In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to B.B.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.

No. 2 CA-JV 2025-0043
Filed January 8, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. S20240169
The Honorable Janet C. Bostwick, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Attorney Slade Smith PLLC, Tucson
By Slade Smith
Counsel for Appellant

Stuart & Blackwell PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellees

Pima County Office of Children’s Counsel, Tucson
By Jordan E. Paul
Counsel for Minor
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge O’Neil authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief
Judge Eppich and Judge Sklar concurred.

O’ N E I L, Judge:

¶1 In this appeal, we are asked to interpret A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(5),
which provides that a parent-child relationship may be terminated when
“the potential father failed to file a paternity action within thirty days of
completion of service of notice as prescribed in” A.R.S. § 8-106(G).
Specifically, we must consider whether § 8-533(B)(5) permits termination
on this ground for a potential father who filed a paternity action but did not
timely serve it, resulting in dismissal of the action. We conclude that § 8-
533(B)(5) does not contemplate termination on this basis. When a child’s
potential father has filed a paternity action, his status, his rights, and any
parent-child relationship are conclusively determined in that action,
rendering § 8-533(B)(5) inapplicable. Under the facts of this case, Dustin
G.’s status as a potential father ended when his paternity action was
dismissed with prejudice. He had no other rights that needed to be
separately terminated under § 8-533(B)(5). Accordingly, we vacate the
juvenile court’s termination ruling and remand for the court to dismiss the
petition to terminate Dustin’s rights.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the
juvenile court’s ruling. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz.
231, ¶ 13 (App. 2011). After Madeline B. gave birth to B.B. in August 2024,
she signed a relinquishment and consent to place him for adoption.
Madeline indicated that Dustin, her long-term boyfriend with whom she
was then living, was B.B.’s “potential father.” B.B. was placed with
Adoption Solutions of Arizona (ASA), an adoption agency, which in turn
placed B.B. with Paul and Elizabeth C., a Pennsylvania couple.

¶3 Wishing to adopt B.B., Paul and Elizabeth filed a petition to
terminate Madeline’s and Dustin’s parental rights as to B.B.1 They alleged

1The juvenile court terminated Madeline’s parental rights. She is not

a party to this appeal.

2
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

§ 8-533(B)(5) as the ground for terminating Dustin’s rights.2 On September
14, 2024, they served Dustin with notice, as required by § 8-106(G), that
Madeline had identified him as B.B.’s potential father, that she planned to
place B.B. for adoption, and that Dustin had the right to consent or withhold
his consent to the adoption. The notice further provided:

If you withhold your consent to the adoption
and wish to oppose the adoption, you must
initiate paternity proceedings under Title 25,
Chapter 6, Article 1, Arizona Revised Statutes,
and serve the birth mother within thirty (30)
days after completion of service of this notice.
You must comply with the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure when serving the birth mother.

¶4 On October 9, 2024, Dustin filed a paternity petition in Pima
County Superior Court case number SP20240777. Although he reportedly
gave Madeline a copy of the petition that same day, Madeline did not sign
an acceptance of service showing she had voluntarily accepted a copy of the
paternity paperwork until October 18, 2024, and the acceptance of service
was not filed until October 21, 2024. Days later, ASA filed a motion to
intervene and a motion to dismiss the paternity action, arguing that Dustin
had missed the deadline to serve Madeline. Dustin failed to appear at a
hearing on those motions because he was being held without bond at the
Pima County Jail. The court granted the motion to intervene and gave
Dustin leave to respond to the motion to dismiss. Dustin failed to respond,
and the court dismissed the paternity action with prejudice in January 2025.

¶5 The following month, Paul and Elizabeth filed an amended
petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Dustin then filed a
motion to dismiss the termination case as a matter of law, arguing that he
had “filed” for paternity “within the statutorily mandated 30 days” under
§ 8-533(B)(5). Paul and Elizabeth also filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking to terminate Dustin’s parental rights under § 8-533(B)(5)
because he had “failed to file and serve” his paternity petition within thirty
days of the § 8-106(G) notice.

