Transparent Payson v. Town of Payson

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

TRANSPARENT PAYSON, A POLITICAL COMMITTEE REGISTERED PURSUANT TO
ARIZONA REVISED STATUES SECTION 16-905; AND JEFFREY AAL, INDIVIDUALLY
AS A CITIZEN OF THE TOWN OF PAYSON AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF
TRANSPARENT PAYSON,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

TOWN OF PAYSON, ARIZONA, A PUBLIC ENTITY; AND TRACIE BAILEY, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PAYSON TOWN CLERK,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0195
Filed June 26, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County
No. S0400CV202300118
The Honorable Michael Latham, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Timothy A. La Sota PLC, Phoenix
By Timothy A. La Sota
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Brueckner Spitler Shelts PLC, Scottsdale
By Larry J. Crown and Elan S. Mizrahi
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Nancy L. Davidson, Phoenix
Counsel for Amicus Curiae League of Arizona Cities & Towns

TRANSPARENT PAYSON v. TOWN OF PAYSON
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Kelly authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Judge Staring and Vice Chief Judge Eppich concurred.

K E L L Y, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Transparent Payson and Jeffrey Aal (collectively,
“Appellants”) challenge the trial court’s grant of declaratory judgment in
favor of Tracie Bailey and the Town of Payson (collectively, “the Town”).
As part of that judgment, the court declared two propositions—which
required certain local matters to be voted on by the general electorate—
unenforceable. It also determined the Payson Town Council had properly
repealed them. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the court erred
in concluding the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”) was inapplicable to the
Payson Town Council. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

¶2 We view the facts on appeal from a bench trial in the light
most favorable to upholding the judgment. Town of Florence v. Florence
Copper Inc., 251 Ariz. 464, ¶ 20 (App. 2021). In 2018, Payson voters passed
Propositions 401 and 402 (“the Propositions”), which were codified in the
Payson Town Code. Proposition 401, codified as Payson Town Code
§ 157.01, requires any lease agreement or easement of Payson-owned real
property exceeding a three-year duration to be submitted as a direct vote to
the electorate. Section 35.04, which codified Proposition 402, states: “Any
revenue bond for financing or debt that has a combination and or double
barrel feature in the indenture agreement, or elsewhere in the bond terms,
shall be treated as a general obligation bond, requiring a vote of the
qualified electors to enact or fund.” It further requires “a direct vote to
enact/fund” any “contract/lease debt incurred by the town with an
original amount of $1,000,000 or greater.”

¶3 In April 2023, the Payson Town Council passed two
ordinances that separately repealed both sections. In each ordinance, the
Council asserted that the relevant proposition was invalid because the
Payson Town Council lacked legal authority to refer the measures to the

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TRANSPARENT PAYSON v. TOWN OF PAYSON
Opinion of the Court

ballot. The following month, Appellants sought injunctive relief, arguing
that, “[a]s voter passed initiatives, the Propositions are protected from
repeal by elected officials” under the VPA. In response, the Town filed a
counterclaim seeking declaratory relief, asserting that Propositions 401 and
402 are “wholly without authority and outside the delegated powers of the
Payson Town Council.”

¶4 After a bench trial in April 2024, the trial court denied
Appellants’ request for injunctive relief and granted the Town’s
counterclaim for declaratory judgment. The court explained that the
Payson Town Council had acted within its “legal authority” in repealing
the Propositions, which were “unenforceable, invalid, [and] of no legal
force and effect” in part because the Town Council lacked authority to refer
measures to the ballot as required by the Propositions. The court further
noted that “[t]he language of the VPA and the cases applying it all relate to
the Arizona State Legislature” and concluded that it lacked a “sufficient
legal basis to apply the VPA” to the Town of Payson. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A).

Discussion

¶5 On appeal, Appellants contend the trial court erred in
concluding that the VPA was inapplicable to the Payson Town Council.
Although Appellants raise other arguments on appeal, they concede that
the issue of the VPA’s applicability to a town such as Payson is dispositive,
acknowledging that if the VPA does not apply to the Town, they are not
entitled to injunctive relief. We therefore address that issue, which requires
us to interpret the VPA.

¶6 “We review a denial of injunctive relief for an abuse of
discretion.” Ariz. Creditors Bar Ass’n v. State, 257 Ariz. 406, ¶ 8 (App. 2024).
However, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See S. Ariz.
Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, ¶ 16 (2023); see also
Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992).

¶7 In 1998, Arizona voters added the VPA to the state
constitution. Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 221 Ariz. 467,
¶ 6 (2009). In pertinent part, the VPA provides: “[T]he legislature shall not
have the power to repeal an initiative measure approved by a majority of
the votes cast thereon and shall not have the power to repeal a referendum
measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon.” Ariz. Const. art.
IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(B). As an additional restraint, the VPA prohibits the
legislature from amending a voter-approved measure “unless the

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TRANSPARENT PAYSON v. TOWN OF PAYSON
Opinion of the Court

amending legislation furthers the purposes of such measure and at least
three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature . . . vote to
amend such measure.” Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C).

