Jamie Clem v. Pinal County, Pinal County Sheriff Mark Lamb

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

JAMIE CLEM,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

PINAL COUNTY; PINAL COUNTY SHERIFF MARK LAMB,
Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0305
Filed October 30, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CV201600707
The Honorable Joseph R. Georgini, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C., Phoenix
By David L. Abney

and

Robbins Curtin Millea & Showalter LLC, Phoenix
By Joel B. Robbins and Jesse M. Showalter
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Jellison Law Offices PLLC, Scottsdale
By James M. Jellison
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants

CLEM v. PINAL COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Sklar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge
Eppich and Judge Vásquez concurred.

S K L A R, Judge:

In this wrongful-death case, the trial court excused a
potentially biased juror during trial. This case requires us to address
whether it also should have declared a mistrial. The issue arises from Jamie
Clem’s unsuccessful action against the Pinal County Sheriff, who she
alleged was responsible for her son’s death at the Pinal County Adult
Detention Facility. The excused juror was a political supporter of the
sheriff. He was also friends with the sheriff’s in-court representative.

We conclude that a mistrial was not required. The juror’s
potential bias supplied the trial court with ample reason to excuse him. For
a mistrial, though, our law requires prejudice. Clem has demonstrated
none. We also reject Clem’s argument that the court was required to
preclude expert testimony for an asserted disclosure violation. And we
reject the defendants’ argument on cross-appeal concerning a sanction
under Rule 68(g) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. We therefore
affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

In April 2015, Skyler Clem died of a drug overdose. He had
been in custody at the Pinal County Adult Detention Facility when he was
found nonresponsive in a holding cell. His mother and statutory
beneficiary, Jamie Clem, filed this wrongful-death lawsuit in April 2016.
The initial defendants were the county and its sheriff.

Years of litigation followed, including a prior appeal. The
case proceeded to a ten-day jury trial in January 2024. On the first day, the
parties stipulated to the county’s dismissal, leaving the sheriff as the sole
defendant. The jury returned a verdict in the sheriff’s favor.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the county and
sheriff. Under Rule 68(g), the court awarded the defendants double their
taxable costs as well as $30,000 for what it deemed their reasonable

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expert-witness fees. Clem appealed. The defendants cross-appealed
because the award of expert fees was less than half of their request.

JUROR DISQUALIFICATION AND MISTRIAL

Clem makes two arguments concerning the juror who had
supported the sheriff and was friends with his in-court representative. She
first argues that the trial court erred by empaneling the juror. Second, she
argues that, although that juror was excused after additional information
came to light, the court erred by denying her request for a mistrial. We
review both issues for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166,
¶ 106 (2019) (“We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror
for an abuse of discretion.”); Porterie v. Peters, 111 Ariz. 452, 458 (1975) (“We
cannot say from the record that the action taken by the trial court in failing
to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion.”).

I. The trial court empanels juror six over a for-cause challenge

At issue is juror six, a retired corrections officer. During voir
dire, juror six described his relationship with then-Sheriff Mark Lamb’s
in-court representative, Lt. Ross Teeple. At the time, Lamb was
campaigning for the United States Senate, and Teeple was campaigning to
replace Lamb as sheriff.

Juror six explained, “I’ve worked with Ross Teeple at the
prison, the state prison, and I’ve been retired almost ten years now. Just
friends.” He explained that he had seen Teeple “here and there” during
Teeple’s campaign for sheriff. However, he agreed that the friendship
would not “persuade [him] in any way to favor one side over the other.”

Juror six did not respond when jurors were asked if any of
them had “been in pictures” endorsing Lamb or Teeple. But later in the
day, Clem’s counsel found a “public Facebook post that juror number six
had appeared with and spoken at events with Sheriff Lamb.” The photo
involved a “reposting from Teeple for the People, which is Lieutenant
Teeple’s election campaign.”

That prompted follow-up questions from the trial court and
counsel. Juror six explained that he and Teeple were “close friends” who
saw each other “[m]aybe every two months or something.” He also stated
that he had contributed to Teeple’s campaign. He said that during the
earlier questioning, he had forgotten the photo in which he appeared with
Teeple. He explained, “I had a hat on that said ‘Teeple for the People’ for

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Opinion of the Court

his campaign.” He also said that, when Lamb had been campaigning for
sheriff in 2020, he had supported Lamb at two events. However, he clarified
that he was not involved in Lamb’s senate campaign.

