Republican National Committee; Republican Party of Arizona v. Adrian Fontes; Voto Latino

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ARIZONA, LLC;
AND YAVAPAI COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

ADRIAN FONTES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant/Appellee,

VOTO LATINO, ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS, DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0241
Filed March 6, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024050553
The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Kurt M. Altman P.L.C., Phoenix
By Kurt Altman and Ashley Fitzwilliams

and

First & Fourteenth PLLC, Colorado Springs, Colorado
By Christopher O. Murray, Pro Hac Vice, and Julian R. Ellis, Jr., Pro Hac Vice
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM. v. FONTES
Opinion of the Court

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
By Kara Karlson, Karen J. Hartman-Tellez, and Kyle Cummings, Assistant
Attorneys General, Phoenix
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix
By D. Andrew Gaona and Austin C. Yost

and

Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, D.C.
By Lalitha D. Madduri, Pro Hac Vice, and Daniel J. Cohen, Pro Hac Vice
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees Voto Latino and Arizona Alliance
for Retired Americans

Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix
By Alexis E. Danneman and Matthew R. Koerner

and

Herrera Arellano LLP, Phoenix
By Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, and Austin T. Marshall
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees Democratic National Committee
and Arizona Democratic Party

OPINION

Presiding Judge Gard authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Judge Staring and Judge O’Neil concurred.

G A R D, Presiding Judge:

¶1 In this case, we consider whether the Arizona Secretary of
State’s biennial promulgation of the Elections Procedures Manual (EPM),
see A.R.S. § 16-452, is subject to the Arizona Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), see A.R.S. §§ 41-1001 to 41-1039, and, if so, whether the Secretary
substantially complied with that Act’s rulemaking procedures in
promulgating the 2023 EPM. Also at issue is whether eight specific

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provisions of the 2023 EPM contradict or directly conflict with state and
federal laws.1

¶2 The Republican National Committee, Republican Party of
Arizona, and Yavapai County Republican Party (collectively “the RNC”)
filed a statutory special action in superior court, seeking a preliminary
injunction preventing the Secretary from implementing the EPM in the 2024
election. The court denied the injunction and granted a motion to dismiss
filed by the Secretary and several intervenor parties, concluding that the
APA did not apply and that the challenged EPM provisions did not conflict
with other laws. The RNC appeals from that order. We conclude that the
APA applies and that the Secretary did not substantially comply with its
provisions because he provided a public-comment period encompassing
only half the time the APA requires. In light of our resolution, we do not
address the RNC’s challenges to the specific EPM provisions.2 We
accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶3 The chief election officer for the State of Arizona, the Secretary
of State, is tasked every other year with drafting an EPM “to achieve and
maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and
efficiency on the procedures for [elections].” § 16-452(A). The Secretary
must submit the manual to the governor and the attorney general for
approval no later than October 1 of each odd-numbered year preceding the

1In a separate decision order filed in October 2024, we denied the

RNC’s request, made in its opening brief, that we enjoin the 2023 EPM’s use
in the 2024 election. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (cautioning
against enjoining election procedures on the eve of an election). We also
noted that the request was not properly raised in a standalone motion. See
Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 6, 7(c), 13.
2The parties do not allege, nor does the record suggest, that the

Secretary’s failure to substantially comply with the APA in promulgating
the EPM compromised any election’s fairness, its accuracy, the right to vote,
or any other substantive right associated with the election. Rather, the error
here was strictly procedural in nature. See A.R.S. § 41-1002(B) (APA
“creates only procedural rights and imposes only procedural duties”). We
further emphasize that our decision does not affect any election that may
occur before we issue our mandate in this matter.

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general election. § 16-452(B). Upon approval, the EPM must be issued no
later than December 31 of that year. Id. Once issued, “the EPM has the
force of law” and any violation of a rule within it is punishable as a class
two misdemeanor. Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes, 250 Ariz. 58, ¶ 16 (2020);
§ 16-452(C).

