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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Hall, 633 P.2d 398.

72 citing documents.

  • State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    e failed to present any text messages in which Suazo explicitly agreed to provide or receive drugs, on this record, sufficient circumstantial evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that he agreed to sell or transport dangerous drugs, and intended to assist the commission of such an offense when he transported heroin and methamphetamine from Castro’s apartment.5 (holding an “unlawful agreement can be inferred from the parties’ overt conduct”), ¶ 12 (2000).
  • State of Arizona v. Jamonte Lawrence Olague 381 P.3d 269 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Jamonte Lawrence Olague 381 P.3d 269 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
    (hereinafter Hagen), ¶¶ 12-13, -24, -98 (1976); -80, -54 (App. 1975); see also State v. San
  • State v. Ochoa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Ochoa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    (holding “unlawful agreement can be inferred from the parties’ overt conduct”).
  • State v. Weiss 232 P.3d 1259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • State v. Weiss 232 P.3d 1259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); , (overruled on other grounds).
  • State v. GONZALES-PEREZ 62 P.3d 126 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State v. GONZALES-PEREZ 62 P.3d 126 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    Gilbert; , (due process violation based on preindictment delay requires tactical ploy or harassment and substantial prejudice to the defense), overruled on other grounds
  • State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
  • State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
    1135, 1144-47 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 425-28 (1986)
  • State v. Bass 12 P.3d 796 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Bass 12 P.3d 796 Ariz. 2000
    11 The trial court gave a jury instruction on superseding cause, substantially similar to the one requested by Bass, stating that an intervening event becomes a legal excuse, ie., a superseding cause only when “its occurrence was both unforeseeable and when *576 with benefit of hindsight it may be described as abnormal or extraordinary.” ¶ 12 Relying on a , , Bass argues that this jury instruction was incorrect for failing to differentiate between “coincidental” intervening acts and “responsive”
  • State v. Panveno 996 P.2d 741 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Panveno 996 P.2d 741 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Yoshida 986 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Yoshida 986 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Lemming 937 P.2d 381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Medina 949 P.2d 507 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Medina 949 P.2d 507 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    (“Moreover, even in cases where an accused experiences some prejudice from a lapse of time, prosecutions fol *422 lowing investigative delays do not necessarily offend due process.”); , -98 , -87 (1988); -93 , -02 (1981).
  • State v. Lemming 937 P.2d 381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    (speedy trial rights upon “arrest” within meaning of Rule 8.2(a) attach “only upon indictment”).
  • State v. Everidge 932 P.2d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • State v. Everidge 932 P.2d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • State v. Dunlap 930 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Dunlap 930 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Superior Court 922 P.2d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Superior Court 922 P.2d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Jansing 918 P.2d 1081 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Jansing 918 P.2d 1081 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Williams 904 P.2d 437 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Williams 904 P.2d 437 Ariz. 1995
  • In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-128676 868 P.2d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-128676 868 P.2d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    In support of this argument
  • State v. Petzoldt 836 P.2d 982 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • State v. Petzoldt 836 P.2d 982 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
    in which our supreme court held that “[fjor pre-indictment delay to violate due process, the appellants must show that the delay was intended to gain a tactical advantage or to harass them and that the delay actually and substantially prejudiced them.” 129 Ariz. at 592-93 , 633 P.2d at 401-402 .
  • State v. Gilbert 837 P.2d 1137 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Garcia 823 P.2d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Granados 837 P.2d 1140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Garcia 823 P.2d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • State v. Granados 837 P.2d 1140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
    (stale investigation not necessarily a denial of due process); and State ex rel.
  • State v. Gilbert 837 P.2d 1137 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
    (intentional delay to harass or gain a tactical advantage or avoid the speedy trial requirements of Rule 8 will justify a dismissal with prejudice).
  • State v. Marty 801 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Marty 801 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    Under Arizona law, however, proximate cause may be interrupted where another cause “with which the defendant was in no way connected intervenes, and but for which death would not have occurred.” , Wiley 144 Ariz. at 540 , 698 P.2d at 1259
  • State v. Michael 778 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • State v. Michael 778 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
    2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)
  • State v. Mauro 766 P.2d 59 Ariz. 1988
  • State v. Mauro 766 P.2d 59 Ariz. 1988
  • State v. Broughton 752 P.2d 483 Ariz. 1988
  • State v. Broughton 752 P.2d 483 Ariz. 1988