Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Rodriguez, 560 P.2d 1238.
- State of Arizona v. Jose Raul Juarez-Orci 342 P.3d 856 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
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State of Arizona v. Jose Raul Juarez-Orci
342 P.3d 856
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
Cf. United States v. Brown, 575 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1978) (where no evidence of flight or attempted flight, references to flight in instruction “surplusage”); (general intent instruction “surplusage” where jury received separate instruction on specific intent for crime at issue, instructions were separated by five unrelated instructions, and specific intent requirement discussed six times in closing arguments and general intent not men
- State v. Knox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Knox
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
§ 13-1506; (“[S]pecific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.”).
- State v. Ontiveros 81 P.3d 330 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State v. Ontiveros
81 P.3d 330
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Although the intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself, , we may not presume that Ontiveros intended the ordinary consequences of his act.
- State v. Johnson 72 P.3d 343 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- State v. Johnson 72 P.3d 343 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- State v. Mott 931 P.2d 1046 Ariz. 1997
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State v. Mott
931 P.2d 1046
Ariz. 1997
(taking into account the closing arguments of counsel in assessing the adequacy of instructions).
- State v. Orendain 916 P.2d 1064 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- State v. Orendain 916 P.2d 1064 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- State v. Lara 902 P.2d 1337 Ariz. 1995
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State v. Lara
902 P.2d 1337
Ariz. 1995
("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.”).
- State v. Cramer 851 P.2d 147 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
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State v. Cramer
851 P.2d 147
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Additionally, considering the instructions in context and matters outside the instructions to determine whether those given are sufficient, , it is clear that the jurors understood that the weight of the marijuana was an element of the crime, having been included in the indictment which was read to them.
- State v. Belyeu 795 P.2d 229 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
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State v. Belyeu
795 P.2d 229
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
(jury can infer intent to commit burglary from fact that defendant broke a window to gain entrance); -34 , -41 (1977) (jury can infer intent from forced entry and unsatisfactory explanation for entry); State v. Tubbs, 155 Ariz. at 536, 747 P.2d at 1235 (App.1987) (jury can infer intent to commit burglary from fact that defendant ripped off screen and entered through the window).
- State v. Bruggeman 779 P.2d 823 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
- State v. Bruggeman 779 P.2d 823 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
- State v. Tubbs 747 P.2d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
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State v. Tubbs
747 P.2d 1232
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
(citations omitted); -34 , -41 (1977) (jurors could infer intent from forced entry and unsatisfactory explanation for entry); and State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz.App.
- State v. Oppenheimer 673 P.2d 318 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
- State v. Oppenheimer 673 P.2d 318 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
- In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 61935-4 669 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
- In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 61935-4 669 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
- State v. Earby 665 P.2d 590 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
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State v. Earby
665 P.2d 590
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
*248 , where, as in the case at bar, the jury was otherwise instructed on the requisite state of mind required by the statute.
- State v. Miller 658 P.2d 808 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
- State v. Miller 658 P.2d 808 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
- State v. Malloy 639 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1981
- State v. Malloy 639 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1981
- State v. Anderson 623 P.2d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
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State v. Anderson
623 P.2d 1247
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Rather, the State urges that although the term “private parts” may be, under the facts here, ambiguous, the failure to give an explanatory instruction was cured by closing argument of counsel emphasizing the touching of the genital, procreation area as constituting the criminal act charged
- State v. Wilson 584 P.2d 53 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
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State v. Wilson
584 P.2d 53
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
The State argues, on the other hand, , the requisite intent and the overt act can be shown by the same evidence and that the intent to do an act may be inferred or presumed from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.
- State v. Calvery 571 P.2d 300 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
- State v. Calvery 571 P.2d 300 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
- State v. Mincey 566 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1977
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State v. Mincey
566 P.2d 273
Ariz. 1977
: conflicting jury instructions were given concerning the intent or mens rea necessary for conviction.
- State v. Cook 564 P.2d 97 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
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State v. Cook
564 P.2d 97
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
filed February 18, 1977, in a separate appeal taken by Cook’s co-defendant, Richard Amini Rodriguez.