Tamara Camila Rivero Quinteros v. Anthony Celaya

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

ANTHONY CELAYA,
Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TAMARA CAMILA RIVERO QUINTEROS,
Respondent/Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CV 2025-0040-FC
Filed November 20, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2014094181
The Honorable Lisa S. Wahlin, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Anthony Celaya, Chandler
In Propria Persona

Adam C. Rieth P.L.L.C, Mesa
By Adam Rieth
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 CELAYA v. RIVERO QUINTEROS
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge O’Neil authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief
Judge Eppich and Judge Sklar concurred.

O’ N E I L, Judge:

¶1 Trial courts have discretion to modify legal decision-making
and parenting time in the best interests of a child. They abuse that
discretion in reaching a decision unsupported by substantial evidence,
failing to consider relevant evidence, or erring under the law. But our
review for such abuse cannot be a mere reweighing of the evidence, nor
does disagreement with a court’s decision alone suggest error. In this
appeal, Tamara Rivero Quinteros asserts the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied her request to modify legal decision-making and instead
granted Anthony Celaya’s request for more parenting time. She claims the
court reached its decision without substantial supporting evidence, ignored
relevant evidence, and committed legal error. We affirm because the
court’s decision was a proper exercise of its discretion in considering the
facts in evidence and entering orders to serve the child’s best interests.

Background

¶2 Anthony and Tamara have shared joint legal decision-making
for their child since the trial court first entered its decree in 2014. The child
spent the first several years of his life living primarily with Tamara. In the
decree, the court noted that because of his work schedule, Anthony did “not
want parenting time during his work hours” and had asked only for
parenting time “from 2:30 pm to 9:00 pm during the work week, with
alternate weekends.” The decree gave Anthony parenting time each
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evening and on alternating weekends.

¶3 The trial court twice dismissed Tamara’s petitions to reduce
Anthony’s parenting time, in 2014 and 2015. But in 2021, based on
Anthony’s petition to modify parenting time, the court found that
circumstances of Anthony’s employment had significantly changed,
warranting increased parenting time. Although the court kept the child’s
schedule the same during the school year, it ordered equal parenting time
during summer break.

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¶4 Tamara filed another petition to modify legal decision-
making, parenting time, and child support in 2023, seeking final say in
parenting decisions and reduced parenting time for Anthony. In his
response, Anthony asked the court to modify legal decision-making and
parenting time by instead giving him final say and equal parenting time.
After an evidentiary hearing, in 2024, the court ordered that the parties
would continue to share joint legal decision-making but modified parenting
time so that Anthony and Tamara shared equal time throughout the year.
The court later denied Tamara’s motion for additional findings and to alter
or amend its ruling. Tamara appeals from the court’s decision.

Discussion

¶5 Tamara asserts the trial court abused its discretion because it
did not grant her final say in legal decision-making and granted equal
parenting time instead of limiting Anthony’s parenting time to weekends
during the school year. She claims the court lacked substantial evidence to
support its decision, ignored evidence, and committed legal error.

¶6 A petition to modify legal decision-making and parenting
time involves a two-stage inquiry. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339,
¶ 14 (App. 2020). The court’s sole task in the first stage is to decide whether
there has been a change in circumstances that materially affects the child’s
welfare. Id. ¶ 16. If so, the court will go on in the second stage to
“determine legal decision-making and parenting time . . . in accordance
with the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A); see Backstrand, 250
Ariz. 339, ¶¶ 14, 25. Trial courts have significant discretion throughout this
process. They have discretion to weigh evidence and witness credibility in
determining the facts. Yanez v. Sanchez, 257 Ariz. 302, ¶ 30 (App. 2024).
They also have discretion to decide whether the facts represent a material
change in circumstances warranting modification. Backstrand, 250 Ariz.
339, ¶ 14. If so, they have discretion in evaluating the best interests of the
child. See Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 284 (1977) (trial judge in “best position
to determine the issues” and has “wide discretion in deciding what will be
in the best interests of the child”). And, after considering those interests,
courts have discretion to craft appropriate legal decision-making and
parenting time provisions. Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, ¶¶ 31-34 (App.
2022).