¶4 On July 31, 2023, the Secretary published a 259-page draft
EPM, allowing public comment for a period of fifteen days. On August 15,
the RNC submitted a formal comment, raising concerns about the
“unnecessarily restrictive” and short public-comment period, as well as
several specific provisions in the draft EPM. The Secretary submitted a
revised draft EPM to the governor and attorney general for review on
September 30, acknowledging the draft had been posted for public
comment “[i]n keeping with the good practice of the prior Administration”
and that suggestions had been incorporated “where appropriate.” On
December 30, the Secretary published a final EPM, spanning 268 pages,
with the approval of the governor and attorney general.

¶5 Shortly thereafter, the RNC filed a verified special-action
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The first count alleged that
the 2023 EPM was subject to the APA’s rulemaking process and that the
Secretary had failed to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements. Accordingly, the RNC sought a declaration invalidating the
EPM and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement and implementation in
the 2024 election. The complaint also set forth eight counts “in the
alternative” challenging specific provisions of the EPM as conflicting with
state and federal laws.

¶6 A few days later, the RNC moved for a preliminary injunction
on the EPM-invalidation claim, as well as on six of the eight alternative
claims challenging particular EPM provisions. The Secretary opposed the
request and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), Ariz. R. Civ. P. In May 2024,
the superior court heard oral argument on the motions and took the matter
under advisement.

¶7 The superior court thereafter dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim, concluding that the APA procedures did not apply
to the promulgation of a valid EPM because the EPM statute, § 16-452,
provides an independent procedure. The court also upheld each of the
challenged provisions, finding that they did not contradict or directly
conflict with federal or state laws. The court entered final judgment in the

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Secretary’s favor, and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1). See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 10(c).

Discussion

¶8 The RNC argues the superior court erred by concluding that
the APA’s rulemaking process does not apply to the Secretary’s EPM
promulgation, and that that the Secretary’s failure to comply with the APA
here invalidates the 2023 EPM. Alternatively, the RNC maintains that, if
the EPM is deemed valid, eight of its specific provisions should be
independently invalidated because they conflict with federal and state
statutes or exceed the Secretary’s authority. We agree on the first argument,
which renders the second moot.

I. Standing

¶9 As a preliminary matter, the Secretary and intervenors
Arizona Alliance for Retired Voters and Voto Latino encourage us to affirm
the superior court’s dismissal without reaching the merits because the RNC
lacks standing to challenge the 2023 EPM. Specifically, the Secretary
contends that the RNC “fail[ed] to explain how either the way the EPM was
enacted or the enforcement of any of the individually challenged provisions
harms—or even affects—them in any way.” The RNC responds that it has
met its burden to establish standing because it primarily sought declaratory
relief invalidating the EPM under the APA rulemaking procedure. See
A.R.S. § 41-1034(A) (citing Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S.
§§ 12-1831 through 12-1846). Although the superior court expressed
“concerns about whether [the RNC has] standing for some or all of [its]
claims,” it did not expressly rule on that issue.

¶10 “Standing is a question of law that we review de novo.”
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 220 Ariz. 401, ¶ 7 (App. 2008). “[T]he
question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we
have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of the federal
constitution.” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in
Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6 (1985); see Ariz. Const. art. VI; U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1. Therefore, “we are not constitutionally constrained to decline
jurisdiction based on lack of standing.” Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520,
¶ 31 (2003) (quoting Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, ¶ 24 (1998)). Instead,
standing “only raises ‘questions of prudential or judicial restraint.’”
Strawberry Water Co., 220 Ariz. 401, ¶ 7 (quoting Armory Park Neighborhood
Ass’n, 148 Ariz. at 6).

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¶11 Nonetheless, Arizona has “established a rigorous standing
requirement.” Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 210 Ariz. 138, ¶ 6 (2005).
The standing inquiry in Arizona is whether “under all circumstances, the
party possesses an interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Strawberry
Water Co., 220 Ariz. 401, ¶ 8. Generally, to establish standing, a party must
demonstrate “an injury in fact, economic or otherwise, caused by the
complained-of conduct, and resulting in a distinct and palpable injury
giving the plaintiff a personal stake in the controversy’s outcome.” Id.

