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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Cobb, 566 P.2d 285.

57 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Lito Hernandez 417 P.3d 207 Ariz. 2018
  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Lito Hernandez 417 P.3d 207 Ariz. 2018
    ¶13 The court of appeals accepted the trial court's analysis that Hernandez's vehicle came to rest on the curtilage of his girlfriend's home but, citing State v. Cobb , , 489, , 290 (1977), questioned whether the driveway, as "only a semiprivate area," qualified for the full protection afforded curtilage.
  • State v. Hernandez 399 P.3d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Hernandez 399 P.3d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    “A driveway[, however,] is only a semiprivate area.” , quoting United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975); , (driveway, although in curtilage, considered semiprivate), For the purposes of our analysis, we accept the trial court’s finding that Herna
  • State v. Jacot 330 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Jacot 330 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    ¶ 12 , the Arizona Supreme Court held that a defendant’s driveway was not within the curtilage of his home: A driveway is only a semiprivate area.
  • State v. Blakley 243 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State v. Blakley 243 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    The vehicle was parked in the driveway, an area generally considered “semiprivate.”
  • State of Arizona v. Ryan Ray Olm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Ryan Ray Olm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    (driveway generally considered “semiprivate” and resident‟s privacy expectation for “activities on his driveway will generally depend on the nature of the activities and the degree of visibility from the street”); n.1, n.1 (1976) (“
  • State v. Valenzuela 984 P.2d 12 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Valenzuela 984 P.2d 12 Ariz. 1999
  • Mazen v. Seidel 940 P.2d 923 Ariz. 1997
  • Mazen v. Seidel 940 P.2d 923 Ariz. 1997
    If the officer was lawfully in the place where he saw the contraband, this court has stated that there was no real search; thus “it cannot be unreasonable or unconstitutional to seize the item in plain view.”
  • State v. Schackart 858 P.2d 639 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Schackart 858 P.2d 639 Ariz. 1993
    See Hart v. Eyman, 458 F.2d 334, 338 (9th Cir.1972)
  • State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
  • State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
  • State v. Murray 782 P.2d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • State v. Murray 782 P.2d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
    is such error as goes to the foundation of the case, or which takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense.” , overruled on other grounds
  • State v. King 763 P.2d 239 Ariz. 1988
  • State v. King 763 P.2d 239 Ariz. 1988
    Thomas, 130 Ariz. at 436 , 636 P.2d at 1218 ( , overruled on other grounds, , ).
  • State v. Garcia 731 P.2d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Garcia 731 P.2d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Stone 728 P.2d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Stone 728 P.2d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
  • State v. Flores 682 P.2d 1136 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. Flores 682 P.2d 1136 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • State v. McGann 645 P.2d 811 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. McGann 645 P.2d 811 Ariz. 1982
    Fundamental error is “error as goes to the foundation of the case, or which takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense.” , overruled on other grounds
  • State v. Mincey 636 P.2d 637 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Mincey 636 P.2d 637 Ariz. 1981
    State v. Pulliam, supra, , holding that thereafter the failure to give the particular instruction required by the Pulliam Court would no longer be fundamental error.
  • State v. Platt 637 P.2d 1073 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Platt 637 P.2d 1073 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Nelson 633 P.2d 391 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Nelson 633 P.2d 391 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Robinson 620 P.2d 703 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. Robinson 620 P.2d 703 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. Morse 617 P.2d 1141 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Morse 617 P.2d 1141 Ariz. 1980
    Although the Arizona rule is that the trial court must, upon defendant’s request, instruct the jury on vol-untariness of defendant’s statements, , the question of admissibility of statements because of possible Miranda violations need not be presented to the jury, but is controlled by the independent determination of the trial judge.
  • State v. Brooks 618 P.2d 624 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • State v. Brooks 618 P.2d 624 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • State v. Porter 595 P.2d 998 Ariz. 1979
  • State v. Porter 595 P.2d 998 Ariz. 1979
    The State of Arizona, , claims that this is no longer the law.
  • State v. Stone 594 P.2d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
  • Overruled State v. Stone 594 P.2d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
    Pulliam was overruled, however, , in which the Supreme Court held: In the future, due process will be adequately served in Arizona if the trial judge alone determines, before trial, the voluntariness of any admissions or confessions of an accused.
  • State v. Tothill 586 P.2d 655 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
  • State v. Tothill 586 P.2d 655 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
  • State v. Mosley 581 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1978
  • State v. Mosley 581 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1978