Cited by

¶ 12 (App. 1993) (“To justify reversal, trial errors must be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appealing party” and “must affirmatively appear from the record.”).

.”); (“To justify reversal, trial errors must be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appealing party.” (citing Walters v. First Fed.

A finder of fact “may accept everything a witness says or part of it or none of it.”

Court, (concluding the factfinder “must weigh evidence independently from the conclusions of witnesses” and acted within its discretion in assigning a greater weight to certain evidence “than did the witnesses”) ( and State Farm Fire & Cas.

Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstaff Bank, FSB, ¶ 7 (App. 2011); (“we presume the legislature expressed its meaning in as clear a manner as possible.”).

Furthermore, “we presume the legislature expressed its meaning in as clear a manner as possible.”

We have frequently referred to this as our “standard *361 instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses.” ¶ 19 , 5 ; , (A jury “may accept everything a witness says or part of it or none of it.”); see also Am.

“The credibility of a witness’ testimony and the weight it should be given are issues particularly within the province of the jury.” Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 12 , (quoting Kuhnke v. Textron, Inc., , ) (internal quotation marks omitted); , (holding this court will not reweigh conflicting evidence presented to a jury when determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support a judgment).

meant Lashonda “was unable or unwilling to provide the 6 child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and that this caused a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” 5 ¶11 A court is required to refuse an instruction that does not correctly state the law, P.2d 1103 (App. 1993), and need not give “additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the instructions [given] in defendant’s language.”

¶ 15 , for the principle that “the prejudicial nature of the error must affirmatively appear from the record,” and finds none appearing.

the juvenile court properly instructed the jury that “neglected” meant Lashonda “was unable or unwilling to provide the child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and that this caused a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” 5 ¶ 11 A court is required to refuse an instruction that does not correctly state the law, , and need not give “additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the instructions [given] in defendant’s language

(a jury “ ‘may accept everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it,’ and, with regard to expert testimony, You may accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, and you should give it as much weight as you think it deserves.’ ”) ¶ 25 This ease provides an example of why

(“We ‘will not weigh evidence to determine its preponderance on a disputed question of fact; our only concern is whether facts have been established which might reasonably support the trial court’s judg

(we presume legislature expressed its meaning in as clear a manner as possible) CONCLUSION Because appellee was not the owner of the Windstar under A.R.S.

Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp-, 179 Ariz- 557

(not error to refuse instruction that defendant was liable for selling quantity of alcohol it knew or should have known created risk of injury when plaintiff displayed no obvious signs of intoxication and immediately left defendant’s premises).