Cited by

ether the defendant has been denied the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears either on the issues 6 STATE v. PARKINSON Opinion of the Court in the case or on the credibility of the witness.” ().

We assess the reasonableness of cross-examination restrictions under the Confrontation Clause “on a case-by-case basis.”

See, –26 (1977) (“As evidence of the witness’ condition becomes more remote in time, it has proportionately less bearing on the credibility of the witness.”).

defendant had the opportunity to present the jury with “information which bears either on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness.” State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 4 STATE v. SALAZAR Decision of the Court 509, 518, ¶ 30 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) ().

-80, ¶ 41 (App. 2016) ().

¶86 “The right to cross-examination must be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds and the trial court has discretion to curtail its scope.”

of fact information which bears either 1 Hudson’s attorney mistakenly referred to Detective A instead of Detective B. 6 STATE v. HUDSON Decision of the Court on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness.” ¶ 30 (2002) ().

While a cross-examiner should be afforded great latitude, the superior court is tasked with ensuring that cross-examination is “kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds,”

See State v. Hardy , , ¶¶ 49-50, , 22-23 (2012) ; see also State v. Fleming , , 125-26, , 275-76 (1977) ("As evidence of the witness' condition becomes more remote in time, it has proportionately less bearing on the credibility of the witness.").

See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); State v. Cañez, ¶ 62 (2002), ¶ 11, n.1 (2016); (“The right [of confrontation] does not confer .

quoting State v. Fleming , , 125, , 271 (1977).

“As evidence of the witness’[s] condition becomes more remote in time, it has proportionately less bearing on the credibility of the witness.” -26 (1977).

DISCUSSION ¶5 Although the “right of cross-examination is a vital part of the right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment,” the superior court “has discretion to curtail its scope.”

().6 ¶17 The record does not support Meyers’ contention that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding his prior statement to the detective that Earl was possibly involved with drug dealers as hearsay.

That right, however, “must be kept within reasonable bounds” and the test for reasonableness is “whether the defendant has been denied the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears either on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness.”

8 A prosecutor’s improper comments about the exercise of the right to remain silent “will be fundamental error.”

State v. Cañez, (“The right to cross-examination must be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds and the trial court has discretion to curtail its scope.”).

(noting that the sanction of preclusion of testimony for disclosure violations is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); , (holding that the trial court has the discretion to curtail the scope of cross-examination when appropriate).

1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); , (“The right to cross-examination must be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds and the trial court has discretion to curtail its scope.”).

atitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125, (“The right to cross-examination must be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds and the trial court has discretion to