Patricia Adams v. Hon. Brenden Griffin City Prosecutor's Office

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

PATRICIA ANN ADAMS,
Petitioner,

v.

HON. BRENDEN J. GRIFFIN, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA,
Respondent,

and

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2023-0072
Filed November 30, 2023

Special Action Proceeding
Pima County Cause No. CR20232794001

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Mary Trejo, City of Tucson Public Defender’s Office
By Marianne Vaiana, Associate Public Defender and Kristina Bohn, Supervising City
Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Petitioner

Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney’s Office
By Alan L. Merritt, Deputy City Attorney and Mari L. Worman, Senior Assistant
Prosecuting City Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
 ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Kelly authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Brearcliffe and Judge O’Neil concurred.

K E L L Y, Judge:

¶1 This special action involves a challenge to a ruling of the
Tucson City Court mental health judge dismissing charges against Patricia
Adams, who has repeatedly been found incompetent to stand trial. The
parties dispute the meaning and effect of A.R.S. § 13-4504, specifically
whether the city court properly dismissed the charges under that provision
or should have transferred the matter to the superior court for a
competency evaluation. For the reasons that follow, we accept jurisdiction
and grant relief.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Patricia Adams was arrested in August 2022, at which time
there were multiple misdemeanor charges pending against her in various
Tucson City Court cases. Adams filed a motion to dismiss the charges
pursuant to § 13-4504, noting that she had previously been found
incompetent to stand trial, and not restorable to competence, three times in
the past, most recently in August 2018. The state responded that there were
reasonable grounds for a new competency examination based on Adams
having received mental health services under title 36 since her last
incompetency determination. The state asked that the matter be transferred
to the superior court for a competency examination, expressing “concern
that if th[e City] Court dismisse[d]” the charges, it lacked the authority “to
order the initiation of civil commitment proceedings” or a guardianship
pursuant to § 13-4504(B).

¶3 The city court rejected the state’s arguments and dismissed
the charges without prejudice. Noting that Adams was “subject to an order
for court-ordered treatment,” the court concluded it did not need to “order
or request that any agency initiate civil commitment proceedings,” and
declined to issue orders pursuant to § 13-4504(B). The state appealed from
that decision.

¶4 On appeal in the superior court, the state argued the city court
had “incorrectly interpreted A.R.S. § 13-4504” and “exceeded its

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Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction when it acknowledged there were reasonable grounds to
question Adams’s competence to stand trial but refused to transfer the cases
to Superior Court.” Although acknowledging the city court had not
actually ordered it to initiate guardianship proceedings, the state further
asserted the city court could not do so. 1 The respondent superior court
judge determined the city court “lacked jurisdiction” to conduct hearings
under § 13-4504(A) and Rule 11.2(f), Ariz. R. Crim. P. He remanded the
matter to the city court to determine if reasonable grounds existed for
further competency proceedings, and if so, to transfer the matter to superior
court for an evaluation. Adams’s petition for special action relief with this
court followed.

Jurisdiction

¶5 “The decision to accept or reject special action jurisdiction is
highly discretionary.” Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, ¶ 4 (App. 2009); see also
Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3 bar committee note (“The special action requests
extraordinary relief, and acceptance of jurisdiction of a special action is
highly discretionary with the court to which the application is made.”).
This proceeding originated in the city court, and Adams therefore has no
right of appeal beyond the superior court. See A.R.S. § 22-375(B). Further,
special action jurisdiction is appropriate when, as the parties assert here,
the question presented is a purely legal one. See Blake v. Schwartz, 202 Ariz.
120, ¶ 7 (App. 2002). Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and accept
jurisdiction.

Discussion

¶6 Adams argues the respondent superior court judge
improperly “reversed the [city court’s] determination that reasonable
grounds for further Rule 11 examinations d[id] not exist” and improperly
interpreted § 13-4504(A). The state contends the city court’s ruling under
§ 13-4504(A) was essentially an incompetency determination, which it
lacked the authority to make. As relevant here, on special action review,
this court must determine whether the respondent “failed . . . to perform a
duty required by law as to which he has no discretion,” “has proceeded . . .
without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority,” or abused his
discretion. Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3. When reviewing an order dismissing

1Because the city court did not enter any such orders, we need not

address these arguments.

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Opinion of the Court

criminal charges, this court assesses whether the dismissing court abused
its discretion. See State v. Medina, 190 Ariz. 418, 420 (App. 1997).

