Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Smith, 4 P.3d 388.
- State of Arizona v. Michael Eugene Traverso Ariz. 2025
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State of Arizona v. Michael Eugene Traverso
Ariz. 2025
See Stewart, 202 Ariz. at 449 ¶ 9 (describing such a right as one that is “so inherently personal that it cannot be waived by defense counsel; only the defendant can waive it” ( ¶ 17 (App. 1999))).
- State v. Emedi 484 P.3d 657 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
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State v. Emedi
484 P.3d 657
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
-35 (1980); ¶ 11 (App. 1999), ¶ 17 (2009).
- State v. Contreras Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Contreras
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 8 (App. 2006) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).
- State v. Soliz 219 P.3d 1045 Ariz. 2009
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State v. Soliz
219 P.3d 1045
Ariz. 2009
4 See, ¶ 21, (reversible error when defendant’s right to twelve person jury waived by defense counsel’s stipulation with state that sentences would run concurrently, resulting in a sentence of less than thirty years); ¶¶ 10, 12, (App. 1998
- State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
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State v. Escobedo
213 P.3d 689
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Our cases have referred to this error both as “fundamental error,” , ¶ 21 , , ¶ 10 , and as “structural error,” ¶¶ 21-22 , State v. Ring (Ring III), 204 Ari
- State v. Martinez 212 P.3d 75 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
- State v. Martinez 212 P.3d 75 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
- State v. Moreno-Medrano 185 P.3d 135 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
- State v. Moreno-Medrano 185 P.3d 135 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
- State v. Price 183 P.3d 1279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
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State v. Price
183 P.3d 1279
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23
- In Re Tiffany O. 174 P.3d 282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State of Arizona v. Samuel Wayne Swoopes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
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State of Arizona v. Samuel Wayne Swoopes
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
18 911 (1976) (waiver of right to jury trial); (right to twelve-person jury); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2052-53 (1973) (“Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a crimin
- State of Arizona v. Zachary Samuel Eggers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
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State of Arizona v. Zachary Samuel Eggers
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
A suspect is in custody if “‘under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.’” quoting Carter, 145 Ariz. at 105, 700 P.2d at 492; (“The test used to determine if a person is in custody under a Fifth Amendment analysis is whether the person’s freedom of movement is restricted to the ex
- State v. Kuck 129 P.3d 954 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
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State v. Kuck
129 P.3d 954
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
340, ¶2 , 395 (App.1999).
- State v. Kuck 110 P.3d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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State v. Kuck
110 P.3d 1022
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
340, ¶ 2 , 395 (App.1999).
- State v. Munninger 104 P.3d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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State v. Munninger
104 P.3d 204
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
1019 ); ¶ 16 , ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") ( , ).
- State v. Maldonado 78 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State v. Maldonado
78 P.3d 1060
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
340 ¶ 2, 21, 395 (App.1999); , 280 ¶ 26-27
- State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
- State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- State v. Sepahi 61 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- State v. Benenati 52 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
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State v. Benenati
52 P.3d 804
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
§ 21-102(A); , (defendant entitled to twelve-person jury when exposed to sentence in excess of thirty years notwithstanding that actual sentences imposed totaled 7.5 years).
- Stewart v. Smith 46 P.3d 1067 Ariz. 2002
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Stewart v. Smith
46 P.3d 1067
Ariz. 2002
2d 578, ¶ 22 (1998) (The waiver of the right to counsel “must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”); (When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, “the court must always address the defendant personally, pursuant to [Rule] 18.1(b)(1) to ascertain ‘that the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent.’”); (“[A] defendant’s right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution is a right so inherently personal that it cannot be waived by defense counsel; only the defendant can wa
- In Re Jorge D. 43 P.3d 605 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
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In Re Jorge D.
43 P.3d 605
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
1602 ); ¶ 4 , (employing an objective test to determine "whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way”) (
- State v. Espinosa 29 P.3d 278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
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State v. Espinosa
29 P.3d 278
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Thus, preclusion would not apply to claims involving such constitutional rights as the right to counsel, , the right to a jury trial, , or the right to be tried by a twelve-person jury, , unless the record establishes that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right.
- State v. Anderson 4 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2000
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State v. Anderson
4 P.3d 369
Ariz. 2000
3, 6 , -340 , -395 (App.1999) (defendant tried to eight-person rather than twelve-person jury to which he was entitled; not possible to predict what properly composed jury might have done).