¶12 Section 41-1034(A), however, allows “[a]ny person who is or
may be affected by a rule” under the APA to “obtain a judicial declaration
of the validity of the rule by filing an action for declaratory relief.” We have
previously held that a party may seek declaratory relief under this statute
when “the plaintiff asserts that a rule is invalid due to any agency’s failure
to comply with the applicable statutory procedures when promulgating the
rule.” Samaritan Health Sys. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.
Admin., 198 Ariz. 533, ¶ 22 (App. 2000). We have also interpreted the
language, “[a]ny person who is or may be affected,” in an analogous statute,
see A.R.S. § 49-497, as eliminating “the need to show a distinct and palpable
injury” and instead granting standing “if a person ‘may’ be affected.” Home
Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 219 Ariz. 374, ¶¶ 25-27 (App. 2008).

¶13 Section 12-1832 of Arizona’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act allows “[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute” to have a court determine “any question of
construction or validity arising under the . . . statute” and “obtain a
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” The
purpose of the act is to “settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations” and is
therefore remedial. A.R.S. § 12-1842. Standing under the Act requires “that
there be an actual controversy ripe for adjudication and that there be parties
with a real interest in the questions to be solved.” Bd. of Supervisors of
Maricopa Cnty. v. Woodall, 120 Ariz. 379, 380 (1978). Similar to § 41-1034(A),
which obviates the requirement to show a distinct and palpable injury, an
existing injury is not required under the Act so long as the relief sought is
“based on an existing state of facts” and “is not advisory.” Ariz. Creditors
Bar Ass’n v. State, 257 Ariz. 379, ¶ 12 (App. 2024) (quoting Land Dep’t v.
O’Toole, 154 Ariz. 43, 47 (App. 1987)); Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State, 252 Ariz.
219, ¶ 16 (2022); see Mills v. Ariz. Bd. of Tech. Registration, 253 Ariz. 415, ¶ 29
(2022).

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¶14 In its complaint, the RNC claimed that each of its county,
state, and national party committees “promote[] the election of Republican
candidates” and have “an interest in the administration” and “procedural
integrity of Arizona elections,” as well as “the competitive environment
affecting Republican candidates.” Each of the committees “expend[]
significant resources supporting Republican candidates . . . and some of
these resources will necessarily be diverted if election rules are not made
consistent with Arizona law.” The RNC reiterates those claims on appeal
and emphasizes that, because the EPM governs “the conduct of persons
campaigning, voting, observing, administering, and reporting on
elections,” and because failure to follow the EPM is a crime, the RNC, as
well as its candidates and volunteers, are necessarily affected. At oral
argument, the RNC contended that it meets the test for standing because an
actual controversy exists between parties who are sufficiently interested
here.

¶15 We agree with the RNC. The relief the RNC sought by filing
a declaratory action arose from “an existing state of facts”—it is undisputed
that the Secretary made a draft of the EPM available to the public for
commentary for a period of fifteen days, which is shorter than that
provided under § 41-1023(B). Ariz. Creditors Bar Ass’n, 257 Ariz. 379, ¶ 12.
And because the RNC has demonstrated its members, candidates, and
volunteers are necessarily affected by the administration of procedures that
govern every stage of the electoral process, the RNC has established it is a
party with a “real interest in the questions to be solved.” Bd. of Supervisors
of Maricopa Cnty., 120 Ariz. at 380. We therefore conclude the RNC has
standing to seek declaratory relief under the APA to challenge the validity
of the 2023 EPM. We address the merits below.

II. Applicability of the APA rulemaking process to the EPM

¶16 “We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.” Abbott v. Banner Health Network, 239 Ariz. 409,
¶ 7 (2016). We likewise “review issues construing statutes and rules
de novo.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. 58, ¶ 8. We begin with the text
when construing statutes. Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409, ¶ 8
(2023). “We interpret statutes ‘according to the plain meaning of the words
in their broader statutory context, unless the legislature directs us to do
otherwise.’” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, ¶ 19 (2024) (quoting S. Ariz.
Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, ¶ 31 (2023)). We will
not “read into a statute something which is not within the manifest
intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself,” nor will we

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“‘inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its
expressed provisions.’” Roberts v. State, 253 Ariz. 259, ¶ 20 (2022) (quoting
City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133 (1965)). If “a statute’s plain
language is unambiguous in context, it is dispositive.” In re Drummond,
257 Ariz. 15, ¶ 5.

