Cited by

(no fundamental error review in a post- conviction relief proceeding); (“It is the petitioner’s burden to assert grounds that bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order to obtain relief.”).

However, the court’s broad discretion in this sphere cannot override the constitutional imperative that a defendant cannot be punished “because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do.” Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; (“A defendant is guilty when convicted and if he chooses not to publicly admit his guilt, that is irrelevant to a sentencing determination.”); ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (“[I]n sentencing a defendant, a court may not consider .

G. Execution Impact Evidence ¶63 Johnson argues the trial court erred by excluding execution impact evidence because it was relevant to his character and showed his family’s love and support, citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288, 304 (1976), –06 (Cal.

prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence.”) (emphasis added); ¶ 14 (2003) (recognizing victims’ right to finality); (same); (noting in capital case that Rule 32 PCR proceedings are “not designed to afford a second appeal” and that “there must be an end to litigation”).

And, a petitioner “must strictly comply with Rule 32 or be denied relief.” (); ¶ 9 (App. 2000) (holding a petition for review incorporating trial court filings “utterly fails to comply with Rule 32.9” and rejecting summarily the claims raised), disapproved of on other grounds by Stewart

P. 32.2(b); (“It is the petitioner’s burden to assert grounds that bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order to obtain relief.”).

(recognizing that an insufficient argument waives a claim on review), abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2015); (“Petitioners must strictly comply with Rule 32 or be denied 1 Before he was retried, Luke underwent competency evaluations pursuant to Rule 11 and was deemed competent.

P. 32.6(d) (petitioner may not amend a petition for post-conviction relief to raise new issues absent leave of court upon a showing of good cause); (“Petitioners must strictly comply with Rule 32 or be denied relief.”); (appellate court will not consider meritorious issues not first presented to the trial court).

Unlike a direct appeal, in which the type and number of issues an appellant can raise “are not limited by a per se rule,” the issues that may be raised in a Rule 32 petition ai*e limited by Rule 32.1, and a petitioner must “assert grounds that bring him *525 within the provisions of the Rule in order to obtain relief.” -46 , -95 (1984).

Disposition ¶26 “The preclusion rules exist to prevent multiple post-conviction reviews, not to prevent review entirely.” And, “Rule 32 ‘is designed to accommodate the unusual situation where justice ran its course and yet went awry.’”

“A defendant is guilty when convicted and if he chooses not to publicly admit his guilt, that is irrelevant to a sentencing determination.”

“The right to appeal is guaranteed by our constitution, Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24, but the Rule 32 procedure is not.”

(alteration in original) ( ).

3 [convicted] defendant admits his guilt, this can be used as additional mitigating evidence, provided the defendant is truly remorseful for his crime.” State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 162

“Rule 32 ‘is designed to accommodate the unusual situation where justice ran its course and yet went awry.’” State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 146

( , (“A defendant is guilty when convicted and if he chooses not to publicly admit his guilt, that is irrelevant to a sentencing determination.”), cert.

ercising the constitutional right to appellate review”); Ellis, 176 Ariz. at 123 , 859 P.2d at 746 (“It was precisely because of art. [II], § 24 that this court expressly left open the avenue of appellate review by [post-conviction relief] in lieu of direct appeal when it amended the rules with respect to cases involving admissions of probation violations [and guilty pleas].”); , (post-conviction relief “ ‘designed to accommodate the unusual situation where justice ran its course and yet went aw

(“[Rule 32] is not intended to unnecessarily delay the renditions of justice or add a third day in court when fewer days are sufficient to do substantial justice.”).

is irrelevant to a sentencing determination.”

E.g., State v. Cañez, ¶ 120

State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 162

____________________________________ JOHN PELANDER, Chief Judge CONCURRING: ____________________________________ M. JAN FLÓREZ, Presiding Judge ____________________________________ PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge 6 P.2d 991 (1984), Ruggiero also argues that “[t]he trial court committed fundamental error by considering the improper aggravating factor of failure to accept responsibility.” But, Ruggiero did not object below and we therefore review this claim for fundamental error.