¶7 Our review of Adams’s petition involves the intersection of
two sets of statutes and Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We address these in turn
and, because the language of the statutes and rules is plain, it controls the
outcome here. See 4QTKIDZ, LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC, 253 Ariz. 382, ¶ 5
(2022). First, the criminal code sets forth various provisions relating to a
defendant’s competency to stand trial in title 13, chapter 41. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-4501 to 13-4519. A defendant cannot “be tried, convicted, sentenced
or punished for an offense if the court determines that the person is
incompetent to stand trial.” § 13-4502. After a defendant is charged, the
process to determine competency begins with the filing of a request for a
competency evaluation, which may be filed by “any party” or may be
initiated by “the court on its own motion.” § 13-4503(A). The court may
request the assistance of a mental health expert to determine if reasonable
grounds for an examination exist. § 13-4503(B). Generally, once a court
determines that such grounds exist, the superior court has exclusive
jurisdiction to hold competency hearings. § 13-4503(C). A limited
jurisdiction court may “exercise jurisdiction over a competency hearing in
a misdemeanor case” arising in such a court only if the presiding judge of
the superior court has authorized it to do so. § 13-4503(D).

¶8 If the court initially finds the defendant incompetent, it must
order treatment for restoration of competency “unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant will not be restored to competency
within fifteen months.” § 13-4510(C). When a treatment order is issued, it
is valid for 180 days or until the treating agency reports either that the
defendant has been restored or is not substantially probable to regain
competency within twenty-one months, the charges are dismissed, or the
maximum sentence has expired. § 13-4512(I); see also § 13-4514. If the court
determines there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will
regain competency within twenty-one months, it is to “proceed pursuant to
[A.R.S.] § 13-4517.” § 13-4514(F). Otherwise, an order issued under §§ 13-
4512 or 13-4514 remains in effect for not more than twenty-one months or
the maximum possible sentence. § 13-4515(A).

¶9 If the court proceeds under § 13-4517, any party may request
that the court dismiss the charges, remand the defendant to an evaluating
agency “for the institution of civil commitment proceedings,” or “[a]ppoint
a guardian ad litem.” § 13-4517(A). “If the defendant is remanded, the
prosecutor shall file a petition for evaluation . . . .” § 13-4517(A)(1). The

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Opinion of the Court

court may also “retain jurisdiction” over the defendant until commitment
under title 36 or appointment of a guardian. § 13-4517(C); see also § 13-
4517(D)-(E).

¶10 Separate from the process set in motion by a request to
determine incompetency under § 13-4503, § 13-4504(A) provides that,
“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary,” a “court may hold a hearing
to dismiss any misdemeanor charge against [an] incompetent person” who
“has been previously adjudicated incompetent to stand trial.” If the charge
is dismissed, “the court may order the prosecutor to initiate civil
commitment or guardianship proceedings.” § 13-4504(B).

¶11 Second is the statutory scheme for civil commitments, set
forth in title 36, chapter 5. This chapter includes articles for both court-
ordered evaluations, A.R.S. §§ 36-520 to 36-531, and court-ordered
treatment, A.R.S. §§ 36-532 to 36-544. An application for a court-ordered
evaluation may be filed by “[a]ny responsible individual.” § 36-520(A).
Upon receiving an application, a screening agency is to provide a
prepetition screening and, if it finds reasonable cause to believe the patient
should be subject to court-ordered evaluation, file a petition for evaluation.
§ 36-521(A)-(D). The county attorney may also file such a petition if ordered
by a court to do so. § 36-521(F). If after the evaluation the patient is found
to require court-ordered treatment, the evaluating agency or the county
attorney is to file a petition for treatment under § 36-533. § 36-531(A)-(C).

¶12 “If a petition for court-ordered evaluation is filed by a
prosecutor pursuant to § 13-4517, a prior application for court-ordered
evaluation or prescreening is not necessary.” § 36-521(I). And, § 36-531(E)
directs that when a prosecutor files a petition pursuant to § 13-4517, and the
evaluating agency intends to release the person, the agency must give the
“prosecuting agency” notice of that intent. See also § 36-540(Q) (“If the court
does not find a person to be in need of treatment and a prosecutor filed a
petition pursuant to § 13-4517, the evaluation agency, within twenty-four
hours, shall notify the prosecuting agency of its finding.”). “Prosecuting
agency” is defined to include “the county attorney, attorney general or city
attorney who applied or petitioned for an evaluation or treatment pursuant
to this chapter.” § 36-502(38).

¶13 Third, there are procedural rules under Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim.
P., that set forth the processes for conducting incompetency hearings and
mental examinations in criminal proceedings. Rule 11.2 sets forth the
requirements for a motion for an evaluation, including the information the
motion should include. The rule also includes a provision outlining the

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Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction of the superior and limited jurisdiction courts. Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 11.2(d). Consistent with § 13-4503(D), it allows the presiding judge of the
superior court to issue an order authorizing a limited jurisdiction court to
hear competence issues in misdemeanor cases, but it otherwise gives
“exclusive jurisdiction over all competence hearings” to the superior court.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(d). In a separate subsection, however, the rule states,
“[i]f the court finds that a person has been previously adjudicated
incompetent to stand trial under this rule, the court may hold a hearing to
dismiss any misdemeanor charge against the incompetent person under
A.R.S. § 13-4504.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(f).