¶6 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing and denied
both the motion to dismiss and the motion for partial summary judgment.

2 Paul and Elizabeth also alleged § 8-533(B)(6) as a ground for
termination, but they later withdrew that ground.

3
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

After a contested severance trial, the court granted the petition to terminate
Dustin’s parental rights. The court noted that the case involved a
“dispositive question of law of statewide interest” and asked this court “to
clarify whether a potential father must meet all requirements as prescribed
in A.R.S. § 8-106(G) at risk of termination of rights under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(5) or need only ‘file a paternity action within thirty days.’”3 As to
that question, the court concluded that the “potential father requirements
in § 8-106(G),” including service on the mother and proceeding to a
judgment, “apply to § 8-533(B)(5) by reference.” The court explained that
reading § 8-533(B)(5) “in isolation renders [the] § 8-106(G) requirements
meaningless in termination cases and would lead to absurd results”
because a “potential father who fails to comply with § 8-106(G) would have
his rights terminated by adoption but could survive termination under § 8-
533(B)(5).” Because Dustin failed to timely serve Madeline with the
paternity paperwork and failed to proceed to a judgment, the court
concluded that termination of Dustin’s parental rights “is the result the facts
and law require.” The court further found that termination was in B.B.’s
best interests. This appeal followed.

Discussion

¶7 Dustin contends the juvenile court erred by terminating his
parental rights because § 8-533(B)(5) applies only when a father fails to
timely file a paternity action. Because this issue involves statutory
interpretation, our review is de novo. Albert L. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 253
Ariz. 146, ¶ 13 (App. 2022). “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the
text.” In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28, ¶ 12 (2024) (quoting Franklin v. CSAA Gen.
Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409, ¶ 8 (2023)). We determine the meaning of the text
based on “the plain meaning of the words in their broader statutory
context.” In re Chalmers, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 12, 571 P.3d 885, 888 (2025). In so
doing, “we look to the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes
that are in pari materia—of the same subject or general purpose—for
guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved.” State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Orlando, 259 Ariz. 531, ¶ 10 (2025) (quoting Stambaugh v.

3 The juvenile court designated this issue as one appropriate for
special-action review pursuant to Rule 13(a), Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. Dustin,
however, filed a timely notice of appeal rather than seeking special-action
review. See Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of Psych. Exam’rs, 210 Ariz. 177, ¶ 21 (App.
2005) (special-action jurisdiction reserved for extraordinary circumstances
and not available when equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by
appeal exists).

4
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, ¶ 7 (2017)). If the statutory language in context is clear
and unambiguous, it controls unless the result is unconstitutional or
absurd. Carson v. Gentry, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶¶ 56, 58, 574 P.3d 205, 218 (2025).

¶8 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds
for termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-
533(B), 8-537(B); Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, ¶ 12 (2020).
Section 8-533(B)(5) provides, as a basis for terminating the rights of a man
who might be the child’s father but has not established paternity, “that the
potential father failed to file a paternity action within thirty days of
completion of service of notice as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G.”

¶9 Although § 8-533(B)(5) does not specifically mention the
failure to serve as a basis for termination, the juvenile court in this case
concluded that the statute’s language incorporates the provisions of § 8-
106(G), including a timely service requirement. In essence, this
understanding of § 8-533(B)(5) would require the words “as prescribed in
§ 8-106, subsection G” to modify a potential father’s responsibility to “file a
paternity action.” In other words, it would mean that § 8-533(B)(5)
authorizes termination when a potential father fails “to file a paternity
action . . . as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G.” A close reading of both
§ 8-533(B)(5) and § 8-106(G), however, reveals two significant problems
with this interpretation.

¶10 First, the language of § 8-533(B)(5) indicates a different
meaning. According to the nearest-reasonable-referent canon, a modifier
should generally apply to the most proximate reasonable referent. Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152
(2012); see Angulo-Murrieta v. City of Yuma, 251 Ariz. 86, ¶ 16 (App. 2021)
(applying canon to criminal statute). In § 8-533(B)(5), this would mean the
words “as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G” modify the “service of
notice” that triggers a potential father’s responsibility to file a paternity
action. In other words, when a father has received “service of notice as
prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G,” his failure to timely file a paternity
action becomes a basis to terminate his rights. § 8-533(B)(5).