¶8 Prior to the VPA’s adoption, legislators possessed the
authority, by a majority vote, to amend or repeal any ballot measure, but
only if passed at the polls by less than a majority of total registered voters
in the state. Brewer, 221 Ariz. 467, ¶ 7. Proponents of the measure “were
concerned that the legislature was abusing its power to amend and repeal
voter-endorsed measures.” Id.; see also Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 231 Ariz. 342, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (“[T]he principal purpose of the VPA is to
preclude the legislature from overriding the intent of the people.”). As a
consequence of this law, “voter-approved measures are now superior to
enactments of the legislature in that they cannot be repealed by legislative
act, and they cannot be easily amended.” Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 231
Ariz. 342, ¶ 9.

¶9 As they did below, Appellants maintain the VPA applies to
municipalities such as the Town and, thus, its safeguards extend to local
propositions. Therefore, they argue, the Town violated the VPA through
its repeal of the Propositions here. In response, the Town asserts that the
VPA solely restricts the State Legislature and does not implicate local
government measures.

¶10 When interpreting a constitutional provision, “[w]e look first
to the language of the provision, for if the constitutional language is clear,
judicial construction is neither required nor proper.” Perini Land & Dev. Co.,
170 Ariz. at 383; see also Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119 (App. 1994)
(“If the language is clear and unambiguous, we generally must follow the
text of the provision as written.”). This court “give[s] terms their ordinary
and commonly accepted meaning, unless the legislature has provided a
specific definition.” JH2K I LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 246 Ariz. 307,
¶ 9 (App. 2019).

¶11 Appellants contend that because the VPA electorate “clearly
disapproved of the Legislature having the ability to immediately repeal a
law adopted by the electorate,” these same voters would also object to a
municipal council taking the same action. Thus, they argue, a broader VPA
interpretation would effectuate the voters’ intent.1

1“Historically, the Arizona Supreme Court [has] said the primary

objective in interpreting a voter-enacted law is to effect the voters’ intent.”

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TRANSPARENT PAYSON v. TOWN OF PAYSON
Opinion of the Court

¶12 The VPA discusses both “the veto power of the governor” and
the “Legislature’s power” regarding an “initiative or referendum.” Ariz.
Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6). In describing the legislature’s authority, the VPA
refers to the “members of each house of the legislature.” Ariz. Const. art.
IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C), (D). While the VPA itself does not define “Legislature,”
see Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6), a prior subsection within the same
section of the Arizona Constitution provides that the legislature consists “of
a senate and house of representatives.” Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); see
also Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, ¶ 60 (2021) (“[T]he meaning of words in our
constitution must be drawn from the context in which they are used and
considered in light of the document as a whole.”). Defining “Legislature”
to include city or town councils, which lack a senate and house of
representatives, would not constitute an “ordinary” or “commonly
accepted meaning” of the term. JH2K I LLC, 246 Ariz. 307, ¶ 9. Accordingly,
the VPA’s language is clear and unambiguous—it is directed at the
bicameral state legislature, not “local councils.”

¶13 While Appellants contend that extending the VPA’s authority
to local councils would be in accord with the voters’ underlying policy goal,
we must interpret the provisions “as they are written,” and we decline to
rewrite them to achieve any unstated outcome. Ariz. Free Enter. Club v.
Hobbs, 253 Ariz. 478, ¶ 38 (2022) (courts “are constrained from rewriting the
law under the guise of interpreting it even if we divine a more desirable
intended outcome than the text allows”). The clear and unambiguous
language of the VPA renders it inapplicable to the Payson Town Council.
See S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n, 254 Ariz. 281, ¶ 16. Given this conclusion
and Appellants’ concession that such a determination would preclude them
from relief, we need not reach Appellants’ remaining arguments. See Wolk
v. Nichols, 117 Ariz. 352, 352 (1977).

3 SL Fam., LLC v. State, 258 Ariz. 523, ¶ 14 (App. 2024). But “a majority of
the members of the current Arizona Supreme Court now reject discern[ing]
and giv[ing] effect to legislative intent as the goal of statutory
interpretation.” Id. (alteration in 3 SL Fam., LLC) (quoting State ex rel. Ariz.
Dep’t of Revenue v. Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432, ¶¶ 23-36 (2023) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t
of Revenue v. Action Marine, 218 Ariz. 141, ¶ 10 (2008))). “Arizona courts use
the same interpretive approach for a voter-enacted statute as for a
legislature-enacted statute.” Id.

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TRANSPARENT PAYSON v. TOWN OF PAYSON
Opinion of the Court

Disposition

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

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