¶7 Although trial courts must make decisions about legal
decision-making and parenting time in the child’s best interests, this
necessity does not mean that courts supplant the rights of fit parents in
favor of their own preferences and beliefs concerning what good parenting

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ought to entail. See Jordan v. Rea, 221 Ariz. 581, ¶¶ 19-20, 22 (App. 2009)
(“Of course, the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not and cannot
abrogate a fit parent’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of his or
her child.”). Parents possess the fundamental right to direct their child’s
“upbringing, education, health care and mental health.” A.R.S. § 1-601(A).
Arizona law presumes it is in a child’s best interest to have both parents
involved in parenting decisions and “[t]o have substantial, frequent,
meaningful and continuing parenting time with both parents.” A.R.S. § 25-
103(B). Mere disagreement with parental decisions does not suggest
grounds to reduce or strip away the parent’s presence and responsibility in
the child’s life. See § 1-601(B); cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000)
(parents presumed to act in child’s best interest). Even when the context of
some intractable parental dispute requires a court to decide an issue in a
child’s best interests, the court cannot replace the role of a parent. See
Jordan, 221 Ariz. 581, ¶¶ 19-20, 22; Nicaise v. Sundaram, 244 Ariz. 272, ¶¶ 1,
27-28 (App. 2018) (court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the
parents and make parenting decisions for them”), vacated in part on other
grounds, 245 Ariz. 566 (2019); cf. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (in context of
grandparent visitation decision by single parent, “the court must accord at
least some special weight to the parent’s own determination” of what best
interests require).

¶8 In keeping with these principles, provided both parents are fit
and absent dangers such as child abuse and domestic violence, the factors
trial courts must consider in determining a child’s best interests under § 25-
403(A) are largely relational. Courts must evaluate factors “relevant to the
child’s physical and emotional well-being” such as the child’s relationship
with the parents and other friends and family, the child’s adjustment to life
in and around each home, the child’s own desires, the mental and physical
health of all involved, and each parent’s ability to maintain a healthy
working relationship with the other. § 25-403(A). Similarly, in determining
legal decision-making, § 25-403.01(B) directs courts to consider the parents’
agreement, reasonableness in agreeing or disagreeing, and ability to
cooperate, as well as the logistical feasibility of joint decision-making.
While these statutory factors are not exhaustive, they generally attend to a
child’s desires, attachments, and adjustment to each home environment,
along with each parent’s willingness to cooperate without undermining the
other parent’s role in the child’s upbringing. Id. With these and other
relevant factors in mind, § 25-403.02(B) requires courts to “adopt a
parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-
making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting
time.”

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¶9 The whole of this endeavor is an exercise of a trial court’s
discretion that we will not disturb absent abuse. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339,
¶ 14. A court may abuse its discretion by reaching a decision unsupported
by evidence, by failing to consider relevant evidence, or by erring according
to law—each of which Tamara alleges here. Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486,
¶ 9 (App. 2012). But as Tamara presents her arguments in this appeal, each
is essentially an invitation to reweigh the evidence and to substitute our
own judgment in place of the court’s discretion. We decline the invitation.

I. Insufficient Evidence

¶10 Tamara challenges the trial court’s orders concerning both
legal decision-making and parenting time on the basis that the court’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We will reverse a
decision to modify legal decision-making and parenting time on this basis
only “when the record is devoid of competent evidence to support the
decision.” Yanez, 257 Ariz. 302, ¶ 26 (quoting Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243
Ariz. 469, ¶ 4 (App. 2018)). It is not enough to show that conflicting
evidence cut against the court’s conclusion or that the supporting evidence
was unpersuasive. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, ¶ 16 (App. 2009). Our role
is not to reweigh evidence. Id. “[O]ur only concern is whether facts have
been established which might reasonably support the trial court’s
judgment.” Whittemore v. Amator, 148 Ariz. 173, 175 (1986). In considering
this issue, we view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
court’s decision. State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, ¶ 14
(App. 2003).