¶11 Second, § 8-106(G) does not prescribe filing or any other
requirements for paternity actions, which are addressed elsewhere in our
statutory scheme. See A.R.S. §§ 25-801 to 25-818. Indeed, § 8-106(G) does
not place any requirements on potential fathers at all. It would make little
sense for § 8-533(B)(5) to require a potential father to file a paternity action

5
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

“as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G” when § 8-106(G) does not establish
prescriptions for filing paternity actions. Rather, § 8-106(G) outlines the
information a potential father must be provided when served with notice
of an adoption:

1. That adoption is planned.

2. The potential father’s right to consent or
withhold consent to the adoption.

3. The potential father’s responsibility to
initiate paternity proceedings under title 25,
chapter 6, article 1, and to serve the mother
within thirty days of completion of service.

4. The potential father’s responsibility to
proceed to judgment in the paternity action.

5. The potential father’s right to seek custody.

6. The potential father’s responsibility to begin
to provide financial support for the child if
paternity is established.

7. That the potential father’s failure to file a
paternity action pursuant to title 25, chapter 6,
article 1, and to serve the mother and proceed to
judgment in the paternity action as prescribed
by this section, bars the potential father from
bringing or maintaining any action to assert any
interest in the child.

Although § 8-106(G) requires potential fathers to be provided with notice
of various rights and obligations, including the responsibility to both file
and serve a paternity action, this subsection does not directly govern
potential fathers. It provides the substantive requirements for adoption
notices that must be given to a potential father. This further supports a
conclusion that it is the “service of notice” in § 8-533(B)(5) that must be
completed “as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G,” because notice to
potential fathers is precisely what § 8-106(G) prescribes.

¶12 Reading these provisions together compels the conclusion
that § 8-533(B)(5) authorizes termination based only on a potential father’s
failure to timely file a paternity action after being served with an adoption

6
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

notice. Our analysis, however, cannot end here, given our obligation to
consider § 8-533(B)(5) in context with the broader statutory scheme. State
v. Serrato, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 16, 568 P.3d 756, 760 (2025).

¶13 The trial court was not wrong to note the possibility for
absurd results from the inability to terminate the rights of a potential father
who ignores the warnings in an adoption notice under § 8-106(G). It would
be strange to require such stern warnings if failure to heed them lacked
meaningful consequence. It is especially difficult to reconcile the warning
that the failure to timely file, serve, and proceed to judgment in a paternity
action “bars the potential father from bringing or maintaining any action to
assert any interest in the child” with Dustin’s apparent proposition that a
potential father who has failed in that very way nonetheless retains an
interest of some kind that cannot be terminated. Such a result would place
some potential fathers forever in limbo, with rights that can neither be
established nor terminated. Worse, if these rights allowed potential fathers,
unable to assert their own rights, to nonetheless interfere with or prevent
adoption, it could create a class of permanently fatherless children. At oral
argument, Paul and Elizabeth argued that this risk is especially acute in the
context of out-of-state adoptions, where they assert that termination orders
are frequently required before the adoption may proceed. Fortunately,
understood within the broader statutory scheme, § 8-533(B)(5) leads to no
such outcome. See Carson, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 56, 574 P.3d at 218 (courts must
avoid statutory interpretation that leads to absurd outcomes).

¶14 A potential father is “a man, identified by the mother in an
affidavit, who is or could be the father of the child, but whose paternity has
not been established.” David C. v. Alexis S., 240 Ariz. 53, ¶ 14 (2016). He is
not the child’s legal father. A legal father “is one who was married to the
mother between the time of conception and birth, has adopted the child, or
has legally established paternity.” Id. ¶ 13. A potential father has a right to
seek paternity and thus establish his rights as the child’s legal father, and
he is entitled to notice of adoption proceedings so that he has an
opportunity to do so before the child is adopted. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. But only a
legal father must consent to a child’s adoption. § 8-106(A)(2). A potential
father’s consent is not required. § 8-106(B). Unless a potential father takes
the critical step of filing a paternity action and seeing it through, any
potential rights he might have asserted as the child’s legal father are never
established.

