Cited by

cf. Flying Diamond Airpark, ¶ 28 (App. 2007) (quoting City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., ¶ 22 (App. 1999)) (equitable estoppel); (promissory estoppel).

See City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., -97 ¶¶ 23-24 (App. 1999) (remanding because findings failed to address issues necessary to review the court’s application of the law).

See, (“When zoning power is used in such a way that the attempted regulation amounts to a ‘taking’ of property, the zoning ordinance runs into direct conflict with [Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17.]”); see also City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., ¶ 10 (App. 1999) (cities do “not have vested rights in [their] zoning powers, and the state can reduce or condition those powers”).

City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., ¶ 8 (App. 1999); –08, ¶ 16 (App. 1998).

Even if we assume the Cities could have a vested right to TIF distributions, but see City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., *89 394, ¶ 9 , on appeal the Cities have specifically acknowledged they are not claiming any such right.

of Supervisors of Pinal Cnty., , City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., -97, ¶¶ 23-24 , -66 (App.1999) (remanding because findings failed to address issues necessary to review the court’s application of the law).

See City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., ¶ 19 , (“In actions for equitable relief, we defer to the trial court’s discretion in fashioning the remedy.”); see also New England Mut.

See City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc.

§ 9-462.02(A) because a structural modification that exceeds this code’s restrictions would not constitute a “reasonable alteration.” See City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., ¶¶ 29-30

See City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., (“Although Whiteco could not obtain vested property rights if the permits authorized construction of the billboards in violation of then-existing .

¶ 28 There are three elements to equitable estoppel: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.’ ” City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., , quoting Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, , -68 (1998); see also Camelback Del Este Homeowners Ass’n v. Warner

In City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., , the court of appeals held that § 9-462.02 applied retroactively to prohibit the City from enforcing its ordinance against some, but not all, of the billboards in question.

See Motel 6 Operating Ltd. P’ , cf. City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., , (“The City’s power to enact zoning ordinances derives exclusively from the state.”).

§ 1-244, but “statutes [concerning] procedures and remedies that do not impair vested rights are exceptions.” City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc.

¶20 This Court applied Gannett to another municipal suit in City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc.

See Premier Financial Services v. Citibank (Arizona), , (“We cannot consider issues and theories that were not presented to the court below.”); see also City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., , (refusing to consider arguments raised for first time on appeal).