Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Risher, 574 P.2d 453.
- State v. Watson 459 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- State v. Watson 459 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- State v. Arana 843 P.2d 652 Ariz. 1992
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State v. Arana
843 P.2d 652
Ariz. 1992
For example, , 272 n. 2, , 927 n. 2 (1985), we noted that the amendment which gave rise to today’s version of § 13-702(H), , in which we held that a defendant found guilty of an “open-end” offense may be placed on probation for a longer period of time than the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor and still have the offense designated as a misdemeanor upon successful completion of the probationary period.
- State v. Brown 816 P.2d 932 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
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State v. Brown
816 P.2d 932
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
the supreme court considered an analogous issue.
- State v. Everhart 819 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
- State v. Everhart 819 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
- State v. Lucero 778 P.2d 1362 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
- State v. Fox 738 P.2d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
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State v. Fox
738 P.2d 364
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
However, a defendant “may be placed on probation for a longer period of time than the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor and still have the offense designated as a misdemeanor upon successful completion of the probationary period.” , A.R.S.
- State v. Livanos 725 P.2d 505 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
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State v. Livanos
725 P.2d 505
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
The code provided the method of designating “open-ended” offenses and, under the new code, the trial court could no longer delay the designation of the offense
- State v. LaBar 715 P.2d 775 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
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State v. LaBar
715 P.2d 775
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
The appellant is certainly correct in arguing that, generally speaking, a suspended sentence resulting in probation does not constitute a “sentence.”
- State v. Sweet 693 P.2d 921 Ariz. 1985
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State v. Sweet
693 P.2d 921
Ariz. 1985
If he does not, then it will be designated as a class six felony; and the Court so admonishes the defendant.” We are referred to this court’s , for the proposition that until the trial court declares it to be a misdemeanor, an open-ended sentence is deemed to be a felony conviction.
- State v. Barksdale 694 P.2d 295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
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State v. Barksdale
694 P.2d 295
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
our supreme court held “probation is not a sentence, but a feature of imposition of sentence.”
- State of Arizona v. Sweet 693 P.2d 944 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
- State of Arizona v. Sweet 693 P.2d 944 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
- State v. Carpenter 684 P.2d 910 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
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State v. Carpenter
684 P.2d 910
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Justice Holohan dissenting.
- State v. Wright 643 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
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State v. Wright
643 P.2d 23
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
the court held this could be done when the defendant was found guilty on an “open-enid” offense (one which could be treated either as a misdemeanor or felony).
- State v. Williams 639 P.2d 1043 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- State v. Grice 597 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
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State v. Grice
597 P.2d 548
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
in support of his position.
- State v. Mendivil 592 P.2d 1256 Ariz. 1979
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State v. Mendivil
592 P.2d 1256
Ariz. 1979
Although the offense had occurred prior to the 1977 amendment of § 13-1657, Division Two held that the amended version of § 13-1657 could be used because “probation is not a sentence,” , , for that proposition.
- State v. Soule 591 P.2d 993 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
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State v. Soule
591 P.2d 993
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
The Court in Tuzon further expanded the reasoning by stating: The question of how to treat an open-end offense in cases where imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant placed on probation was answered by this court in a , .
- State v. Mendivil 592 P.2d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
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State v. Mendivil
592 P.2d 1272
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
In Levasseur , the court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding in State v, Risher, , that probation is not a “sentence.” , bans only the imposition of a more severe sentence than that in effect at the time the crime was committed, the Levasseur court held that prohibition did not apply to changes in probation statut
- State v. Levasseur 578 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
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State v. Levasseur
578 P.2d 1026
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
31 , our Supreme Court has recently stated in State v. Risher, Ariz., : “Except for the purpose of commencing the time within which a person must appeal, probation is not a sentence and is granted only after the imposition of sentence is suspended.” (Emphasis ours) Accord: Pickett v. Boykin, Ariz.
- Pickett v. Boykin 576 P.2d 120 Ariz. 1978
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Pickett v. Boykin
576 P.2d 120
Ariz. 1978
(No. 3999-PR, filed Jan.
- State v. Tuzon 575 P.2d 1231 Ariz. 1978
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State v. Tuzon
575 P.2d 1231
Ariz. 1978
The question of how to treat an open-end offense in cases where imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant placed on probation was answered by this court in a , .