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Although Arizona courts disfavor motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, such motions will be granted when the claims in the complaint “are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period.” ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

of Ariz., (quoting Montaño v. Browning, ); see Mertola, (cause of action accrues and statute of limitations commences when one party is able to sue another).

For that reason, claims based on undisputed facts “clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” ¶ 4 (App. 2002); 127 (App. 1984) (granting summary judgment for moving party because non-moving party’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations).

Co., (noting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is dismissal on the merits and has “res judicata effect”); Montaño v. Browning, (“claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred”).

¶11 We also review de novo questions of law regarding a statute of limitations, including “when a particular cause of action accrues.” ¶ 10 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, “claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, (quoting Montaño v. Browning, ); cf. Garza v. Swift Transp.

Claims filed outside the limitations period are “conclusively barred.” ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

of Ariz., ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (quoting Montaño v. Browning, ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

(quoting Montaño v. Browning, ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

Claims “clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶ 10 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

¶ 4 (App. 2002) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, “claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” Montaño v. Browning, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

(describing statute of limitations and accrual of action as question of law).

to punish litigants because of the inaction of their counsel”); (stating that, although dismissal from inactive calendar for lack of prosecution is without prejudice, “such an order must be issued only after careful consideration because justice requires that when possible a matter be determined upon its merits”); ¶ 4

We review de novo questions of law concerning the statute of limitations, including “when a particular cause of action accrues,” where, as here, such a determination “hinges solely on a question of law rather than resolution of disputed facts.” Montaño v. Browning

We review de novo questions of law concerning the statute of limitations, including “when a particular cause of action accrues.” ¶ 4

Co. of Am., , we further recognize that, generally, “claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.” ¶ 4 , ( , Gregory v. Porterfield, 26 Ariz.App.

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[although] claims that are clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively barred.”

See Montaño v. Browning, -46, ¶ 2 , -96 (App.2002); Engle Bros., Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Ariz.App.