¶17 As we discussed above, the legislature has delegated to the
Secretary of State the biennial duty to prescribe rules in an official
instructions and procedures manual to govern state elections. § 16-452. The
process with which the Secretary must comply in issuing the EPM is
outlined in the statute:

A. After consultation with each county board of
supervisors or other officer in charge of
elections, the secretary of state shall prescribe
rules to achieve and maintain the maximum
degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity
and efficiency on the procedures for early
voting and voting, and of producing,
distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating
and storing ballots. The secretary of state shall
also adopt rules regarding fax transmittal of
unvoted ballots, ballot requests, voted ballots
and other election materials to and from absent
uniformed and overseas citizens and shall
adopt rules regarding internet receipt of
requests for federal postcard applications
prescribed by § 16-543.

B. The rules shall be prescribed in an official
instructions and procedures manual to be
issued not later than December 31 of each odd-
numbered year immediately preceding the
general election. Before its issuance, the manual
shall be approved by the governor and the
attorney general. The secretary of state shall
submit the manual to the governor and the
attorney general not later than October 1 of the
year before each general election.

Id. Violation of any rule that is adopted is punishable as a class two
misdemeanor. § 16-452(C).

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¶18 The APA sets out separate procedures that agencies must
follow when promulgating rules, which include, among other things,
public notice, a public-comment period, and the opportunity to request an
oral proceeding. §§ 41-1001 to 41-1039. These requirements “ensure that
those affected by a rule have adequate notice of the agency’s proposed
procedures and opportunity for input into the consideration of those
procedures.” Carondelet Health Servs., Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys. Admin., 182 Ariz. 221, 226 (App. 1994). The APA’s
rulemaking procedures “apply to all agencies and all proceedings not
expressly exempted.” § 41-1002(A). Accordingly, a “rule is invalid unless
it is consistent with the statute, reasonably necessary to carry out the
purpose of the statute and is made and approved in substantial compliance
with §§ 41-1021 through 41-1029 and articles 4, 4.1, and 5 of this chapter,
unless otherwise provided by law.” § 41-1030(A). And the APA
contemplates an interplay between the duties it imposes on agencies and
those imposed by other statutes:

This chapter creates only procedural rights and
imposes only procedural duties. They are in
addition to those created and imposed by other
statutes. To the extent that any other statute
would diminish a right created or duty imposed
by this chapter, the other statute is superseded
by this chapter, unless the other statute
expressly provides otherwise. § 41-1002(B).

¶19 There is no dispute that the EPM constitutes a collection of
“rule[s]” as defined by the APA, see § 41-1001(21),3 and that the Department
and Secretary of State are regulatory “agenc[ies]” subject to the APA, see
§ 41-1001(1).4 At issue on appeal is whether the adoption and promulgation
of the EPM, under § 16-452, is subject to the rulemaking process under the
APA, §§ 41-1001 to 41-1039.

¶20 The superior court concluded that the EPM’s promulgation is
not subject to the APA’s procedures. The court relied on § 41-1030(A) to

3A “rule” is defined as “an agency statement of general applicability

that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the
procedure or practice requirements of an agency.”
4An “agency” is defined as “any board, commission, department,

officer or other administrative unit of this state, including the agency head.”

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conclude that the legislature has “otherwise provided by law” a procedure
for the Secretary to promulgate the EPM under § 16-452 that is separate
from, and not subject to, APA guidelines. The court rejected the RNC’s
argument that the APA requires an express exemption, concluding that
such a requirement would render the language “unless otherwise provided
by law” in § 41-1030(A) meaningless. The court also found deadline-related
and gubernatorial approval conflicts between § 16-452 and the APA, and
concluded that the EPM statute supersedes the APA.

¶21 We begin with the plain reading of § 41-1002, which
unambiguously states that all agencies are subject to the APA’s rulemaking
procedures unless “expressly exempted.” There are two ways in which the
legislature has expressly exempted an agency from the APA: (1) by listing
a number of exempted subject-matter specific rules and agencies within the
APA in § 41-1005 titled “Exemptions,” and (2) by including express
language in implementing statutes indicating they are “exempt from title
41, chapter 6.” See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 3-109.03(C) (exempting Department of
Agriculture), 16-974(D) (exempting rules adopted by Citizens Clean
Elections Commission), 17-255.01(D) (exempting order issued by director
of Game and Fish Department but requiring publication in administrative
register), 20-1241.09(B) (exempting Department of Insurance and Financial
Institutions), 36-736(A) (exempting orders issued by local health officers).