Clem challenged juror six for cause. The trial court denied the
challenge. It explained in part, “I don’t find the nature of the
relationships . . . to be of any real significance to disqualify him given what
I’ve been told by both sets of attorneys regarding the involvement of Teeple
and Lamb” in the case. The court concluded, “At this point it appears based
on his body language, the record, his statements on the record to the court,
to the attorneys that he can be fair and impartial.”

II. The trial court denies Clem’s motion for mistrial after Clem
discovers additional information about the juror’s associations with
Teeple and Lamb

Further developments arose on the fifth trial day. A paralegal
for Clem’s counsel had seen that on juror six’s Facebook page “he had
posted a[n] endorsement of Mark Lamb and Ross Teeple during this trial.”
Clem sought a mistrial, arguing, “[T]his post during trial is signaling to
Ross Teeple and Mark Lamb, ‘I’m still your guy.’”

Juror six acknowledged reposting a video from the “Teeple
for the People” website. He also acknowledged that “it could” look unfair
that he had posted support for Teeple and Lamb during trial. But he
reiterated that he had no allegiance to Teeple and Lamb “pertaining to this
trial.” He said, “When I did that, I wasn’t even thinking about this case.”

On questioning from the trial court, juror six said he did not
recall speaking with the other jurors “about anything involving this case or
politics.” But, as illustrated by the following colloquy with the court, he
had discussed his opinions about Teeple and Lamb with other jurors:

Q. Okay. So but have you—have you
voiced any of your opinions involving any of
the people, including Lieutenant Teeple or
Sheriff Lamb, to any of your colleagues, your
fellow jurors?

A. Yes, we have discussions.

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Q. Okay. Have you—have you told them
that you’re friends with Sheriff Lamb and/or
Lieutenant Teeple?

A. Yes, they know.

Q. You used the term “friend” versus
“supporter,” right? Is that—you consider
yourself friends?

A. Yes, with Lieutenant Teeple.

The juror further explained on questioning from defense counsel that he
had seen Teeple within about a month at campaign events, but “[m]onths,
maybe a year” excluding campaign events. And he reaffirmed that he
believed he could be “fair and impartial to both sides in the case.”

The trial court concluded, “We have an appearance of
impropriety at this point.” It explained that although juror six had
assuaged any concerns that arose during voir dire on the first day, the court
had become “more concerned—significantly more concerned” and would
therefore remove the juror.

However, the trial court denied Clem’s motion for mistrial
without explanation. After the jury rendered its verdict, Clem renewed the
motion, which the court again denied. At no point after the verdict did
Clem seek to renew the motion or supplement the record with affidavits
from other jurors about their discussions with juror six. Nor does the record
contain evidence about the content of those discussions, except as described
above.

III. The empanelment of juror six was not reversible error in the
absence of prejudice

Clem first argues that the trial court abused its discretion and
committed “reversible error” by empaneling juror six. At oral argument,
she characterized juror six’s empanelment as having resulted in an
“appearance of impropriety” and a “tainted” trial requiring reversal even
in the absence of prejudice.

Under A.R.S. § 21-211(4), a person who is “biased or
prejudiced in favor of or against either of the parties” is disqualified from
jury service. Juror six’s lengthy friendship and public political support for
Teeple—the sheriff’s in-court representative at trial—strongly suggests a

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bias, especially given his public support for Lamb as well. This is true
despite the juror’s repeated assurances that he could put his friendship
aside. See State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 319 (1993) (“[T]he impartiality of a
potential juror who is personally acquainted with individuals involved in
the prosecution is necessarily suspect, and the trial judge must take care to
be certain that the juror can and will be fair and impartial.”). Thus, Clem
makes a strong argument that juror six should not have been empaneled
and that his empanelment created an appearance of impropriety.

It does not follow, however, that any error in empaneling
juror six was reversible in the absence of prejudice. In civil cases, a
prejudice requirement derives from our constitution, case law, and
procedural rules. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for
technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it
shall appear that substantial justice has been done.”); Creach v. Angulo, 189
Ariz. 212, 214-15 (1997); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61 (“At every stage of the
proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect
any party’s substantial rights.”).

