Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Tuzon, 575 P.2d 1231.

62 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Giovani Fuster Melendez 565 P.3d 1034 Ariz. 2025
State of Arizona v. Giovani Fuster Melendez 565 P.3d 1034 Ariz. 2025
(holding that prosecutors do not violate Doyle when impeaching a defendant with his post-Miranda interrogation statements that omitted facts later testified to at trial).
Jardines v. Hon. ryan-touhill/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
Jardines v. Hon. ryan-touhill/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
(citing United 8 JARDINES v. HON.
State v. Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
(“When one who has voluntarily made statements to police officers after his arrest makes new exculpatory statements at trial, the fact that he failed to make these statements earlier may be used for impeachment.”).
State v. Sotelo-Nava Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Sotelo-Nava Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Jacobson 418 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Jacobson 418 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
d. See State v. Oaks , , 434, ¶ 9, , 165 (App. 2005) ("By its very nature, the term ['reasonable person'] connotes an objective standard of conduct, not a subjective standard," which "does not take into account the individual characteristics of the accused.") (citing *967 State v. Serrano , , 501, , 1346 (App. 1985), and then State v. Tuzon , , 209, , 1235 (1978) ).
Louis E Cespedes v. Hon. lee/state Ariz. 2017
Louis E Cespedes v. Hon. lee/state Ariz. 2017
Thus, using force in self-defense is based on “a reasonable person's belief, not the unreasonable, even if honest, belief of the accused.” ¶ 11 (2010) (stating that justification under § 13-404 “adopts a purely objective standard, permitting the use of force only if a ‘reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself’”); Korzep, 172 Ariz. at 540 (holding that
State v. Spriggs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Spriggs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
“When one who has voluntarily made statements to police officers after his arrest makes new exculpatory statements at trial, the fact that he failed to make these statements earlier may be used for impeachment.” (citation omitted).
State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Raimonde Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Criticized State v. Raimonde Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“The standard is a reasonable person’s belief, not the unreasonable, even if honest, belief of the accused.”).
State v. Alonzo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Alonzo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“When one who has voluntarily made statements to police officers after his arrest makes new exculpatory statements at trial, the fact that he failed to make these statements earlier may be used for impeachment.”).
State v. Dixon 622 P.2d 501 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
State v. Dixon 622 P.2d 501 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
(failure to make exculpatory statements after arrest may be used for impeachment where defendant did not keep silent).
State of Arizona v. Derek Scott Oaks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Derek Scott Oaks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
(standard in determining self-defense is “a reasonable person’s belief, not the unreasonable, even if honest, belief of the accused”).
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Martin 49 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Martin 49 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
(impeachment allowed even though defendant placed on probation for the prior offenses); , (impeachment by a prior conviction of open-ended second-degree burglary was proper); -08 , -96 (App.1979) (open-ended conviction considered a felony for purposes of impeachment).
State v. Henry 863 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1993
State v. Henry 863 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1993
(defendant testified to self-defense at trial; was impeached with failure to mention self-defense during post-arrest statement); , (prosecutor’s comments on defendant’s credibility permissible); Cf. State v. Benton, 109
State v. Duzan 862 P.2d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Duzan 862 P.2d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
(closing arguments and jury instructions considered together in determining whether prosecutor’s statement constituted error).
State v. Allgood 831 P.2d 1290 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Allgood 831 P.2d 1290 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Hernandez 823 P.2d 1309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Hernandez 823 P.2d 1309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Torres 781 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
State v. Torres 781 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Matter of Hendrix 701 P.2d 841 Ariz. 1985
Matter of Hendrix 701 P.2d 841 Ariz. 1985
575 P.2d *346 1231 (1978).
State v. Bracy 703 P.2d 464 Ariz. 1985
State v. Bracy 703 P.2d 464 Ariz. 1985
State v. Chaney 686 P.2d 1265 Ariz. 1984
State v. Chaney 686 P.2d 1265 Ariz. 1984
State v. Moya 683 P.2d 307 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
State v. Moya 683 P.2d 307 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
“When one who has voluntarily made statements to police officers after his arrest makes new exculpatory statements at trial, the fact that he failed to make these statements earlier may be used for impeachment.”
State v. Harding 670 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1983
State v. Harding 670 P.2d 383 Ariz. 1983
State v. Routhier 669 P.2d 68 Ariz. 1983
State v. Routhier 669 P.2d 68 Ariz. 1983
Appellant’s express invocation of his rights, as well as his failure to make a complete statement or to answer particular questions, distinguishes this case from
State v. Jessen 657 P.2d 871 Ariz. 1982
State v. Jessen 657 P.2d 871 Ariz. 1982
It is within the discretion of the trial court to decide whether a defendant may require a prosecuting attorney to testify in his behalf, (citation omitted) Calling a prosecutor as a witness for the defendant inevitably confuses the distinctions between advocate and witness, argument and testimony, and should be permitted only if required by a compelling need, (citations omitted)”