Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Morales, 587 P.2d 236.

32 citing documents.

  • State v. Ruiz-Gastelum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Ruiz-Gastelum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986); 8 STATE v. RUIZ-GASTELUM Decision of the Court (1978) (“[G]reat latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of an accomplice or co-defendant who has turned State’s evidence and testifies on behalf of the State
  • State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne 447 P.3d 297 Ariz. 2019
  • State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne 447 P.3d 297 Ariz. 2019
    This Court has long held that “great latitude should be allowed in the cross- examination of an accomplice or co-defendant who has turned State’s evidence and testifies on behalf of the State on a trial of his co-defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
    A defendant has great latitude to cross-examine an “accomplice or co-defendant who has turned State’s evidence and testifies on behalf of the State in a trial of his co-defendant.” (citations omitted).
  • State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
    -21 , -10 (1978); cf. McDaniel, 127 Ariz. at 15-16 , 617 P.2d at 1131-32 .
  • State v. Ruelas 798 P.2d 1335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Ruelas 798 P.2d 1335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    That rule, however, permits a court, in its discretion, to allow impeachment by a juvenile adjudication if the conviction would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult qnd the court is satisfied that its admission “is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” A
  • State v. Van Den Berg 791 P.2d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Van Den Berg 791 P.2d 1075 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    -21 , -40 (1978) (proper to preclude use of witness’ juvenile record when “sought only for the purpose of attacking his general credibility and did not go to a bias or motive for his trial testimony”).
  • State v. Goswick 691 P.2d 673 Ariz. 1984
  • State v. Goswick 691 P.2d 673 Ariz. 1984
    Defendant contends, however, , supports his position.
  • State v. McElyea 635 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. McElyea 635 P.2d 170 Ariz. 1981
    We have stated that “the trier of fact must not be prevented from learning what [the] major witness expected for his testimony.” State v. McDaniel, supra, 127 Ariz. at 15 , 617 P.2d at 1131 (1980)
  • State v. Morales 630 P.2d 1015 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Morales 630 P.2d 1015 Ariz. 1981
  • State v. Manley 623 P.2d 829 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. Manley 623 P.2d 829 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1980
  • State v. McDaniel 617 P.2d 1129 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. McDaniel 617 P.2d 1129 Ariz. 1980
    a case similar to McDaniel’s but before a jury, we reversed because the trial court foreclosed defense inquiry into the penalties faced by a juvenile accomplice if he were to be tried as an adult.
  • State v. Clark 616 P.2d 888 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Clark 616 P.2d 888 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Watkins 614 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Watkins 614 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1980
    Those cases, all based on §§ 13-455 and 456 of the old Criminal Code in effect prior to the instant offenses
  • State v. Gretzler 612 P.2d 1023 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Gretzler 612 P.2d 1023 Ariz. 1980
    The trial court’s refusal to allow inquiry into the penalty the witness would have faced had he not agreed to testify was reversible error.”
  • State v. Dunlap 608 P.2d 41 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Dunlap 608 P.2d 41 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Melendez 588 P.2d 294 Ariz. 1978
  • State v. Melendez 588 P.2d 294 Ariz. 1978