Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Miniefield, 522 P.2d 25.

28 citing documents.

State v. Arias Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Arias Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Because attorneys are given wide latitude in closing arguments and may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, those unfavorable characterizations, alone, were not improper.3 ¶68 In more than a dozen other instances, however, the prosecutor also argued that Arias had directly wronged the jurors, asserting she had “looked at each and every one of [them]” and “lied to [them]” and “attempted to manipulate
State v. Rael Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Rael Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
In argument, counsel is permitted to “draw[] reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
see also United States v. Poole, 735 F.3d 269, 276–78 (5th Cir. 2013).
State v. Martinson 384 P.3d 307 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Martinson 384 P.3d 307 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
The supreme court rejected that argument, holding that “if the legislature explicitly states that a particular felony is a predicate felony for felony-murder, no ‘merger’ occurs.”5 Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 142; (arson does not merge into felony murder because it is designated a predicate felony under felony murder statute).
State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson 351 P.3d 1079 Ariz. 2015
State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson 351 P.3d 1079 Ariz. 2015
(“[T]he fact that the [predicate felony] supplied the premeditation necessary for first-degree murder does not make it part of the same offense.”); (“In Arizona, first degree murder is only one crime regardless whether
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
e broad language in Essman suggesting that the predicate felony must be 25 “independent of the homicide.” For example, in State v. Miniefield, the defendant argued that it was fundamental error to charge him with felony murder by arson because “the arson was merely the use of fire to attempt to kill the victim.”
State v. Sandoval 857 P.2d 395 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Sandoval 857 P.2d 395 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
(Arizona criminal law is based solely on statute and not on common law).
State v. Lopez 847 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1992
Distinguished State v. Lopez 847 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1992
Lopez cites three Arizona cases in support of his merger argument, , , and State v. Essman, supra, which we find distinguishable.
State v. Gerlaugh 654 P.2d 800 Ariz. 1982
State v. Gerlaugh 654 P.2d 800 Ariz. 1982
we held that convictions and sentences for both first degree murder and arson (the underlying felony) did not violate A.R.S.
State v. Rumsey 636 P.2d 1209 Ariz. 1981
State v. Rumsey 636 P.2d 1209 Ariz. 1981
State v. Edwards 594 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1979
State v. Edwards 594 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1979
we held that convictions and sentences for both first degree murder and arson (the underlying felony) did not violate A.R.S.
State v. Turrubiates 542 P.2d 427 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
State v. Turrubiates 542 P.2d 427 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
State v. Richmond 540 P.2d 700 Ariz. 1975
State v. Richmond 540 P.2d 700 Ariz. 1975
“We the jury * * * do find the defendant -of the crime of murder, second degree.” While we have said: “The trial court should instruct the jury on every degree or grade of the offense which is supported by the evidence, * * , ( , 522P.2d 25 (1974).
State v. Taylor 537 P.2d 938 Ariz. 1975
State v. Taylor 537 P.2d 938 Ariz. 1975