Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. King, 514 P.2d 1032.

92 citing documents.

  • State v. Alcantar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Alcantar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    When the State’s argument goes beyond the limits of permissible argument, the issue is whether the argument (1) was “so unduly prejudicial as to have amounted to a denial of a fair trial” and (2) was “likely to have influenced the jury in reaching a verdict.” Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 222 ¶ 109 (–43 (1973)).
  • State v. Lopez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Lopez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    To that end, “[a] 13 STATE v. LOPEZ Decision of the Court prosecutor must not convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” ¶ 54 (2003) (citation omitted), or “a defendant’s guilt or innocence,”
  • State v. Gilbert Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Gilbert Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    See, (finding the prosecutor vouched in arguing “the State wouldn’t have put [the witness] on the witness stand if [it] didn’t believe every word out of his mouth”); –43 (1973) (finding the prosecutor vouched in arguing “I don’t think [the witness] ever lied to you .
  • State v. Larrazolo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Larrazolo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    The trial court’s admission of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is discretionary, and Larrazolo provides no legal support that there is a limit on the number of prior convictions a trial court may allow.
  • State v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State of Arizona v. Jose Alejandro Acuna Valenzuela 426 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2018
  • State of Arizona v. Jose Alejandro Acuna Valenzuela 426 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2018
    Even if a prosecutor’s argument extends beyond the limits of permissible argument, the consideration is whether the argument was “so unduly prejudicial as to have amounted to a denial of a fair trial” and whether, “under the circumstances of a particular case, the remarks of counsel were likely to have influenced the jury in reaching a verdict.” –43 (1973) (concerning a prosecutor expressing personal opinion, vouching for state’s witnesses, and misstating testimony).
  • State v. Jaramillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Jaramillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    (holding prosecutor’s expression of personal opinion as to defendant’s guilt and at least two avowals as to a witness’s credibility did not prejudice the defendant, so as to warrant reversal, because the court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence).
  • State v. Shook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Shook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Harrison Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Harrison Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Reyes 307 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • State v. Reyes 307 P.3d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    at ¶ 20; , (“[OJmissions in the giving of instructions which were not raised at trial will not be considered unless the error is so fundamental that it is manifest the defendant did not receive a fair trial.”).
  • State v. Lámar 72 P.3d 831 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Lámar 72 P.3d 831 Ariz. 2003
    (holding prosecutor's expression of personal opinion as to defendant's guilt and at least two avowals as to a witness's credibility did not prejudice the defendant, in *842 part, because court instructed jury that closing argument was not evidence)
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
    *603 A criminal defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf “does not include the unqualified right to have brought out on cross-examination only those facts which are favorable to his case.”
  • State v. Smith 774 P.2d 811 Ariz. 1989
  • State v. Smith 774 P.2d 811 Ariz. 1989
  • State v. Cannon 713 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Cannon 713 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1985
    (“The fact that its application may have prevented [appellant] from taking the stand is not material.”)
  • State v. Salcido 681 P.2d 925 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. Salcido 681 P.2d 925 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. Zaragoza 659 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Zaragoza 659 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1983
    There is no danger that the jury found that appellant killed the victim while attempting sexual assault based on an inaccurate definition of the word “attempt.” , , People v. Nelson, 73 Ill.App.3d 593 , 29 Ill.Dec.
  • State v. Bailey 647 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. Bailey 647 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1982
    State v. Harrington, 27 Ariz.App.
  • State v. Mincey 636 P.2d 637 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Mincey 636 P.2d 637 Ariz. 1981
    We must also determine, however, whether appellant was prejudiced thereby because, as we have said before, “[i]t does not necessarily follow from the fact of improper argument that the jury was improperly influenced.”
  • State v. McElyea 635 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. McElyea 635 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Taylor 622 P.2d 474 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Taylor 622 P.2d 474 Ariz. 1980
    The omitted instruction did not deal with the definition of the elements of the crime, , but went to the issue of credibility.
  • State v. Vargas 618 P.2d 229 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Vargas 618 P.2d 229 Ariz. 1980
    17A A.R.S., Rule 29(a), Rules of Supreme Court, DR7-1Q6(C)(4).
  • State v. Noble 612 P.2d 497 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Noble 612 P.2d 497 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Soule 591 P.2d 993 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
  • State v. Soule 591 P.2d 993 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
  • State v. Islas 582 P.2d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
  • State v. Islas 582 P.2d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
    We reach the same result as to another objectionable portion of the prosecutor’s argument: “I’m aghast at the defense for trying, objecting to the fact that agent Parella is not here, when he objected on redirect examination—■ “MR. SCHOLL: I object, your Honor.