Verdicts may typically be reversed without prejudice only in
the narrow context of structural error. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534,
¶¶ 45-46 (2003) (listing types of structural error). We have found no case
law, though, extending structural error beyond the criminal context. See id.
¶ 46. And even if structural error applies in this civil case, our case law
suggests that it would not include the empanelment of a biased juror who
was later excused, before deliberations began. Cf. State v. Eddington, 226
Ariz. 72, ¶¶ 12, 15, 18 (App. 2010) (concluding that error in declining to
strike juror who was “interested” in the case under Section 21-211 was
subject to harmless-error review (quoting § 21-211(2))), aff’d, 228 Ariz. 361
(2011). We decline to reach such a conclusion in the first instance, especially
because, as we discuss below, any impropriety in empaneling juror six was
remedied by his excusal.

Absent structural error, Clem does not identify any remedy
for the empanelment of juror six that the trial court failed to provide. The
only other plausible remedy is a mistrial. Cf. State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149,
¶¶ 69-82, 86 (2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of mistrial
where jurors had been excused after misapprehending admonition and
making incorrect statements of law to other jurors). And Clem is already
challenging the court’s denial of a mistrial based on the totality of juror six’s
statements, not just those he made before being empaneled. Thus, we need
not further address juror six’s empanelment.

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IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clem’s
motion for mistrial

A mistrial is an “extreme remedy.” State v. Rios, 258 Ariz. 175,
¶ 13 (App. 2024) (quoting State v. Kleinman, 250 Ariz. 362, ¶ 12 (App. 2020)).
It is appropriate only where some occurrence has made it “apparent to the
court” that “one of the parties cannot have a fair trial, or where further
proceedings would be productive of great hardship or manifest injustice.”
Id. (quoting Kleinman, 250 Ariz. 362, ¶ 12). Before declaring a mistrial, the
trial court must attempt to determine whether feasible alternatives exist.
State v. Woods, 237 Ariz. 214, ¶ 15 (App. 2015).

A. Standard for mistrial based on improper juror
communications

Neither the parties’ briefing nor our research has yielded any
cases in which a party sought a mistrial under circumstances similar to
those here. Our case law recognizes that, as a general matter, a mistrial can
be appropriate where jurors engage in improper communications. See, e.g.,
State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 557, 560 (1994) (holding evidentiary hearing or
mistrial necessary after alternate juror left note on juror’s car reading “He’s
guilty” or “My vote is guilty”). But such an outcome is proper only where
the offending communications result in prejudice. State v. Vasquez, 130
Ariz. 103, 105 (1981); cf. Perez ex rel. Perez v. Cmty. Hosp. of Chandler, Inc., 187
Ariz. 355, 358 (1997) (requiring prejudice for improper communication to
be basis for new trial).

As our supreme court recognized in American Power Products,
Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., the prejudice inquiry typically requires courts to
“determine whether the communication would likely prejudice a
hypothetical average juror.” 239 Ariz. 151, ¶ 17 (2016). This objective
standard requires the court to consider “whether the communication
related to the evidence presented, the applicable law, or the ultimate issue
in the case, or whether it clearly interfered with the jury’s decision-making
process.” Id. ¶ 18.

But in American Power Products, the court also recognized that
some errors make a prejudice determination difficult. Id. ¶ 16. In part, this
is because Rule 606(b)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence limits the scope
of inquiries into a verdict’s validity by prohibiting jurors from testifying
about their deliberations. That rule reads:

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During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
in a civil case, a juror may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of
anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote;
or any juror’s mental processes concerning the
verdict or indictment.

The rule contains two relevant exceptions. First, jurors may testify about
whether “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury’s attention.” Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A). Second, they may testify
about whether “an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on
any juror.” Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B). Taken together, the rule and its
exceptions permit jurors to be questioned about outside information they
received, but not about its effect on the deliberations.

Given Rule 606(b), the court concluded in American Power
Products that prejudice must be presumed in certain cases. 239 Ariz. 151,
¶ 17. Specifically, where an improper juror communication “creates a
structural defect in the trial that deprives a litigant of an essential right, the
trial judge must conclusively presume prejudice.” Id.; see also State v.
Vasquez, 130 Ariz. at 105 (requiring mistrial where “such a state of facts is
shown that it may fairly be presumed . . . that the defendant’s rights were
prejudiced” (quoting State v. Adams, 27 Ariz. App. 389, 392 (1976))).