¶11 Tamara’s opening brief recounts at length the conflicting
evidence that, if viewed in the light most favorable to her, might have
supported a decision in her favor. Her argument ill fits our standard of
review, which instead requires demonstrating that the record lacks
evidence to support the trial court’s decision.1 The existence of contrary

1Tamara misstates this standard in her opening brief. Contrary to
her articulation of the standard, when considering whether substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s decision, the existence of conflicting
evidence is not merely the beginning of our analysis. More often, it is the
end. When conflicting evidence exists concerning a disputed fact, we trust
the court to weigh that evidence in deciding the issue. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48,
¶ 16; see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., L.L.C., 215 Ariz. 589, ¶ 27 (App.
2007) (“To the extent the parties presented facts from which conflicting

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evidence, however persuasive, does not in itself suggest the court abused
its discretion so long as the record contains evidence that reasonably
supports the court’s decision. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, ¶ 16. And it does.

A. Joint Legal Decision-Making

¶12 In determining that Anthony and Tamara would continue to
share joint legal decision-making without either party having final say, as
they had done for the preceding ten years, the trial court found the parents
had “been able to cooperate in decision-making to the extent required” and
joint legal decision-making remained “logistically possible.” Tamara
argues this decision was unsupported by evidence because for two years,
Anthony did not agree to medicate their child for anxiety. She thus asserts
the court abused its discretion because it did not find that Anthony’s “delay
in approving anxiety medication . . . was not in the child’s best interest” and
in failing to give Tamara final say in legal decision-making as a
consequence.

¶13 The ultimate question before the trial court, however, was not
whether the child would have benefited from anxiety medication or even
whether either Tamara or Anthony had acted wisely in evaluating the
child’s needs. The parents had already resolved that dispute on their own.
The court was deciding whether joint legal decision-making was in the
child’s best interests. See § 25-403(A) (“court shall determine legal decision-
making . . . in accordance with the best interests of the child”). In
considering a legal decision-making arrangement between two fit parents,
the court could not simply override either parent’s fundamental right to
direct the child’s healthcare and upbringing. See § 1-601(A); Jordan, 221
Ariz. 581, ¶¶ 19-20, 22 (“Unless fit parents disagree, the courts have no
jurisdiction to become involved with a fit parent’s choices for the
upbringing of the child and override that paramount parental privilege.”).
That right generally allows parents to disagree in good faith about a child’s
best interests without fear that a court might limit involvement in the
child’s life merely because it sides with the other parent in a dispute. See
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-69; § 1-601(B).

¶14 In this case, even if the trial court had agreed with Tamara
that the better choice would have been to approve medication much earlier,
it was not required to conclude that a modification of legal decision-making

inferences could be drawn . . . , it was for the trial court, not this court, to
weigh those facts.”).

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was in the child’s best interests. This is because the court was evaluating a
legal decision-making arrangement, not the merits of a healthcare or any
other parenting decision. Whatever the wisdom of each parent’s position
concerning their child’s need for medication, consistent with the factors in
§§ 25-403(A) and 403.01(B), the court had ample reason to conclude that the
child had a healthy relationship with both parents and that the parents were
capable of working together for the good of the child despite their
differences.

¶15 Anthony viewed the prospect of medicating the child
differently than Tamara did. He testified that he had resisted medicating
the child because he was “very hesitant with medication” and believed the
child merely had an “attention issue.” That disagreement long persisted.
But although their communication was poor, as the trial court noted, they
worked through their differences in time, and eventually they agreed to
medicate their child.

¶16 Anthony testified that although he and Tamara have
“moments where [they]’re just not on the same page,” they could both “do
[their] part to come to an agreement.” In fact, they had done so, including
in situations where Anthony had “hesitations” but either compromised or
deferred to Tamara’s wishes. According to Anthony’s testimony, he and
Tamara are “two parents trying to do what is best for their child” but who
do “not always . . . agree on things.” Although the trial court
acknowledged Tamara’s assertion that Anthony had not been “fully
invested” in the decision-making process, the court apparently disagreed,
concluding that their “different parenting styles” did not prevent them
from cooperating as necessary. The record reasonably supports the court’s
decision to order joint legal decision-making.