¶15 Indeed, if a potential father fails to timely file and serve a
paternity action after receiving an adoption notice, his opportunity to
establish parental rights is forever foreclosed. As noted, § 8-106(G)(7)

7
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

warns a potential father that his failure to timely file, serve, and proceed to
judgment in a paternity action will bar him from asserting an interest in the
child. Section 8-106(J), understood in the context of A.R.S. § 25-804, gives
substance to that warning:

A potential father who fails to file a paternity
action and who does not serve the mother
within thirty days after completion of service on
the potential father . . . waives his right to be
notified of any judicial hearing regarding the
child’s adoption or the termination of parental
rights and his consent to the adoption or
termination is not required.

Cox v. Ponce, 251 Ariz. 302, ¶¶ 8-9 (2021) (explaining that pursuant to § 8-
106(J), potential father’s failure to comply with strict deadline triggers
consequence warned of in § 8-106(G)(7)). Section 25-804 requires dismissal
of any paternity action “that is barred pursuant to § 8-106, subsection J.”

¶16 Just as § 8-106(G)(7) warns, if the potential father fails to
timely file, or if he files but fails to timely serve, his paternity action is
barred and must be dismissed. See Cox, 251 Ariz. 302, ¶¶ 9, 11-12. If he
timely files and serves but does not proceed to judgment, resulting in
dismissal, see Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 46(b) (allowing involuntary dismissal for
failure to move case forward), any attempt to refile will certainly fall
outside the time requirements of § 8-106(J) and will therefore be barred.
And, of course, if the potential father proceeds to judgment on the merits,
he is a potential father no longer. He is either a legal father or no father at
all. Under any of these scenarios, when the potential father files a paternity
action, his legal status is determined by the outcome of that action.

¶17 Only when the potential father fails altogether to file a
paternity action, and the time to do so has expired, does § 8-533(B)(5)
provide for termination of his rights, because only then is termination
necessary. In that scenario, the legislature has provided termination as a
means of foreclosing his right to seek paternity, effectively extinguishing
his status as a potential father and eliminating any uncertainty. Cf. Frank R.
v. Mother Goose Adoptions, 243 Ariz. 111, ¶¶ 24-25 & 24 (2017) (discussing
“child’s interest in having a stable and permanent home and not being
removed from adoptive parents with whom the child has bonded”). But
that right is already foreclosed as to a potential father whose paternity
action is dismissed with prejudice and barred under § 8-106(J). See Cox, 251
Ariz. 302, ¶¶ 8-9, 11-12, 19 (strict deadline in § 8-106(J) consistent with

8
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.B.
Opinion of the Court

“Arizona’s strong public policy favoring finality in adoptions”). Any
potential he might once have had to establish rights as a legal father is
precluded. His status as a potential father is effectively terminated, and he
has no remaining rights to terminate.

¶18 In this case, Dustin filed a paternity action, but he did not
timely serve it. His action was dismissed with prejudice, and he is barred
from establishing paternity under § 8-106(J). Dustin is correct that the trial
court lacked a basis to terminate his parent-child relationship under § 8-
533(B)(5), but only because he had no legal relationship to terminate.

Disposition

¶19 We vacate the juvenile court’s ruling terminating Dustin’s
parental rights to B.B. and remand for the court to dismiss the petition to
terminate Dustin’s rights. We recognize that the parties and especially B.B.,
having so thoroughly litigated the question of Dustin’s status and rights as
a potential father, may have an interest in a conclusive determination by
the court that Dustin’s potential parental rights are foreclosed and his
consent to adoption is not required. Our opinion does not preclude the
court, in entering its dismissal order, from making appropriate findings to
that effect.

9