Cited by

¶ 26 (App. 1998) (When there is no controlling statute or case law, Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement of the Law when the Restatement view “is logical, furthers the interests of justice, is consistent with Arizona law and policy, and has been generally acknowledged elsewhere.”).

documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised[.]”); ¶ 2 n.2 (App. 1998).

See Carver, 160 Ariz. at 175; ¶ 2 n.2 (App. 1998) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record.]”) (citing United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)).

See, –71, ¶ 8 (App. 2016) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); ¶ 24 (App. 1998) (wrongful interference with a dead body); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc.

¶23 Costco, on the other hand, to define good faith.

A. Negligence Counts ¶9 in dismissing the Tunes’ claims of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts One, Two, and Four).

¶8 Because we “decide cases on nonconstitutional grounds if possible,” ¶ 10 (App. 1998), we will first address Normandin’s statutory arguments, ¶ 7 (App. 1999).

-35, ¶ 32, –68 (App. 1998) (finding the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act did not unconstitutionally abrogate an action to recover damages for injuries); ¶ 34, (“We have held that article 18, § 6 precludes abrogation, but not regul

-28, ¶ 6, -61 (App. 1998).

See Cont'l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, ¶ 12 , (noting legal theories must be timely raised to the trial court to afford it an opportunity to address all issues); , 326 n. 2, , 659 n. 2 (App.1998) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record].” (alteration in original)) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)).

In the absence of controlling statutory or ease authority, Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement of the Law on a particular subject, provided its application “is logical, furthers the interests of justice, is consistent with Arizona law and policy, and has been generally acknowledged elsewhere.”

In the absence of controlling statutory or case authority, Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement of the Law on a particular subject if its position, as applied to the claim at issue, “is logical, furthers the interests of justice, is consistent with Arizona law and policy, and has been generally acknowledged elsewhere.” ¶ 26 , (citing Ft.

n.2, n.2 (App. 1998) (“‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record].’”), quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (alterations in Ramirez).

See AR-CAP 13(a)(6) (requiring an appellant to provide citations to the record); n.2 , , 660 n.2 (App. 1998) (“judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record”) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)).

this court, "without retreating from our holdings in Tomasits and Morton,” id.

d. We generally follow the Restatement in the absence of controlling precedent, but “we will not do so blindly.”

(although Arizona courts generally follow Restatement if no controlling statute or case on the subject exists, “we will not do so blindly,” but rather, “must consider whether the Restatement position, as applied to a particular claim, is logical, furthers the interests of justi

Ariz., (A rizona cou rts usually follow Restateme nt absent controlling authority, provided its application “is logical, furthers the interests of justice, is consistent with Arizona law and policy, and has been g enerally acknowledg ed elsewhere.”).