B. Clem has not demonstrated prejudice under either
applicable standard

In arguing that a mistrial was required, Clem asserts that juror
six “objectively appeared biased and prejudiced in favor of Defendant
Sheriff and his official, in-court, designated representative.” As we have
explained, whether a juror is “biased or prejudiced” is undoubtedly
relevant to that juror’s qualifications to serve. § 21-211(4). But Clem has
pointed to no case suggesting that a mistrial is necessary simply because a
biased juror was empaneled and remained on the jury for some portion of
the trial, even where the empanelment raised an appearance of
impropriety. Nor have we found any such case, let alone one that required
a mistrial where that juror was excused before deliberations began.

We are unpersuaded that we should impose such a standard
here. Instead, we conclude that the relevant inquiries are whether any
improper communications occurred, and if so, whether they satisfied the
prejudice standard articulated in American Power Products. Absent

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prejudice from one of juror six’s communications, a mistrial was not
necessary.

Clem does not frame her argument with these inquiries. But
she nevertheless asserts that she was prejudiced by juror six’s discussions
with other jurors about his opinions of Teeple and Lamb, as well as the
jury’s awareness of his friendship with Teeple. The prejudice was
heightened, in her view, by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 40(h)(1)(B),
which allows civil jurors to discuss the evidence even before deliberations
begin, under certain conditions.

Clem acknowledges, however, that the record contains “only
scraps and hints about what Juror No. 6 told the other jurors.” Indeed, the
record is devoid of any reference to the content of assertedly improper
communications. To excuse this lack of evidence, she relies on Arizona
Rule of Evidence 606(b). But Rule 606(b) was not applicable when juror six
was questioned and excused on the fifth trial day. That rule concerns the
permissible scope of inquiries into the validity of a verdict. Likewise, Rule
606(b)’s prohibition on juror testimony concerns their deliberations, votes,
and mental processes. Here, no deliberations or votes had occurred on the
fifth day, and the trial court was not inquiring into the validity of a verdict.
Its inquiry was more akin to an investigation into juror misconduct, where
courts generally have broad discretion. See State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, ¶ 74
(2012) (“When a trial court becomes aware of possible juror misconduct, it
should ‘conduct whatever investigation it deems warranted.’” (quoting
State v. Cook, 170 Ariz. 40, 55 (1991))).

Moreover, even after the trial concluded, Rule 606 did not
prevent Clem or the trial court from obtaining at least some information
regarding juror six’s communications. At a minimum, they could have
asked what “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influence”
had been shared. See Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A)–(B); Brooks v. Zahn, 170
Ariz. 545, 553 (App. 1991) (describing scope of permissible inquiry in
determining whether jury considered extraneous information).

Nevertheless, Clem did not obtain affidavits or other
information from jurors about this information. See, e.g., Dunn v. Maras, 182
Ariz. 412, 419-20 (App. 1995) (discussing affidavits from jurors about
extraneous, prejudicial information provided by juror regarding settlement
involving separate defendant in medical-malpractice case). Nor did any
other jurors comment during trial about juror six’s communications with
them. We therefore have very limited information about the nature of those
communications. To the extent we know about them, they largely

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concerned information that was already shared during voir dire—juror six
had supported Lamb and Teeple, and he was friends with Teeple. Nothing
about this information was prejudicial, especially once juror six was
excused.

Thus, despite having available mechanisms for obtaining
them, Clem has not presented any facts that could allow us to conclude that
a hypothetical, reasonable juror would have been prejudiced by any
improper communications from juror six. Nothing suggests that any such
communications concerned the evidence, applicable law, or ultimate issues,
or that they interfered with the jury’s decision-making. Am. Power Prods.,
239 Ariz. 151, ¶ 18.

We are similarly unpersuaded that we must presume the
existence of prejudice, which would require a “structural defect” in the trial.
Id. ¶ 17. Clem has largely not addressed this issue. At best, she points to
the possibility that juror six’s friendship with Teeple and support for Lamb
influenced the jury’s discussions about the evidence before the juror was
excused.

But Clem has not explained how these facts could have
deprived her of an essential right. Although the jury could discuss the
evidence, it was instructed not to “form final opinions about any fact or
about the outcome of the case” until hearing all evidence, argument, and
instructions. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 40(h)(1)(B) (requiring court to instruct
jurors to “reserve judgment about the action’s outcome until deliberations
begin”). That did not occur until after juror six was excused. We presume
the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. Ahmad v. State, 245 Ariz. 573,
¶ 10 (App. 2018). As a result, we see no basis for presuming that any
improper communications from juror six resulted in a structural defect. It
follows that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clem’s motion
for mistrial. Excusing juror six was a sufficient remedy for any impropriety
or error in his empanelment.