B. Equal Parenting Time

¶17 The trial court found the child “has a good relationship with
both parents,” is “close with” his extended family on both sides, and “is
adjusted to both homes.” As a result, the court concluded that a schedule
allowing equal time with both parents throughout the year was in the
child’s best interests. Tamara argues the court’s decision is unsupported by
the record because she presented evidence that she was the better parent.
She also argues the court “misapplied best interest factors” in finding that
Anthony was more likely than Tamara “to allow the child frequent,
meaningful and continuing contact” with the other parent and because it
found that Anthony attends school-related meetings “when his work
schedule allows.” Tamara recites her own testimony concerning Anthony’s

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various purported shortcomings, argues that Anthony’s explanations and
contrary evidence were unpersuasive, and concludes that “[i]t cannot be
any clearer as to which parent is interested in the child’s best interest.”

¶18 Proceedings to determine parenting time between fit parents
are not a contest to decide who is the better parent. See Goodman v. Forsen, 239 Ariz. 110, ¶ 14 (App. 2016) (“The court’s role is not to engineer what it
perceives to be the optimal situation for the child.”), abrogated in part on other
grounds, In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 244 Ariz. 111, ¶ 19 (2018). A trial
court will not limit parenting time merely to punish a parent for decisions
the court does not approve. See Jordan, 221 Ariz. 581, ¶ 22; Jackson v.
Tangreen, 199 Ariz. 306, ¶ 13 (App. 2000) (trial court may not “substitute its
own judgment for that of a fit parent”). The court might dislike certain
decisions of either or both parents, on any number of occasions, yet decide
nonetheless that the child’s interests will be best served by equal parenting
time. See A.R.S. § 25-103(B) (presumption that child’s best interests served
by having both parents involved in decision-making with substantial
parenting time).

¶19 Nor was the trial court obliged to join Tamara in inferring
from the facts that Anthony was not “interested in the child’s best interest.”
The court determines such facts. See Yanez, 257 Ariz. 302, ¶ 30. After doing
so, the court has discretion to decide on parenting time orders in the child’s
interest. Gish, 253 Ariz. 437, ¶ 34. Although Tamara testified that Anthony
was not “fully invested” in parenting the child, the court also heard
Anthony’s testimony that both parents cared for the child even though they
disagreed. Tamara’s argument asks us to second-guess the court’s
credibility determinations, reweigh the evidence, and substitute our
judgment concerning the best interests of the child for the court’s own. That
is not our role. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, ¶ 27 (“We will not substitute our
judgment by reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests
analysis.”).

¶20 In explaining its finding that Anthony was the parent more
likely to facilitate contact with the other parent, the trial court noted that
Tamara had “repeatedly made allegations or initiated proceedings against
[Anthony] in an attempt to reduce [Anthony]’s parenting time.” The
court’s statement might have referred, in part, to the positions Tamara took
in the initial paternity proceedings and her prior petitions to reduce
Anthony’s parenting time in 2014 and 2015. The court was entitled to
consider that context and the parties’ history in reaching a decision in this
proceeding. Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179-80 (1982). “[T]he

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present cannot be understood without considering the events of the past.”
Id. at 179.

¶21 As far back as the 2014 decree, the trial court found that
Tamara was “unreasonably hostile to the child having a relationship with
the child’s father” and had “deliberately made false allegations against
[Anthony] in order to undermine the child’s relationship with [Anthony]
on an improper basis.” The court concluded that Anthony was “far more
supportive of the child’s relationship with [Tamara] than [Tamara] is
supportive of the child’s relationship with [Anthony].”

