Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1.

292 citing documents.

  • State v. Smith 159 P.3d 531 Ariz. 2007
  • State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
    § 13-703(F)(8) aggravating factor (multiple homicides), a crime against an intended victim not resulting in death (attempted murder or assault, for example) does not trigger any aggravating factor.9 & n.2, & n.2 (1983) (confirming that crimes occurring in the same series of events do not trigger (F)(2), the prior serious offense aggravator).
  • State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
    -09 , -34 (1981), , 57 n. 2, , 16 n. 2 (1983).
  • State v. Grell 135 P.3d 696 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Grell 135 P.3d 696 Ariz. 2006
    3 , and concluded that the manner of killing, in addition to being cruel, was also heinous and depraved.
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
    See, ¶ 57, (defining heinous and depraved); ¶ 34, (defining relishing); State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 606, (defining witness elimination); -53, This Court also rejected Anderson’s challenge that the decision in Walton would not save a facially vague F.6 aggravator when a jury, as opposed to a judge, performs the initial fact-finding function because the jury instructions given were “adequate to provide a narrowed construction of th
  • State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
    See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, (quoting Clark, 126 Ariz. at 436, 616 P.2d at 896); see also Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 355-56, ¶ 128, 111 P.3d at 397-98.14 ¶85 Here, substantial evidence supports the cruelty prong of the (F)(6) aggravator.
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granville 123 P.3d 662 Ariz. 2005
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granville 123 P.3d 662 Ariz. 2005
    State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 54
  • State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
    - 34 - 206, overruled, in part, n.2, n.2 (1983).
  • State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
    and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency”); (“Where none of the statutory aggravating circumstances are found to be present, our statute prohibits the death penalty.”).4 In contrast, nothing in § 13-703 required that any specific fact be
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
    we held that fire falls within the statutory definition of “dangerous instrument.” , 198 n. 1, , 1023 n. 1 (1981) , (“The jury also found that these crimes involved the use or exhibition of fire, a dangerous instrument under A.R.S.
  • State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Canez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Cañez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Cañez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Canez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Smith 50 P.3d 825 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Smith 50 P.3d 825 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
  • Evanchyk v. Stewart 47 P.3d 1114 Ariz. 2002
  • Evanchyk v. Stewart 47 P.3d 1114 Ariz. 2002
    e that the defendant had the “intent to promote the offense of murder and an agreement with another that one will do the actual killing.” P.2d 1 (1983).
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
    792, 802 (1993); -53 , -13 (1993), , 63-64 n. 7, , 1011-12 n. 7 ¶¶ 28-30 (1998); -16 , -61 (1983); -08 , -33 (1981), , 57 n. 2, , 16 n. 2 (1983).
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
    792, 802 (1993); -53, -13 (1993), - 64 n.7, -12 n.7 ¶¶28-30 (1998); -16, -61 (1983); -08, -33 (1981), n.2, n.2 (1983).
  • State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
    (cruelty alone is sufficient to support a finding of F.6); , (heinousness or depravity alone is sufficient to support a F.6 finding).
  • State v. Ring 25 P.3d 1139 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Ring 25 P.3d 1139 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Estrada 18 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • State v. Estrada 18 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
    or depraved.” Citing another capital case, , petitioner claims that the trial court should have considered the following five factors in determining whether his crime was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner: (1) whether petitioner relished the murder; (2) whether petitioner inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim; (3) w
  • State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
    conviction occurs upon determination of guilt.” ( , 57 n. 2, , 16 n. 2 (1983)) (citations omitted)).
  • State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999