STANDARD-OF-CARE EXPERT

Clem also argues that the trial court improperly allowed a
defense expert to testify about jail standards of care even though his report
did not use the term “standard of care.” In Clem’s view, this amounts to a
disclosure violation under Rule 37(c)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure. We review for an abuse of discretion whether a trial court
properly admitted expert testimony. Escamilla v. Cuello, 230 Ariz. 202, ¶ 20
(2012). We apply the same standard to a court’s decision to allow untimely

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disclosed evidence. Estate of Brady v. Tempe Life Care Village, Inc., 254 Ariz.
122, ¶ 16 (App. 2022).

At issue is the testimony of Gary DeLand. Clem objected to
DeLand’s testimony on the ground of a lack of disclosure, but the trial court
overruled the objection. DeLand’s report is not in our record. But DeLand
acknowledged at trial that the report did not use the term “standard of
care.” It did contain details about standards for intake, supervision,
surveillance, security checks, headcounts, and “meal pass-outs.” DeLand
testified extensively about these issues. And in doing so, he was asked
numerous questions, both on direct and cross-examination, about the
standard of care. His opinion had also been described in at least one pretrial
document as containing standard-of-care opinions.

Rule 26.1(d) provides detailed requirements for expert
reports. Among these is a “complete statement of all opinions the expert
will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Ariz. R. Civ. P.
26.1(d)(4)(B). If a party fails to timely disclose required material, the trial
court must preclude the party from using the information at trial. Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 37(c)(1). However, this is not required if the “court specifically finds
that such failure caused no prejudice or orders otherwise for good cause.”
Id.

Here, while the term “standard of care” is legally significant,
we are unpersuaded that its omission from the report constitutes a failure
to disclose under Rule 26.1. This is especially true given our inability to
compare DeLand’s report to his testimony. From the record, it appears that
his testimony and report covered the same subject matter. Therefore, Clem
could not have reasonably been surprised by his testimony, especially given
the pretrial document describing him as a standard-of-care expert. See
Reyes v. Town of Gilbert, 247 Ariz. 151, ¶ 24 (App. 2019) (explaining purpose
of disclosure rules is to allow parties to reasonably prepare for trial, and
“courts must use a common-sense approach in applying the rules”). Nor
has Clem adequately described how the omission prejudiced her. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to preclude DeLand’s testimony.

RULE 68 SANCTION

On cross-appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court
improperly reduced a mandatory sanction under Rule 68. The sanction was
ordered because the defendants obtained a more favorable verdict at trial
than an offer of judgment they had conveyed in June 2016. We review the

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court’s award of expert fees under Rule 68 for an abuse of discretion. Flood
Control Dist. v. Paloma Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 230 Ariz. 29, ¶ 57 (App. 2012).

Rule 68 concerns offers of judgment. At issue here is
subsection (g), which imposes consequences on a party that rejected an offer
and failed to obtain a more favorable judgment. The trial court relied on
the 2016 version of Rule 68(g), which was in effect when the offer was made.
Under that version, the party that rejected the offer was required to “pay,
as a sanction, reasonable expert witness fees and double the taxable costs,
as defined in A.R.S. § 12-332, incurred by the offeror after making the offer.”
The court calculated the sanction at $15,931.67 for taxable costs and $30,000
for reasonable expert fees. The defendants, however, had sought $16,283.72
in taxable costs and $61,827.71 in expert fees.

The defendants challenge the reduction. They appear to focus
primarily on the reduction in expert fees, because they conceded in the trial
court that the cost reduction was appropriate. In their view, because Rule
68 made an award mandatory, the court was required to explain its
reduction. But Rule 68 does not expressly require the court to do so, and
the defendants have identified no other authority that does.

More generally, trial courts have broad discretion in assessing
the reasonableness of expert fees. Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, ¶ 18
(App. 2006). And the defendants have cited no authority requiring courts
to explain reductions based on unreasonableness. We do not generally
require such explanations in determinations of a reasonable attorney fee.
See, e.g., Fulton Homes Corp. v. BBP Concrete, 214 Ariz. 566, ¶ 9 (App. 2007)
(providing that attorney-fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 can be affirmed
“with a reasonable basis even if the trial court gives no reasons for its
decision regarding whether to award fees”).

We see no reason to depart from that practice here. This is
especially true because Clem presented significant argument in the trial
court that the defendants’ experts had kept insufficient time records. We
therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in reducing
the expert-witness-fee award.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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