¶22 Although Tamara misleadingly states her 2014 and 2015
petitions “were dismissed without adjudication on the merits,” the trial
court dismissed the 2014 petition “for failure to state a significant and
continuing change in the material circumstances.” Tamara made further
allegations against Anthony in response to Anthony’s successful petition to
modify parenting time in 2021, asking the court to designate Tamara
“primary residential parent with [Anthony] having parenting time based
upon the child’s comfort level and best interest.”

¶23 Within that historical context, the trial court might reasonably
have concluded that Tamara’s various allegations against Anthony and the
positions she took at trial reflected more of the same hostility towards the
child’s relationship with his father that Tamara had displayed in the past—
including, for example, her allegations that Anthony was not feeding,
showering, or providing medication for the child, was not ensuring he
finished his homework, and generally did not act in the child’s best interest.
The court heard Tamara’s testimony on each of those allegations, yet it
apparently disagreed with her conclusions, explaining that the evidence
failed to show “that the child is not being adequately cared for in either
home.”

¶24 Anthony, by contrast, testified “that it is essential for both
[parents] to be involved,” expressed optimism in their ability to resolve
issues, stated that the child “enjoys spending time with me” and “equally”
enjoyed spending time with his mother, and argued that an “equal amount
of time in both homes” would be “essential for him.” The record is replete
with evidence that Anthony was much more supportive of Tamara’s
relationship with the child than she was of his.

¶25 Evidence concerning Anthony’s attendance at meetings was
thoroughly contested at trial, and we will not second-guess the trial court’s
resolution of that issue. In re Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, ¶ 40 (App.

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2008). Anthony testified that he had “tried [his] best” to attend meetings
but would “rely on” Tamara to attend meetings during business hours.
Although Tamara points to a single meeting that Anthony missed while
unemployed, such that his work schedule should not have been an
“excuse,” a lone exception does not meaningfully undermine the court’s
finding, much less its ultimate conclusion that the child was “adjusted to
both homes.”

¶26 To prevail on appeal, it is not enough to relitigate the facts and
argue the trial court should have reached a different conclusion. See
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). Tamara’s burden is
to demonstrate that the record is bereft of evidence to support the court’s
decision, not merely that her own evidence was stronger or that Anthony’s
evidence should have been disregarded. Yanez, 257 Ariz. 302, ¶ 26.
However firmly Tamara might believe her own testimony was more
reliable, Anthony’s testimony supports the court’s findings, and those
findings, in turn, support the court’s order for equal parenting time. In
addition to the evidence of Anthony’s care for and relationship with the
child, Anthony testified that he believed the child’s needs would be better
served by a consistent year-round schedule spending equal time with each
parent. It seems the court agreed, and it had the discretion to do so. We
find no abuse of that discretion.

II. Failure to Consider Evidence

¶27 Tamara asserts that, in concluding the disagreements
between the two parents represented “a difference in parenting styles” that
did not warrant limiting Anthony’s parenting time, the trial court failed to
consider evidence relevant to the child’s best interests. She argues that the
court’s decision to award equal parenting time suggests the court “ignored
the evidence . . . that negatively reflected on [Anthony].” Tamara lists some
such evidence, ranging from Anthony’s purported failure to enforce nightly
showers before bedtime to his alleged inconsistency in ensuring the child
took medication.

¶28 A trial court abuses its discretion by reaching a conclusion
without considering relevant evidence. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, ¶ 9. We
assume, however, that a court has fully considered all of the relevant
evidence admitted into the record before making a decision. Fuentes v.
Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 18 (App. 2004). The fact that a court does not agree
with a party’s position in no way suggests a failure to consider evidence.
Scott v. L.E. Dixon Co., 42 Ariz. 525, 531 (1934). It means only that the court,
after considering the evidence, reached a different conclusion. Id. When

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we have found an abuse of discretion for failure to consider evidence, it is
because the record demonstrates the court wrongly removed relevant
evidence from the decision-making process, not merely because the court
reached a decision unfavorable to the party who proffered that evidence.
See, e.g., State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 102 (1983) (error in refusing to
consider mitigating circumstance not listed in sentencing statute).

