Brenden Kapusta v. Dr. Bryce Bennett, Oasis Psychological Services, Bianca Boling

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

BRENDEN KAPUSTA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

DR. BRYCE BENNETT, OASIS PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, AND BIANCA BOLING,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0317
Filed January 30, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023054647
The Honorable Michael Gordon, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Brenden Kapusta, Aurora, Oregon
In Propria Persona

Klein Thomas Lee & Fresard
By Brandon L. Boxler, Richmond, Virginia

and

By Paul R. Lee and Elsa Paulina Rivera Ramirez, Phoenix
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Dr. Bryce Bennett and Oasis Psychological
Services

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Phoenix
By Charles T. Carson and J. William Cook
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Bianca Boling
 KAPUSTA v. BENNETT
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Chief Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Brearcliffe concurred and Judge Eckerstrom dissented.

S T A R I N G, Chief Judge:

¶1 Brenden Kapusta appeals from the superior court’s orders
dismissing his claims against Dr. Bryce Bennet, Oasis Psychological
Services, and Bianca Boling (collectively, “the Oasis Defendants”).1 For the
reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In 2014, Kapusta pled guilty to attempted voyeurism. The
superior court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed him on
probation for ten years. The conditions of Kapusta’s probation required
him to “attend, actively participate in, and remain in sex offender treatment
at the discretion of” the probation department.

¶3 After several years of treatment with another provider, the
probation department referred Kapusta to Oasis Psychological Services,
where he began treatment with a student clinician, Boling, under the
supervision of Dr. Bennett. Oasis discharged Kapusta after approximately
seven months. The discharge summary stated that he had “display[ed]
minimal commitment to the treatment process,” had violated Oasis’s
“group payment policy,” had been “disrespectful” towards “staff and
therapists,” and had disobeyed Oasis’s “Group Expectations and Program
Description policy.”

¶4 Immediately after Oasis discharged Kapusta, the probation
department filed a petition to revoke his probation, noting, among other
things, that he had been “unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender
treatment at Oasis” and had “chose[n] to consume alcohol” in violation of

1Kapusta also appealed the dismissal of his claims against various

employees of the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department. Pursuant
to stipulation, Kapusta’s claims against those defendants were dismissed
with prejudice in February 2025. Accordingly, we consider only the claims
against the Oasis Defendants.

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the conditions of his probation. At a revocation hearing, Kapusta admitted
he had consumed alcohol. Based on this admission, the superior court
found Kapusta had violated the terms of his probation. At the disposition
hearing, the court again suspended the imposition of sentence and
reinstated probation, extending it for approximately six months. The court
also dismissed the remaining allegations in the petition to revoke.

¶5 Nearly two years later, Kapusta filed this lawsuit, asserting a
number of claims against Oasis, as well as others. Kapusta alleged that
Oasis had wrongfully discharged him and that the superior court had
wrongfully extended the term of his probation by relying on reports
containing deceptive and defamatory statements. Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., all of the defendants moved to dismiss Kapusta’s
claims against them, arguing, in part, that they were shielded by absolute
judicial immunity. The Oasis Defendants additionally claimed that the
statute of limitations barred Kapusta’s negligence-based claims against
them. After hearing argument, the superior court concluded that the
defendants were “entitled to absolute immunity” and granted their
respective motions, but it declined to address additional arguments,
including whether Kapusta had complied with all applicable statutes of
limitation. The court dismissed the action in its entirety, and this appeal
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
12-2101(A)(1).

Discussion

I. Judicial Immunity

¶6 Kapusta argues the superior court erred in granting the Oasis
Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of absolute judicial immunity.
We review de novo the dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Coleman v.
City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 7 (2012); see also Brittner v. Lanzilotta, 246 Ariz.
294, ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (whether judicial immunity applies is question of law
reviewed de novo). In doing so, we “must assume the truth of all
well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from
those facts.” Coleman, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 9. Dismissal is inappropriate unless,
as a matter of law, the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any
interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, ¶ 4 (1998). As a general policy matter, Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are disfavored under Arizona law. See State
ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594 (1983).

¶7 Kapusta argues the Oasis Defendants are not entitled to
judicial immunity because they “were not advising the Court nor were they

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acting pursuant to any Court order” when the allegedly defamatory
discharge report was written. (Emphasis omitted.) We agree.