¶22 Here, neither the EPM statute, § 16-452, nor the APA,
§ 41-1005, expressly exempts the EPM from the APA’s rulemaking process.
See Carondelet Health Servs., Inc., 182 Ariz. at 228; Ariz. State Univ. ex rel. Ariz.
Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 237 Ariz. 246, ¶ 23 (App. 2015) (“The
statute’s silence does not exempt the [agency] from the APA’s rulemaking
procedure.”). The superior court, however, relied on § 41-1030(A), which
states that a rule is invalid if it is not made and approved in substantial
compliance with the APA procedures “unless otherwise provided by law,”
to conclude that an exemption exists. The RNC argues that this statute is
remedial and merely sets out conditions or requirements for a valid rule,
recognizing that some rules “are not categorically invalid” for failing to
follow the APA because “some rulemakings are expressly exempt” from that
process. The RNC further contends that the superior court’s interpretation
of § 41-1030(A) “permitted an implied exemption not anywhere
expressed.” We agree.

¶23 As we have discussed, § 41-1002 provides that all agencies—
including the Secretary and his Department—are subject to the APA
rulemaking process unless “expressly exempted.” The superior court’s

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interpretation of § 16-452 as providing an alternative procedure without
any express reference to, or exemption from, the APA effectively recognizes
a silent, implied exemption that contradicts and voids § 41-1002. See Gries
v. Plaza Del Rio Mgmt. Corp., 236 Ariz. 8, ¶ 20 (App. 2014) (“[R]elated
statutes must be ‘read together and harmonized[ ] to avoid rendering any
clause, sentence or word superfluous, void, contradictory, or
insignificant.’” (alterations in Gries) (quoting State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 499-
500 (App. 1995))). Reading § 41-1002(A), § 41-1030(A), and § 16-452 in
harmony, we interpret the “unless otherwise provided by law” language in
§ 41-1030(A) as reiterating § 41-1002’s directive that any exemptions must
be expressly made. If a subject-matter specific rule or department has not
been expressly exempted, or otherwise provided with some alternative to
the APA’s procedure that expressly states that it is such an alternative, then
that rule is invalid unless it was made in substantial compliance with the
APA.

¶24 Finally, we consider whether the rulemaking procedures in
the APA and the EPM conflict. See § 41-1002(B). The Secretary argues
“there is an irreconcilable conflict” between the statutes with respect to
timing. First, the Secretary notes that the APA requires each agency on or
before December 1 of each year to “prepare and make available to the public
the regulatory agenda that the agency expects to follow during the next
calendar year.” § 41-1021.02(A). He contends that this is “incompatible
with” the requirements of § 16-452(B) which require him to issue an EPM
by December 31 of every odd-numbered year. He explains that this would
require him “to lay out the regulatory agenda for the EPM before the start
of the legislative session” and “to do so while carrying out the tasks
associated with the primary and general elections.” The Secretary further
maintains the APA and EPM statutes conflict because the governor is
exempt from the APA, and the APA procedures do not govern a
“multi-agency process” as required by § 16-452. The Secretary concludes
that the APA “would supplant the EPM statute and make compliance with
its terms impossible” and that as a result, the EPM controls as the more
recent and specific statute.

¶25 But § 41-1002(B) states that the procedures and duties
imposed under the APA are “in addition to” those imposed by other
statutes. “To the extent that any other statute would diminish a right created
or duty imposed by this chapter, the other statute is superseded” unless it
“expressly provides otherwise.” Id. (emphasis added). This subsection
again emphasizes that any deviation from the APA’s procedural process
must be expressly permitted in an implementing statute. Here, the

