Cited by

Nevertheless, because a judgment dismissing a claim may be affirmed for any reason supported by the record, we address the BBG Defendants’ “privilege” argument.

¶ 13 (App. 2010) (holding that a claim accrues when “a reasonable person would have been on notice to investigate”) (citation omitted); (holding that a claim tolls when a person is “unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities.”).

But “[t]he burden of establishing that the discovery rule applies to delay the statute of limitations rest[s] on plaintiff.”

Exch., (“We review de novo ‘any questions of law relating to the statute of limitations defense.’” ()).

We review de novo whether a complaint states a claim for relief, Levine v. Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.L.C., ¶ 7 (App. 2018); the application of a statute of limitations, and the superior court’s interpretation of a statute, Watts v. Medicis Pharm.

otation omitted); it does not permit plaintiffs to sleep 6 Humphrey urges us to consider public policies that are generally applicable to limitation statutes, including recognition that the orderly administration of justice resulting from a limitations requirement may be outweighed “where the interests of justice require the vindication of a plaintiff’s rights.” (quotation omitted).

(“We will affirm if the trial court’s disposition is correct for any reason.”).

Additionally, “[w]e will affirm if the trial court’s disposition is correct for any reason.”

Logerquist v. Danforth , , 18, , 283 (App. 1996).

Finally, “[w]e will affirm if the trial court’s disposition is correct for any reason.”

“We will affirm if the trial court’s disposition is correct for any reason.”