¶8 “Judicial immunity protects judges from civil liability for
judicial acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Brittner,
246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 6. Over the years, judicial immunity has also been extended
to certain officers “who perform functions integral to the judicial process.”
Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 99, 101 (App. 1992) (psychologist aiding
court in determining child custody entitled to absolute immunity); see also
Brittner, 246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 7 (therapist appointed by court as advisor
regarding child custody entitled to judicial immunity); DeSilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597, ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (probation officers filing probation revocation
petitions entitled to absolute immunity). “The consistent reasoning in these
cases is that each non-judicial officer performed a function, pursuant to a
court directive, which was related to the judicial process. This application
of judicial immunity . . . would not exist except for the direct connection
with the court.” Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321
(1984). Importantly, “governmental liability is the rule in Arizona and
immunity is the exception.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 200 Ariz. 174, ¶ 4 (2001).
Therefore, the reach of judicial immunity is extremely limited, and courts
bestow immunity with hesitance. See id.; Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 (1977).

¶9 Here, there is no direct connection between the defendants
and the superior court. See Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (“[J]udicial immunity
may fairly be described as derivative in that the immunity would not exist
except for the direct connection with the court.”). The court played no role
in the selection of Oasis and did not require Oasis to provide any specific
treatment or information to it. The court merely ordered Kapusta to attend
sex-offender treatment “at the discretion of” the probation department.
Thus, the court did not even directly order Kapusta to attend treatment.
The probation department exercised its discretion, initially referring
Kapusta to one treatment program and, several years later, requiring that
he attend Oasis. Notably, in Acevedo, a case that arose from allegations of
negligence in supervising a sex offender on probation, our supreme court
concluded that probation officers do not have immunity for supervisory
and administrative acts concerning probationers, highlighting the limited
nature of judicial immunity. Id. at 320, 322; see also Garibay v. Johnson, 259
Ariz. 248, ¶ 16 (2025) (“We distill from our jurisprudence the principle that
common law judicial immunity applies to court officers, employees, and
agents who ‘assist the court in the judicial process’ by carrying out court
orders or otherwise serving an integral part of the judicial process.”
(quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322)). Acevedo and Garibay, along with the fact

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that immunity is disfavored under Arizona law, compel the conclusion that
the Oasis Defendants do not enjoy judicial immunity.

¶10 The Oasis Defendants nonetheless argue that the lack of a
direct connection has no impact on the applicability of judicial immunity
because probation officers are members of the judicial branch, “[s]o either
way, Oasis served and reported to the judiciary.” As noted, this argument
fails in light of Acevedo. Further, a connection to a member of the judicial
branch who reports to the court cannot be equated with a direct connection
to the court itself. See A.R.S. § 12-253 (adult probation officers exercise
supervision over probationers, subject to control and direction by the
court); see also Griggs v. Oasis Adoption Servs., Inc., 241 Ariz. 71, ¶ 20 (App.
2016) (“A generalized connection to the judicial process does not confer
immunity for all activities.”); Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322 (no immunity for
negligent supervision of probationers).

¶11 The Oasis Defendants additionally argue that Lavit and
Brittner are analogous to the instant case, which compels a finding in their
favor. In Lavit, we determined that a psychologist, chosen by the parties
and directly ordered by the court to “serve as an expert for the [trial] court”
in determining child custody, was entitled to judicial immunity. 173 Ariz.
at 100-01. We reasoned that “his evaluations and recommendations aided
the trial court” and that “his services were performed pursuant to a court
order,” elevating the psychologist’s “role to that of a court-appointed
psychologist.” Id. Similarly, in Brittner, this court concluded that a
court-appointed therapist was entitled to judicial immunity because she
was appointed primarily to “make recommendations to assist in a custody
determination,” and the trial “court ultimately relied on” those
recommendations. 246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 7. We further reasoned that the
therapeutic services she had provided—which generally would not be
protected by immunity—were merely “incidental to the court’s purpose.”
Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.

¶12 Lavit and Brittner are distinguishable from this case. First,
unlike the trial courts in Lavit and Brittner, the superior court here neither
appointed the defendants nor requested their recommendations. As
discussed above, the court ordered that the probation department would
have the discretion to require Kapusta to attend sex-offender treatment, and
it was the probation department that referred Kapusta to Oasis and that
provided information about his discharge to the court.

