Cristobal Cardenas v. Hon. Holmberg State of Arizona

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

CRISTOBAL CARDENAS,
Petitioner,

v.

HON. JASON R. HOLMBERG, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PINAL,
Respondent,

and

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2023-0086
Filed February 13, 2024

Special Action Proceeding
Pinal County Cause No. S1100CR202102492

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Kate Milewski, Pinal County Public Defender
By Kai Henderson, Defender Attorney, Florence
Counsel for Petitioner

Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney
By Geraldine L. Roll, Deputy County Attorney, Florence
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
 CARDENAS v. HON. HOLMBERG
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Sklar and Judge O’Neil concurred.

S T A R I N G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Cristobal Cardenas asks this court to accept special
action jurisdiction and vacate the respondent judge’s order denying his
request to stay sentencing. Cardenas argues that, because he filed a notice
of appeal from the respondent’s denial of his motion for a new trial, the trial
court no longer had jurisdiction to proceed with sentencing. We accept
jurisdiction and deny relief.

¶2 On August 22, 2023, a jury found Cardenas guilty of
kidnapping and three counts of sexual assault. The respondent judge set
the case for sentencing and ordered the preparation of a presentence report.
Cardenas filed a timely motion for new trial, which the respondent denied.
Cardenas then filed a timely notice of appeal from that denial. Cardenas
also argued that notice of appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The
respondent subsequently denied “any request to stay this matter regarding
sentencing.” This petition for special action followed.

¶3 Our exercise of special action jurisdiction is appropriate when
a petitioner has no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by
appeal.” Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a). This is particularly so when, as in this
case, the issue presented is “a purely legal question, is of statewide
importance, and is likely to arise again.” Lear v. Fields, 226 Ariz. 226, ¶ 6
(App. 2011) (quoting Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 198 (App. 1992)).
Likewise, we may accept special action jurisdiction when there is a risk the
respondent judge will proceed “without subject matter jurisdiction in
excess of . . . authority.” Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588,
¶ 8 (App. 2009) (quoting Kadera v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 557, 559 (App.
1996)). We therefore accept special action jurisdiction to address the
jurisdiction of the trial court in these circumstances.

¶4 Cardenas argues the filing of a notice of appeal from an order
denying a motion for new trial deprives the trial court of jurisdiction and
the respondent judge therefore should have stayed the sentencing hearing.
Thus, he relies on the long-standing principle that perfection of an appeal

2
 CARDENAS v. HON. HOLMBERG
Opinion of the Court

transfers a matter to the appellate court and therefore generally deprives
the trial court of jurisdiction. See Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151, 154-55 (1917), overruled on other grounds by Consol. Ariz. Smelting
Co. v. Egich, 22 Ariz. 543 (1920). The rationale underlying this jurisdictional
principle is to prevent parties and the court from “render[ing] the
judgments of [the appellate] court nugatory, and its decrees a laughing
stock.” Sam v. State, 33 Ariz. 421, 426 (1928) (quoting Navajo Realty Co. v.
Cnty. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Santa Barbara, 31 Ariz. 128, 136 (1926)).
Accordingly, “[a] trial court may not render any decision that would defeat
or usurp an appellate court’s jurisdiction of a case on appeal.” State v.
O’Connor, 171 Ariz. 19, 21 (App. 1992). But it “retains jurisdiction to act so
long as that act cannot negate the decision in a pending appeal or frustrate
the appeal process.” Id. at 22.

¶5 We see no reason to depart from the general principle in this
case. Allowing the trial court to sentence Cardenas would not negate or
frustrate the pending appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial. The
sentencing will have no effect on the outcome of the current appeal. If the
appeal is successful, Cardenas will receive a new trial. If the appeal is
unsuccessful, he will serve the sentence, barring a later reversal of the
conviction in a subsequent appeal. Further, this disposition is consistent
with Rule 26.3, Ariz. R. Crim. P., which requires the trial court to pronounce
sentence no more than thirty days, or, under limited circumstances, sixty
days, after the determination of guilt.

¶6 For these reasons, although we accept special action
jurisdiction, we deny relief.

3