¶14 When viewed in the context of this scheme as a whole, § 13-
4504 creates a separate pathway for dismissal with its own discrete criteria.
Unlike proceedings seeking an evaluation of competency, § 13-4504 relies
on a finding that the “person has been previously adjudicated incompetent
to stand trial” pursuant to chapter 41. Thus, the proceedings outlined in
the remainder of the chapter—a request for an evaluation, an evaluation,
and a finding of incompetency—have already taken place. Accordingly,
dismissal under § 13-4504 does not require a new evaluation, and allows
dismissal based solely on a previous adjudication. § 13-4504(A).

¶15 And although a proceeding under § 13-4504(A) might involve
a court’s consideration of evidence similar to that presented at a
competency evaluation, that does not itself make the determination
equivalent to a competency hearing under § 13-4503(C). The statutes
simply provide two separate pathways. When competency is at issue, a
limited jurisdiction court is empowered to determine whether reasonable
grounds exist for further competency proceedings. § 13-4503(A)-(C). A
court may consider evidence, including the assistance of a mental health
expert, in doing so. § 13-4503(B). Once a court determines that dismissal is
appropriate based on a prior adjudication of incompetency under § 13-4504,
however, the dismissal obviates any need for new competency proceedings
under § 13-4503(C). Thus, the two statutes provide authority for a court to
take two different actions. See State v. Windsor, 224 Ariz. 103, ¶ 6 (App.
2010) (court considers “each word and phrase” in interpreting statute and
will not make any part of statute superfluous); see also Vera v. Rogers, 246
Ariz. 30, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (court construes related statutes together).

¶16 The parties present considerable argument about the meaning
of “the court” in § 13-4504(A), but we need not go beyond the statutory
language as to that point—particularly in view of the preparatory phrase,
“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary.” The language is plain—if a

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person stands charged with a misdemeanor and the person has been
previously adjudicated incompetent, “the court” hearing the charge may
dismiss it. Id.; see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words . . . shall be construed
according to the common and approved use of the language.”). Because
there is no requirement for “the court” to conduct a competency evaluation
in order to dismiss misdemeanor charges under § 13-4504, there is no
reason to limit jurisdiction to the superior court.

¶17 The state argues, however, that § 13-4504 was “combined”
with § 13-4503 “into Rule 11.2 in 2017.” It contends the rule therefore
“clarifies that, procedurally, the dismissal provisions of [§] 13-4504 apply
after reasonable grounds to question competency to stand trial have been
found.” Citing State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, ¶¶ 35-37 (2021), it argues the
rule must control. But the state later acknowledges that the statutes and
rules in this area have been determined not to conflict. See State v. Bunton, 230 Ariz. 51, ¶ 6 (App. 2012). In any event, Rule 11.2(f) is not significantly
different from § 13-4504. It includes language directing dismissal based on
a previous adjudication, and it cites § 13-4504 expressly. Ariz. R. Crim. P.
11.2(f). Further, because Rule 11.2(f) does not include a limitation as to the
court in which it applies, we read the word “court” to refer to courts “in all
criminal proceedings in Arizona state courts.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.1.
Although another subsection of Rule 11.2 does distinguish between the
jurisdiction of the superior and limited jurisdiction courts, subsection (f)
does not. Thus, we agree with Adams that the respondent superior court
judge abused his discretion by concluding that a hearing pursuant to § 13-
4504(A) is essentially a competency hearing under Rule 11.

¶18 The state, however, also cites Johnson v. Hartsell, 254 Ariz. 585
(App. 2023), arguing that § 13-4504(A) should not be interpreted “to apply
to new charges,” based on the Johnson court’s having limited “the rebuttable
presumption of continuing incompetency” to a single charged offense in
that case. In that case, the trial court had declared Johnson “incompetent
and not restorable,” which led to a “presumption of continued
incompetency.” Johnson, 254 Ariz. 585, ¶ 20 (quoting State v. Hehman, 110
Ariz. 459, 460 (1974)). Based on this presumption, the state could not,
without court permission, refile the same charges “against a presumptively
incompetent defendant without reasonable grounds showing that the
defendant is now competent.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. Relying on the standard for
incompetence set forth in Rule 11.1(a)(2), the Johnson court concluded that
“the incompetency presumption is charge-specific.” Id. ¶ 27. The state
contends that allowing the dismissal of new charges under § 13-4504(A) is
“incompatible” with this conclusion.