¶13 Next, defendant Boling contends that, as in DeSilva, the
defendants are entitled to judicial immunity because their conduct, as it
relates to the preparation of the discharge summary, is closely related to the
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judicial process. In DeSilva, the court determined that probation officers are
entitled to absolute immunity when filing probation revocation petitions
because doing so is “necessary to carry out and enforce the conditions of
probation of the court.” 208 Ariz. 597, ¶¶ 21-22. The court further reasoned
that “probation officers are a well-recognized part of the judicial
department” and that their statutory duties to supervise probationers are
performed “on behalf of and in aid of the court’s jurisdictional function.”
Id. ¶ 23. However, this rationale does not extend to the present matter
because, unlike the probation officers in DeSilva, the defendants are not
members of the judicial branch nor are they bound by statute to supervise
probationers on behalf of the court. See id. ¶¶ 22-23, 26.

¶14 Finally, the Oasis Defendants contend that policy
considerations support extending judicial immunity to the defendants.
Quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321, they argue that granting judicial
immunity to the defendants would “further ‘the underlying policy of
judicial immunity’—namely, to safeguard ‘principled and fearless
decision-making.’” However, the defendants’ conduct, insofar as it relates
to drafting the allegedly defamatory discharge summary, did not involve
any decision-making integral to the judicial process. Indeed, the discharge
summary stated the reasons for Kapusta’s discharge after the decision to
discharge him had already been made. Thus, its drafting did not require
anyone to exercise discretion or reach a conclusion. See DeSilva, 208 Ariz.
597, ¶¶ 23-24.

¶15 The Oasis Defendants also allege that their exposure to
liability will discourage practitioners from accepting “the burdens of
providing these court-ordered treatments.” But we have no evidence that
this phenomenon has occurred in other contexts in which immunity has
been denied, and, on the record before us, we decline to depart from our
precedent, including Arizona’s strong preference for not granting
immunity. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 185 Ariz. 440, 447 (App. 1995) (denying
immunity to state caseworkers for pre-adoption investigations and
post-placement monitoring); Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322 (not “all the activities
of a probation officer in supervising a probationer are entitled to
immunity”). Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s conclusion that
the Oasis Defendants were entitled to judicial immunity for their role in
preparing the discharge summary provided to the probation department.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶16 The Oasis Defendants argue, in the alternative, that we
should “affirm the dismissal of the two negligence-based claims . . . because
those claims are time-barred.” Specifically, they claim that Kapusta should
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have filed suit by June 2023—instead of December 4, 2023—because the
two-year statute of limitations began to run when Oasis discharged him in
June 2021. In reply, Kapusta contends that “[n]othing in the Verified
Complaint, or the record as a whole, conclusively establishes that [he]
discovered or should have discovered the alleged wrongdoing outside the
limitations period.”

¶17 The statute of limitations for a negligence claim is two years.
A.R.S. § 12-542. The statute begins to run when “the plaintiff knows or with
reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.” Doe v.
Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29 (1998). “A plaintiff need not know all the facts
underlying a cause of action” but “must at least possess a minimum
requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and
caused injury.” Id. ¶ 32. Generally, when a claim accrued is a question of
fact for the jury. Satamian v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 163, ¶ 14 (2024).

¶18 Below, the superior court declined to address the defendants’
statute of limitations argument after dismissing Kapusta’s claims on
immunity grounds. And the fact that Oasis discharged Kapusta in June
2021 does not, on its own, establish that he knew or should have known the
facts underlying the cause of action at that time. See Doe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29.
As such, we remand the case to the superior court to determine whether
Kapusta’s claims were time-barred. See Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP,
241 Ariz. 440, ¶ 17 (App. 2017) (remanding to trial court to resolve factual
question of when limitations period commenced).

Disposition

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the
superior court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

E C K E R S T R O M, Judge, dissenting:

¶20 “The purpose behind judicial immunity is to protect
‘principled and fearless decision-making.’” Widoff v. Wiens, 202 Ariz. 383,
¶ 9 (App. 2002) (quoting Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980)).
In practice, judges, and those performing integral judicial functions, must
be able to perform their duties “without fear of the threat of litigation.” See
id. ¶ 12. Non-judicial actors are deemed to perform integral judicial
functions when they act on behalf of the court “pursuant to a court
directive, which was related to the judicial process.” Acevedo v. Pima Cnty.
Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321 (1984).

