Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Watson, 586 P.2d 1253.

183 citing documents.

State v. Cooper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Cooper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Counsel failed to meet her “duty to engage in adequate investigation of possible defenses,” ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and Cooper demonstrated the failure “resulted in not presenting evidence or interposing a defense which would have made a crucial difference to the case at the trial,”
Az Petition Partners v. Hon. thompson/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Az Petition Partners v. Hon. thompson/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Whether a statute is severable is a “question of legislative intent.”
State of Arizona v. Vivek a Patel 486 P.3d 188 Ariz. 2021
State of Arizona v. Vivek a Patel 486 P.3d 188 Ariz. 2021
they would have enacted the remainder of the statute without what is now the offending portion.” Prentiss, 163 Ariz. at 86 ().
State v. Apodaca Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Apodaca Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
STATE OF ARIZONA v. STEVE FRANK McPHERSON 269 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
STATE OF ARIZONA v. STEVE FRANK McPHERSON 269 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to convictions as well as sentences, State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 453, and when a defendant is convicted of the same offense in separate counts, such multiplicitous convictions generally are not permitted.
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
¶62 In State v. Watson, this Court explained that “[s]everability is a question of legislative intent.” 120 Ariz. 441, 445
State v. Smith 159 P.3d 531 Ariz. 2007
State v. Smith 159 P.3d 531 Ariz. 2007
This Court affirmed the convictions
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granville 123 P.3d 662 Ariz. 2005
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granville 123 P.3d 662 Ariz. 2005
¶15 The State also bases its argument that the defendant bears the burden of proving that mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency on this court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
We have also held that it is constitutional to place the burden of proving mitigation on the defendant, , a position endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-51 , 110 S.Ct.
State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
State v. Ring 65 P.3d 915 Ariz. 2003
McComb v. Superior Court 943 P.2d 878 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
est, dragged her to another room, shot her three more times, then shot his male victim three times, shooting him once in the back after he fell and kicking him in the face repeatedly after he was unconscious or dead); -41 , -25 (1979) (holding that shooting the victim twice in the back was not particularly cruel or depraved); , cert.
State v. Lee 917 P.2d 692 Ariz. 1996
State v. Lee 917 P.2d 692 Ariz. 1996
“Fear of force is an element of robbery and the conviction of robbery presumes that such fear was present.” , cert.
State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), , cert.
State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
We later vacated the death sentence, however, , cert.
State v. Cornell 878 P.2d 1352 Ariz. 1994
State v. Cornell 878 P.2d 1352 Ariz. 1994
State v. Ramirez 871 P.2d 237 Ariz. 1994
State v. Ramirez 871 P.2d 237 Ariz. 1994
State v. Gallegos 870 P.2d 1097 Ariz. 1994
State v. Lopez 857 P.2d 1261 Ariz. 1993
State v. Lopez 857 P.2d 1261 Ariz. 1993
State v. Salazar 844 P.2d 566 Ariz. 1992
State v. Salazar 844 P.2d 566 Ariz. 1992
Norton v. Superior Court 829 P.2d 345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Norton v. Superior Court 829 P.2d 345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
“[T]he valid part of a statute will be sustained where the valid and invalid parts are so separate and distinct that it is clear or may be presumed that the legislature would have enacted the former without the latter, if it had known of the invalidity____” , ( , ), cert.
State v. Hinchey 799 P.2d 352 Ariz. 1990
State v. Hinchey 799 P.2d 352 Ariz. 1990
(quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 , 96 S.Ct.
State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 Ariz. 1989
State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 Ariz. 1989
: We can presume that had the legislature been aware of the unconstitutionality of the limitation on mitigating circumstances, they would have enacted the remainder of the statute without what is now the offending portion.
State v. Romanosky 782 P.2d 693 Ariz. 1989
State v. Romanosky 782 P.2d 693 Ariz. 1989
State v. Ritch 774 P.2d 234 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989