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¶19 The presumption of incompetency, however, arises from the
defendant’s due process rights, see State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 485-87
(1967), and relates to the standard the state must meet in order to ensure an
incompetent person is not tried for a crime. Id. at 486. The Johnson court
employed that presumption to set forth the procedural mechanism the state
must use in charging a defendant. 254 Ariz. 585, ¶¶ 25-26. In contrast, § 13-
4504 is a statutory provision allowing a court to dismiss charges against a
defendant on the basis of a prior adjudication of incompetence. Such a
dismissal does not implicate the due process problem underlying the
presumption.2

¶20 Here, the question concerns the scope of the limited
jurisdiction court’s authority to dismiss a charge and what it is to consider
in making its ruling. The state argues the city court “exceeded its
jurisdiction when it dismissed” the charges against Adams. But this
confuses the court’s jurisdiction with its authority to make a particular
ruling. “Jurisdiction can refer to the authority to do a particular thing or to
‘the power of the court to entertain an action of a particular subject matter.’”
Major v. Coleman, 251 Ariz. 345, ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (quoting Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223 (1996)). A municipal court has jurisdiction to
entertain misdemeanor actions when committed within the limits of the
municipality. A.R.S. §§ 22-402(B), 22-301(A)(1); see also Ariz. Const. art. VI,
§ 32(C). Thus, the city court had subject matter jurisdiction over the charges
against Adams, and the propriety of its ruling dismissing those charges was
a question of its authority to do so based on its conformity to the provisions
of § 13-4504. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 32(B) (jurisdiction of inferior courts
is “as provided by law”).

¶21 Section 13-4504(A) sets no parameters for dismissal, and we
have found no guiding Arizona authority citing that statute. We have,
however, addressed dismissal under Rule 11.6(e), which allows for
dismissal of “charges against a defendant found to be incompetent at any
time.” State v. McPherson, 158 Ariz. 502, 504 (App. 1988). In that context,
we concluded that dismissal was “left to the discretion of the trial court,
subject only to the requirements of reasonableness and accepted legal
principles.” Id.; see also State v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 432, 433-34 (1976)

2Nothing in the record before us suggests that Adams has since been

found competent after being found not competent and not restorable in
2018. We therefore do not address what impact, if any, an intervening
finding of competency would have on the application of § 13-4504(A).

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(upholding as constitutional rules allowing dismissal of criminal charges
“merely on the basis of mental incompetency” subject to court’s discretion).
Likewise, a trial court has discretion in determining whether to dismiss
charges based on other due process considerations. See State v. Smith, 242
Ariz. 98, ¶¶ 22-23 (App. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss after two
mistrials); State v. Pickett, 121 Ariz. 142, 145 (1978) (court has discretion to
dismiss as discovery sanction).

¶22 Indeed, as we explained in discussing a trial court’s discretion
to dismiss either with or without prejudice, a former comment to Rule
16.6(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., stated that although that subsection expressly
addresses dismissal for insufficiency, a trial court may dismiss charges
“based on any legally recognized ground.” State v. Huffman, 222 Ariz. 416,
¶ 10 (App. 2009); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P., Prefatory Comment to the 2018
Amendments (we “may continue to refer to comments to pre-2018 versions
of the ARCrP” when they apply). In dismissing a case, the court is generally
to “balanc[e] the defendant’s interest against the state’s.” Huffman, 222
Ariz. 416, ¶ 12; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981)
(due process requires assessing various interests at stake). A reviewing
court should give “great deference to trial court determinations of
conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations.” State v.
Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 445 (1985). Simply disagreeing with a trial court’s
conclusion is not sufficient to conclude that the court abused its discretion.
See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ¶ 34 (2023).

¶23 Against the due process underpinnings of § 13-4504 and the
plain language of § 13-4504(A), we presume the legislature knew of this
existing law and intended for dismissals under this section to function
compatibly with the others. See Ariz. State Bd. of Dirs. for Junior Colls. v. Phx.
Union High Sch. Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 102 Ariz. 69, 72 (1967); see also 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 363 (2023) (“Courts presume that the legislature intended a
statute to be harmonious and consistent with the existing body of law.”). In
order to do so, we read the statute to require a court determining whether
to dismiss misdemeanor charges to balance the state’s interest in
prosecuting a crime, the risk of trying an incompetent defendant, and,
arguably, the judicial resources required to undertake a competency
evaluation. See State v. Johnson, 147 Ariz. 395, 399 (1985).

¶24 Taking this view of the city court’s decision, the respondent
superior court judge abused his discretion by concluding that the city court
had exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the charges against Adams. The
respondent should have instead evaluated the city court’s dismissal for an

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Opinion of the Court

abuse of discretion. See Medina, 190 Ariz. at 420. We therefore vacate the
respondent superior court judge’s order vacating the city court’s dismissal
and remand the matter for the respondent to reconsider the appeal in a
manner consistent with this decision. Additionally, the respondent should
address in the first instance the state’s argument that the city court
improperly took judicial notice of evidence regarding Adams’s medical
treatment and records.

¶25 We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief.

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