¶29 Tamara’s disagreement with the trial court’s decision does
not demonstrate that the court failed to consider evidence. It shows only
that the court viewed the evidence and its implications differently. The
court might, for example, have disagreed with Tamara concerning the
strength of her evidence or the extent to which it reflected on Anthony’s
willingness or ability to care for the child. It might also have concluded that
equal parenting time would be in the child’s best interest despite any
relative weaknesses in Anthony’s parenting skills. Either would be within
the court’s discretion. We find no abuse.

III. Legal Error

¶30 Tamara asserts the trial court committed legal error by
modifying parenting time without a change in circumstances, failing to
explain why equal parenting time was in the child’s best interest, and
denying her motion for additional findings. We defer to a court’s factual
findings, but we review questions of law de novo. Borja v. Borja, 254 Ariz.
309, ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

A. Changed Circumstances

¶31 According to Tamara, “there was no change of circumstances
to warrant any modification of parenting time,” and the trial court’s
decision to modify parenting time was therefore an abuse of discretion. As
we have noted, the first stage of a court’s inquiry when considering a
modification is to determine whether there has been a change of
circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child. Backstrand, 250
Ariz. 339, ¶ 16. The court decides whether a modification is in the child’s
best interests only when it finds that such a change has occurred. Id. ¶ 14.
A court is not required, however, to make an express finding of changed
circumstances. See A.R.S. § 25-411(J). Unless the law demands express
findings, we will infer any findings necessary to sustain the court’s decision
so long as they are reasonably supported by evidence and do not contradict
express findings. Silva v. De Mund, 81 Ariz. 47, 50 (1956) (“[T]his court must
assume the trial court found every controverted issue of fact necessary to
sustain the judgment and, if there is reasonable evidence to support such

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findings, hold that it did so correctly.”); Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, ¶ 11
(App. 1998).

¶32 Tamara has waived this argument by failing to raise it before
the trial court. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) (“[A]bsent
extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised on appeal.”). Far from asserting that there had been no change in
circumstances, Tamara asserted numerous changed circumstances in her
petition to modify legal decision-making and parenting time. She never
abandoned her position throughout trial that those changes warranted
modification. Although their reasons differed, both parents agreed before
the court that circumstances had changed in a way that materially affected
their child’s welfare. Nor has Tamara abandoned her position that changed
circumstances warranted modification on appeal.

¶33 Her argument—which she did not articulate before the trial
court in any event—is different. Tamara argues, in effect, there were
changed circumstances for her but not for Anthony. She claims the only
evidence of “change[d] circumstances was presented by [Tamara]” and that
all such evidence “negatively reflected on [Anthony].” She urges, as a
result, the court could modify parenting time only in a manner that
benefited her. Despite her suggestion that the court committed an error of
law, the substance of her argument again challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence.

¶34 Waiver aside, Tamara is wrong about the record. It is
undisputed that the child had been diagnosed with ADHD and anxiety
since the trial court entered its prior orders, and Anthony testified that the
child “needs a constant schedule.” And the record, when viewed in
Anthony’s favor as it must be for the purpose of this appeal, includes
evidence that Anthony had a good relationship with the child and would
be better positioned to exercise equal parenting time than he had been in
the past, that the child had adjusted well to spending more time in
Anthony’s home since the prior modification, that the previous variable
schedule had not been good for the child, and that a more consistent and
equal division of time between both homes would benefit the child as he
grew older.

¶35 Tamara’s argument, moreover, reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the trial court’s two-stage inquiry in modifying
parenting time. In the first stage of its inquiry, the court must decide
whether changed circumstances exist that materially affect the child’s
welfare. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, ¶ 16. It makes no difference which

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parent introduces evidence of those changes, nor does it matter whether
those changes speak well of either parent. See id. The court’s sole concern
is whether circumstances have changed in a manner that materially affects
the welfare of the child. Id.