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¶21 In essence, Kapusta maintains that the Oasis Defendants
harmed him by authoring reports that caused the superior court judge to
make adverse decisions about his probation. In authoring those reports—
and conducting the evaluations and treatment sessions underlying them—
Oasis performed several integral judicial functions. It provided an
evaluation, thereby assisting the court in determining whether Kapusta
needed treatment and whether that treatment could assist him. It provided
treatment allowing Kapusta to receive an opportunity for rehabilitation,
thereby facilitating the court’s traditional probationary goals of improving
a probationer’s life trajectory and reducing the risk of recidivism. And, it
provided reports containing a candid judgment about Kapusta’s
compliance with the evaluation and counseling regimen, thereby allowing
the court to determine whether Kapusta had been abiding by his conditions
of probation—crucial information relied upon by the court to vigilantly
guard the public from future harm. Because Kapusta’s grievances relate
exclusively to how the Oasis Defendants performed these judicial
functions, each integral to the court’s implementation and enforcement of
its sentencing order, I cannot agree with my colleagues that the court erred
in dismissing Kapusta’s complaint. Id. at 321-22 (judicial immunity should
apply when non-judicial actor engages in integral judicial functions
pursuant to court directive).

¶22 The majority reasons that the Oasis Defendants do not qualify
for judicial immunity because they acted without “direct connection” to the
superior court’s orders. In support of this premise, my colleagues
emphasize that the court’s sentencing order granted the probation office
discretion whether to require Kapusta to participate in counseling. The
majority further observes that the court’s sentencing order is silent as to the
identity of any specific provider and even any requirement that a report be
provided.

¶23 This reasoning overlooks that the probation department acted
exclusively under the authority of the superior court’s sentencing order
when it required Kapusta to participate in counseling with Oasis. That
order directed Kapusta to “actively participate and cooperate in any
program of counseling . . . as determined by [the Adult Probation
Department (APD)].” The order implicitly directed the probation
department to assess whether Kapusta needed counseling to remain
law-abiding. Further, the court’s order expressly contemplated and

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facilitated the court’s access to any reports on Kapusta’s performance in any
counseling ultimately required under the authority of the court’s order.2

¶24 In short, the sentencing order delegated to the probation
department the authority to act as a conduit for executing the superior
court’s orders as to Kapusta’s counseling. Indeed, in the absence of the
court’s sentencing order, the probation department lacked any authority to
direct Kapusta into counseling or any leverage to induce his compliance
with it. When the Oasis Defendants carried out those directives, as
communicated by the probation department, they engaged in functions
integral to executing the court’s orders. They acted, at the direction of the
court’s express delegates, in conformity with the intentions of the court as
expressed by its sentencing order.

¶25 In determining whether non-judicial actors, such as the Oasis
Defendants, are entitled to absolute immunity for facilitating the superior
court’s conditions on a claimant’s probation, we should honor our supreme
court’s reasoning on that specific question. In Acevedo, the court clarified
that non-judicial officers are “entitled to absolute protection from suit for
actions which are necessary to carry out and enforce the conditions of
probation imposed by the court.” See id. at 322 (applying principle of
judicial immunity to probation officers).3 Kapusta’s complaint focuses
entirely on actions the Oasis Defendants took to execute and enforce the
conditions of probation imposed on Kapusta. Thus, under both the public
policy rationale for judicial immunity articulated in Acevedo and our
supreme court’s specific application of that rationale to the implementation

2The court’s sentencing order required Kapusta to “sign any release

or consent required by the APD so the APD can exchange information in
relation to my treatment, behavior and activities.”
3The majority opinion suggests the Oasis Defendants should not

receive immunity for their actions to supervise and enforce probation
conditions because they are neither officers of the court nor employees of a
judicial officer. But, our supreme court has expressly declined to make that
distinction in assessing immunity for non-judicial actors. Acevedo, 142 Ariz.
at 322 (“Those officers, employees, and agents who assist the court in the
judicial process are also entitled to absolute immunity.”) (emphasis added);
see also Brittner v. Lanzilotta, 246 Ariz. 294, ¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2019) (granting
absolute immunity to therapist appointed to assist parents in child custody
dispute).

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of probation conditions, the Oasis Defendants should receive absolute
immunity from such lawsuits. See id. at 321-22.

¶26 The inevitable result of the majority’s contrary conclusion
should give us pause. In deciding whether to provide services to our courts,
the Oasis Defendants, and the host of other non-employee counselors who
assist our courts, now must weigh the financial risks of defending lawsuits
like Kapusta’s. And, even if our courts remain able to secure providers
under these circumstances, those providers will now face the potential
threat of legal retaliation from each probationer who takes issue with the
content of their reports or the quality of their counseling sessions. Such
threats of litigation will predictably challenge a provider’s resolve either to
insist on substantial compliance with the counseling regimen or to provide
uncompromising candor in their subsequent reports to the court.

¶27 For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.4

4Because I would affirm the court’s dismissal of the case on the

ground that the Oasis Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, I do
not address the question of whether the action is also time-barred.

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