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Rodriguez admits that his failure to raise the issue of voluntariness prior to trial means “he has waived his ability [on appeal] to challenge the absence of Miranda warnings,” but he otherwise argues the issue was “adequately preserved” for appellate review because he both “objected to the introduction [

(refusing to consider grounds for suppression not raised at suppression hearing).

he juror from acting with entire impartiality,” and “[t]he finding of the trial court upon that issue should not be set aside by the appellate court unless the error is manifest.”); Ariz. Code §§ 44-1313(j), -1314 (1939); Ariz. Rev. Code §§ 5035(13), 5036 (1928); Rev. Stat. Ariz., Penal Code §§ 1023(13), 1024–25 (1913); –99 ¶¶ 113–21 (2019); –22 n.1 (1965); -36 (1928); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

See Comer, 165 Ariz. at 423-26 (finding no error in refusing to strike two jurors who said defendant was probably guilty, but later stated they could try to form a final opinion based on the evidence); (upholding decision not to excuse juror who expressed opinion that defendant was likely guilty, but said she could judge case on evidence presented).

We will not, however, indulge in such guesswork.” ¶ 18 (1998); (“Unless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not presume its existence.”).

(refusing to consider grounds for suppression not raised at suppression hearing); ("It is highly undesirable to attempt to resolve issues for the first time on appeal, particularly when the record below was made with no thought in mind of the legal issue to be deci

(“Unless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not presume its existence.”); (“[U]nless the record affirmatively shows that .

¶7 Generally, “[i]ssues concerning the suppression of evidence which were not raised in the trial court are waived on appeal.” (“In fact-intensive inquiries on motions to suppress, th[is] court is not obliged to consider new theories .

¶ 34 (2006); (“Issues concerning the suppression of evidence which were not raised in the trial court are waived on appeal.”).

at 61, ¶ 18; ("Unless there are objective indications of jurors' prejudice, we will not presume its existence.").

see also U.S. v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that when the defendant asserted a Miranda rights violation for the first time on appeal, the issue had been waived).

Appellant has not provided, 5 STATE v. DUNBAR Decision of the Court by citation to the record or otherwise, any “objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, [and] we will not presume its existence.”

(“Without a showing of unqualified partiality of the juror, we will not upset a determination so clearly within the province of the [trial] court.”).

(“There is no requirement that the defendant receive notice of how the State will prove his responsibility for the alleged offense.”) ().

(“Issues concerning the suppression of evidence which were not raised in the trial court are waived on appeal.”); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

(record "replete with evidence" of concealment when defendants changed vehicles twice and painted and "partially buried" one of the vehicles); (defendant used false names, shaved beard and dyed hair); (defendant left

To meet this burden, the defendant must present “objective indications of jurors’ prejudice.”

(“Unless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not presume its existence.”).

But “[u]nless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not presume its existence.”

(refusing to consider grounds for suppression not raised at suppression hearing).