Cited by

Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

We assume the Board “chose the phrase advisedly.” ¶ 19 (App. 2006).

“Because an appeal cannot adequately cure an erroneous venue ruling, such orders are appropriately reviewable by special action.” (internal citation omitted).

As we have noted, “when we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.” ¶ 23 n.6 (App. 2006) (citation omitted).

Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez , , 3, ¶ 4, , 757 (App. 2006) ; A.R.S.

¶ 11 (App. 2006); ¶ 7 (2017).

(accepting special action jurisdiction of order transferring venue).

Co. of Ariz., n.6, n.6 (App. 2006).

n.6, n.6 (App. 2006) (“Generally, issues not raised or urged below or on review are deemed waived.”).

:gsh 8 We decline to address or rule on the issue despite waiver, n.6, ¶ 23, n.6 (App. 2006).

First, “[b]ecause an appeal cannot adequately cure an erroneous venue ruling, such orders ‘are appropriately reviewable by special action.’” see also Ariz. R. P. Spec.

When in *110 terpreting statutes, “our central goal ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ ” ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

“In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’” ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

The statute provides: “In any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” “In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ ” ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

"In interpreting statutes, our central goal `is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.'" ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

“In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ ” ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

8 n. 6 ¶ 23, , 762 n. 6 (App.2006) ( , ).

"In interpreting statutes, our central goal `is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.'" ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

“In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ ” ¶ 12 , ( ¶ 9 , ).

(collecting cases emphasizing presumption that if legislature intends to limit a statute, it does so clearly and expressly).

“The waiver rule, however, is merely one of procedure, not jurisdiction.” , ¶ 23 n. 6, , 762 n. 6 (App.2006)

¶5 “In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’”