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Secretary does not explain how § 16-452 acts to diminish any rights created
or duties imposed by the APA. Nor does he explain how a conflict would
result in § 16-452 superseding the APA when § 41-1002(B) provides for the
opposite result. Instead, the issues the Secretary raises here highlight the
potential impracticalities of abiding by both the APA and the EPM
procedures, but impracticalities do not equate to conflicts. The APA and
EPM statutes impose duties on the Secretary that may require him to begin
promulgating the EPM earlier, but they are not inconsistent, do not directly
conflict, and do not create impossible barriers to complying with both. See
Carondelet Health Servs., Inc., 182 Ariz. at 229 (rejecting agency’s argument
that complying with APA would “tie their hands” with “lengthy
rulemaking and protracted public hearings” because thirty to 120-day delay
in enacting rule is not “so alarming” to warrant agency being excused from
compliance). We therefore conclude that, because not expressly exempted,
the 2023 EPM was subject to the rulemaking procedures under the APA.
The superior court thus erred by dismissing the RNC’s complaint on the
basis of its failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

III. Substantial compliance with the APA

¶26 Having concluded that the 2023 EPM was subject to the
APA’s rulemaking process, we must next determine whether the Secretary
substantially complied with the APA. Section 41-1030(A) requires
“substantial compliance” with the APA and directs that the absence of such
compliance invalidates a rule. Whether an agency has substantially
complied with the APA in promulgating a rule presents a mixed question
of law and fact; we generally defer to the superior court’s factual findings
but review de novo its ultimate legal conclusion. Helvetica Servicing Inc. v.
Pasquan, 249 Ariz. 349, ¶ 10 (2020). The parties here do not dispute the
underlying facts—that the Secretary allowed for a fifteen-day
public-comment period and received and considered hundreds of
comments, including comments submitted by the RNC. We therefore
determine as a legal matter whether the Secretary’s process in
promulgating the 2023 EPM substantially complied with the APA.

¶27 The APA requires an agency to “afford persons the
opportunity to submit in writing statements, arguments, data and views on
the proposed rule” for a period of “at least thirty days.” § 41-1023(B)
(emphasis added). Arizona courts have not interpreted “substantial
compliance” under the APA. In other contexts, the supreme court has
defined “substantial compliance” as a “standard that . . . tolerates errors if

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the purpose of the relevant statutory requirements was nevertheless
fulfilled.” In Re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519,
¶ 11 (2023). Applying this standard to the undisputed facts here, we cannot
conclude that the Secretary’s allowance of only half of the APA’s minimum
required comment period amounts to substantial compliance. During the
fifteen-day public-comment period, the RNC raised concerns about the
“unnecessarily restrictive” timeframe and requested that the Secretary
extend the deadline by two weeks. The RNC noted that it had
“preliminarily” identified the “most pressing changes to address” in the
“brief time” that had been allotted for review. On appeal, the RNC
reiterated that submitting comments during that timeframe had been
“taxing” and that it needed more time to analyze the proposed rules and
compile its comments. Because the RNC was prejudiced by the abbreviated
comment period, we cannot say under the circumstances here that the 2023
EPM’s promulgation process fulfilled the APA’s purpose “that those
affected by a rule have adequate notice of the agency’s proposed
procedures and the opportunity for input into the consideration of those
procedures.” Carondelet Health Servs., Inc., 182 Ariz. at 226, 229 (further
explaining intent of APA to “facilitate and encourage public participation
in the formulation of rules”); see Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, ¶ 14
(2005) (court considering various factors to determine substantial
compliance with statutory requirements in context of petitions for ballot
initiatives including nature and purpose of requirements and extent of
deviation from requirements); Aesthetic Prop. Maint., Inc. v. Capitol Indem.
Corp., 183 Ariz. 74, 78 (1995) (substantial compliance inquiry includes
whether failure to comply prejudiced party that statute seeks to protect).
We thus conclude that the Secretary’s promulgation of the 2023 EPM did
not substantially comply with the requirements of the APA’s rulemaking
process.5 § 41-1030(A).

Disposition

¶28 We conclude that the 2023 EPM was subject to the rulemaking
procedure under the APA and that the Secretary did not substantially
comply with the APA’s rulemaking process in promulgating the EPM. We
therefore reverse the superior court’s dismissal and final judgment and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

5In light of our resolution, we need not address the RNC’s alternative

claims challenging eight specific provisions of the EPM on the basis that
they contradict or directly conflict with state and federal statutes.

13