¶36 Once the trial court has found changed circumstances and has
entered the second stage of its inquiry, its job is to determine orders for legal
decision-making and parenting time that are in the child’s best interests. Id.
¶ 25. As we have explained, a proceeding to establish or modify parenting
time is not a contest for the court to decide which parent’s decisions have
been most optimal. See Goodman, 239 Ariz. 110, ¶ 14. And neither stage of
the court’s analysis involves considering which parent benefits from the
orders. See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, ¶ 14. The court is not limited to a
modification that serves the interests of the parent who alleged or
successfully proved a change in circumstances. Whenever a court
determines legal decision-making or parenting time, whether “originally or
on petition for modification,” § 25-403(A) requires that it do so “in
accordance with the best interests of the child.” The court must enter orders
that are in the child’s best interest, regardless of whether either parent finds
those orders preferable to what came before. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, ¶ 25.

¶37 The trial court here entered its modification order after both
parties asserted changed circumstances that materially affected the child’s
welfare. Because Tamara did not challenge the existence of changed
circumstances below—and, in fact, affirmatively asserted that
circumstances had changed—she has waived this issue on appeal. Even
absent waiver, the record reasonably supports a finding that circumstances
had changed. The court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Best Interest Findings

¶38 Tamara argues the trial court erred as a matter of law because
it “failed to state why a[n equal] schedule was in the child’s best interest.”
She asserts the court’s findings were not enough to satisfy § 25-403(B),
which requires “specific findings on the record about all relevant factors
and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.”
Similarly, Tamara argues the court abused its discretion by denying her
motion for additional findings because it “failed to state why its prior Order
was in the child’s best interest as required by statute and case law.”

¶39 To support her position, Tamara cites a memorandum
decision in which we suspended an appeal and remanded for factual
findings because a trial court did not adequately explain the reasons why a

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Opinion of the Court

parenting time order was in the child’s best interest. Sidoti v. Sidoti, 1 CA-
CV 18-0650 FC, ¶¶ 6-7 (Ariz. App. July 2, 2019) (mem. decision). The court’s
findings in Sidoti did not suggest that any of the statutory factors in § 25-
403(A) favored greater time with either parent, yet the court nonetheless
significantly limited one parent’s time. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. In explaining that
decision, the court stated only that its order was “practical and also
maximizes each parent’s parenting time to the extent it is in the child’s best
interests.” Id. ¶ 6.

¶40 Tamara accurately notes the trial court in this case used
language similar to the language in Sidoti. But as Tamara acknowledges,
being a memorandum decision, Sidoti is not precedential and may be cited
for persuasive value only if “no opinion adequately addresses the issue
before the court.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C). Even if there were no
opinions addressing this issue, Sidoti is not persuasive here. Although the
court’s statutory findings in Sidoti did not explain its parenting time order,
this does not suggest that findings regarding statutory factors can never
help explain the reasons why a decision is in the best interests of a child, as
required by § 25-403(B). To the contrary, such findings exist to “aid[] all
parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or
children both currently and in the future.” Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, ¶ 18
(App. 2009). A court’s statutory findings regarding a child’s well-being
cannot be so cleanly separated from its conclusion that an order for legal
decision-making or parenting time serves that child’s interests.

¶41 The trial court’s statutory findings here, which described the
child’s healthy relationship with both parents and adjustment to both
homes, readily explain why an order for joint legal decision-making and
equal parenting time would be in the child’s best interests. See § 25-403(A).
In that context, the court’s reasoning that an equal parenting time would be
practical and would maximize the child’s time with both parents satisfies
the statutory requirement. See § 25-403(B). Even had those findings been
inadequate, in denying Tamara’s motion for additional findings, the court
offered further analysis sufficient to explain its conclusion that the child
was “adequately cared for” in both homes. The court committed no legal
error and did not abuse its discretion.

Disposition

¶42 We affirm the trial court’s decision. Although Tamara seeks
her attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324, given the unreasonableness of her
positions in this appeal, in our discretion, we deny her request. Anthony,

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 CELAYA v. RIVERO QUINTEROS
Opinion of the Court

however, is entitled to his costs upon compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ.
App. P. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

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