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6 AGRICANN v. NATURAL REMEDY Decision of the Court our memorandum decision—rather than a specific order requiring the superior court to conduct what amounts to a ministerial act, see id., a party may argue on appeal that the superior court failed to properly apply our decision and mandate

Prejudice must appear affirmatively from the record.”) ().

We review a superior court’s valuation of a business as part of a divorce proceeding for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 13 (App. 2015), and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s decision

We review whether a trial court follows an appellate court’s mandate de novo, and review the trial court’s damages award for an abuse of discretion, Arizona Biltmore Hotel Villas Condominiums Ass’n, 249 Ariz. at 333 ¶ 31.

(“Not all errors in the superior court warrant reversal, however.

is argument is beyond our Garza III mandate, contending we “specifically defined the issues on remand to be whether (i) Swift deliberately manipulated HHG to have it short mileage for purposes of driver pay, and (ii) Swift could have chosen other options within HHG that would have been more advantageous to its drivers.” See Garza III, 240 Ariz. at 377, ¶¶ 11–12; (“On remand, a superior court must strictly follow the mandate of an appellate decision.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We will reverse only if the complaining party suffers prejudice as a result of the error.”

L. P. 86 (harmless error applies); (reversal is warranted only where prejudice affirmatively appears in the record).

(reversal warranted only if "complaining party suffers prejudice as a result of the error").

(stating appellate court will only reverse superior court’s error if the complaining party suffered prejudice).

¶ 24 , ( , ) (“We will reverse only if the complaining party suffers prejudice as a result of the error.

(stating appellate court will only reverse a trial court’s error if the complaining party suffered prejudice).

1999) (citations omitted); (asserting that in determining the value of a partnership’s assets, “valuation must be based on realizable benefits.”).

¶ 17 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Mitchell II, , (“Molloy II”), and , .

(citation omitted); see also Tucson Gas & Electric, 9 Ariz.App.

The court erred in so ruling, especially in light of Wright’s concession that the agreement’s value for the stock was “completely arbitrary.” The issue of valuation of David’s , (“Valuation must be based on realizable benefits.”).