not divisible under § 25-318(D)).

V. Attorney Fees

¶24 Marc argues that the trial court erred in its award of attorney
fees. We will not disturb a court’s award of attorney fees absent an abuse
of discretion. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 29 (App. 2019).

¶25 Alexis hired her current attorneys in April 2019 and July 2021.
She entered into a contingency fee agreement to pay them collectively 33.3
percent of all gross amounts recovered. Her attorneys completed
approximately four thousand hours of work spanning over five years
during the course of litigation. The trial court awarded her fees for the
litigation related to two separate assets, MGA Employee Services, Inc.
(“MGA”), and Team Select.

¶26 The PSA included a provision concerning litigation Marc was
involved in with his former company, MGA. Under the PSA, if Marc
received a judgment net payment of $8 million or more, Alexis would
receive $2.5 million. Marc admitted to receiving a disbursement above the
agreed-upon $8 million, but failed to provide Alexis with any accounting
of the proceeds or to pay her any amount. Alexis’s attorneys petitioned the
trial court to enforce the decree. Later, Alexis filed a motion for summary
judgment on her petition to enforce the decree. The court granted Alexis’s
petition and awarded her attorney fees.

¶27 During the Team Select litigation, the trial court held two
trials. In the first, the court considered whether to grant Alexis’s motion to
divide Team Select as an undivided asset. Her motion was granted, and as
the prevailing party, the court awarded her attorney fees “associated with
the MGA litigation only.” It determined Marc had significantly greater
financial resources than Alexis, he had acted unreasonably during
proceedings, and the continency fee agreement was appropriate.

¶28 Alexis filed an application and affidavit in support of the
award of attorney fees for the MGA litigation, requesting the contingency
fee amount owed, $832,500, although her attorneys calculated the actual
fees incurred to only be around $35,000. Marc filed a response, contending
the amount requested was unreasonable. Ultimately, the trial court
deferred ruling until the Team Select litigation was complete. In its August

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2021 ruling, the court conducted an eight-factor Fallers2 test to evaluate the
reasonableness of the contingency fee for the MGA litigation and
determined that “while a contingency fee arrangement is appropriate here,
a full 1/3 fee is not called for.” Instead, it awarded $500,000 for fees in
association with the MGA litigation.

¶29 In regard to the Team Select litigation, the trial court found
the amount of attorney fees could not be calculated until Team Select’s
value was determined. After trial, the court valued Alexis’s share in Team
Select to be worth approximately $23.2 million, including pre-judgment
interest. The court also found the lodestar calculation to be “fair and
equitable” and applied a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 to the ultimate fee
calculation, resulting in a fee award of approximately $3.68 million. It
awarded fees for both awards under A.R.S. §§ 25-324 and 12-341.01.

¶30 On appeal, Marc argues the trial court erred by only
considering the contingency agreement and not the lodestar calculation for
the MGA litigation, the Team Select fee award was unreasonably high, the
contingent-fee rationale does not apply where there is a fee-shifting statute,
and the court committed mathematical errors in its fee awards. Alexis
contends the court correctly awarded $500,000 for the MGA litigation, the
Team Select fee award was reasonable, the court can award contingency
fees even if there is a fee-shifting statute, and the court “appropriately
considered the full amount of attorney’s fees and costs” and “did not create
an error.” She further argues the court erred by not awarding her more in
attorney fees.

A. MGA & Team Select Litigation Fee Award

¶31 In deciding whether to award fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A),
the trial court must consider the financial resources of both parties and the
reasonableness of each party’s positions during litigation. The fee award
may cover “the costs and expenses of maintaining or defending any
proceeding. . . .” Id. Costs and expenses “may include attorney fees,
deposition costs and other reasonable expenses as the court finds
necessary.” § 25-324(C). Under § 25-324, a court is permitted to award fees

2In re Conservatorship of Fallers, 181 Ariz. 227, 229-30 & n.2 (App. 1994)

(citing In re Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 271 (1984) and Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER
1.5(a)).

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based on differences in financial resources alone. See Goodell v. Goodell, 257 Ariz. 563, ¶ 41 (App. 2024).

¶32 It is undisputed that Marc has greater financial resources than
Alexis. In its award of attorney fees for the MGA litigation, the trial court
awarded Alexis her attorney fees based on this disparity. The court did not
abuse its discretion in so doing. See id.

¶33 As for the Team Select litigation, the trial court again noted
Marc’s greater financial resources and further found that Marc took
“unreasonable positions” that “caused extensive delays and protracted
litigation.” The ultimate attorney fees awarded for both the MGA litigation
and the Team Select litigation did not exceed the costs Alexis incurred by
hiring counsel and agreeing to a one-third contingency fee. The language
of § 25-324 does not expressly prohibit a contingency fee from being
considered as part of the cost of litigation. Therefore, the court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 29.

¶34 Moreover, the trial court also relied on A.R.S. § 12-341.01 in
its attorney fees award. To the extent this case could be construed as a
contract action, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in awarding
fees under § 12-341.01. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 29.

¶35 We have previously concluded that a separate agreement
incorporated into a dissolution decree maintains its status as an enforceable
contract. See Chopin v. Chopin, 224 Ariz. 425, ¶ 6 (App. 2010). If there is a
causal link between a party’s claim and an underlying contract, it is
appropriate for the trial court to award fees under § 12-341.01(A). Marcus
v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 333, 335-36 (1986). Under § 12-341.01(A), the court may
award reasonable attorney fees to the successful party. The award does not
need to equal, but cannot be more than, the “amount paid or agreed to be
paid.” § 12-341.01(B). The court has broad discretion to determine what
fees are reasonable. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty. v. Paloma Inv. Ltd.
P’ship, 230 Ariz. 29, ¶ 85 (App. 2012). A court begins its determination by
reviewing “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co.,
221 Ariz. 325, ¶ 42 (App. 2009) (quoting Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz.
350, 357 (App. 1991)). This figure is known as the “lodestar,” and it is
presumptively reasonable. See id. We have affirmed an attorney fees award
in excess of the lodestar. Lindsey v. Univ. of Ariz., 157 Ariz. 48, 54-55 (App.
1987).

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¶36 While Marc is correct that the trial court is not required to
award fees based on what is in the contingency agreement, see Sunland
Dairy LLC v. Milky Way Dairy LLC, 251 Ariz. 64, ¶ 30 (App. 2021), under
§ 12-341.01(B) the court is permitted to award up to the amount contracted,
see Cont’l Townhouses E. Unit One Ass’n v. Brockbank, 152 Ariz. 537, 545-46
(App. 1986). Here, the multiplier used by the court resulted in an attorney
fees award that was less than the amount agreed to under the contingency
agreement. Therefore, the court’s award of attorney fees to Alexis was
reasonable. See Flood Control Dist., 230 Ariz. 29, ¶ 85.

B. Mathematical Errors

¶37 Marc also contends the trial court committed two
mathematical errors in its attorney fees calculation. We review the court’s
award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Bogard, 221 Ariz. 325, ¶ 39.
If the court’s reasoning is “untenable, legally incorrect, or amount[s] to a
denial of justice,” the court has abused its discretion. Id. (quoting Charles I.
Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, ¶ 17 (App. 2006)).

¶38 On page eight of the judgment awarding Alexis her Team
Select attorney fees, the trial court calculated her costs to be $125,371.84 and
her fees to be $1,298,283.75; totaling $1,423,655.59. However, on page
eleven of the judgment, the court listed Alexis’s fees as $1,423,655.59 and
again added $125,371.84—double counting her costs. The court also
determined a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 was appropriate, but instead of
multiplying the correct lodestar of $1,298,283.75, it used the incorrect
amount of $1,423,655.59. Marc filed a motion to amend the judgment,
arguing these calculation errors should be corrected. However, the court
declined to recalculate its award. Marc makes the same argument on
appeal.

¶39 Although we would otherwise be inclined to remand for the
trial court to address this argument in the first instance, the court has
already done so when it rejected Marc’s motion to amend the judgment.
We need not remand only for the court to repeat the same exercise of
discretion. Although the court did not explain why it decided against
changing the award in light of the prior calculation errors, implicit in the
court’s denial is the conclusion that the total amount awarded was
appropriate even after those errors had been brought to the court’s
attention. Because the amount was reasonable and within the trial court’s
discretion, we affirm. See Bogard, 221 Ariz. 325, ¶ 39.

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C. Cross-Appeal

¶40 On cross-appeal, Alexis argues the trial court should have
awarded her more in attorney fees. Our standard of review remains one of
an abuse of discretion. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 29; Flood Control Dist.,
230 Ariz. 29, ¶ 84. For the same reason Alexis prevails above, she does not
prevail here.

¶41 As we discuss above, the trial court has broad discretion to
determine what fees are reasonable under both § 25-324, see Armer v. Armer, 105 Ariz. 284, 289 (1970), and § 12-341.01, see Flood Control Dist., 230 Ariz.
29, ¶ 85. Alexis fails to demonstrate how the court abused that discretion
in its fee award. Although the court is permitted to award attorney fees up
to the contingency agreement, so long as they are reasonable, it is not
required to do so. See Sunland Dairy LLC, 251 Ariz. 64, ¶¶ 30-32. Therefore,
we cannot say the court abused its discretion by not awarding Alexis a
higher amount of attorney fees. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 29; Flood Control
Dist., 230 Ariz. 29, ¶ 84.

D. Attorney Fees on Appeal

¶42 Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal
under §§ 12-341.01 and 25-324. We conclude Marc has taken an
unreasonable position by maintaining his claim on appeal that the PSA
precluded Alexis’s claim of a share in the interests in Team Select, despite
the trial court’s credibility finding—to which we defer—as to his repeated
denials of any interest despite the PSA’s clear disclosure obligation. See
Ghostley, 248 Ariz. 112, ¶ 21. We therefore award Alexis her appellate
attorney fees pursuant to § 25-324. As Alexis has substantially prevailed on
appeal, she may recover her appellate costs upon compliance with Rule 21,
Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

Disposition

¶43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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