Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 164 P.2d 598.

53 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. City of Tucson Ariz. 2021
State of Arizona v. City of Tucson Ariz. 2021
to be exercised has been specifically or by implication granted in its charter”); Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 10 (“[A] home rule city deriving its powers from the Constitution is independent of the state Legislature as to all subjects of strictly local municipal concern.” (–9 (1945))).
State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
Id.; see also Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 10, 273 P.3d at 626 (“[A] home rale city deriving its powers from the Constitution is independent of the state Legislature as to all subjects of strictly local municipal concern.”) *599 (internal quotation marks omitted) (-9 , ); -43 , Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 144-46 , 297 P. 1037 ; id.
City of Tucson v. State 273 P.3d 624 Ariz. 2012
City of Tucson v. State 273 P.3d 624 Ariz. 2012
“[A] home rule city deriving its powers from the Constitution is independent of the state Legislature as to all subjects of strictly local municipal concern.” -9, -27, 255 P. 490, 492-93 (1927) (holding that city charter provided legislative authorization for municipal operation of railway under Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 34); The Records of the Arizona Constitu
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Local versus Statewide Concern ¶ 12 The city preliminarily contends we should assess the state’s , , , which considers a city activity to be of statewide interest when the city acts as an agent of the state.
Wonders v. Pima County 89 P.3d 810 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Wonders v. Pima County 89 P.3d 810 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Rineer, , ; see also Babe’s Cabaret.
McMann v. City of Tucson 47 P.3d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
McMann v. City of Tucson 47 P.3d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Such a charter is the “organic law” of a city, , and *472 “does not exist subject to the will of the legislature.”
Union Transportes De Nogales v. City of Nogales 985 P.2d 1025 Ariz. 1999
Union Transportes De Nogales v. City of Nogales 985 P.2d 1025 Ariz. 1999
§ 11-1601(0), affirmatively contemplates that “[l]ieenses that are required by ordinances of a city or town are in addition to the license required by this chapter.” , we noted that local legislation “cannot contradict the state law, but it may parallel it, or even go beyond it, so long as the two are not in conflict.” We find no conflict between relevant state statutes and the Nogales ordinance.
Robertson v. Graziano 942 P.2d 1182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Robertson v. Graziano 942 P.2d 1182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Jett v. City of Tucson 882 P.2d 426 Ariz. 1994
Jett v. City of Tucson 882 P.2d 426 Ariz. 1994
Ripps v. City of Tucson 736 P.2d 827 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
Ripps v. City of Tucson 736 P.2d 827 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
State v. Mercurio 736 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
State v. Mercurio 736 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
Pursuant to Article XIII, § 2 of the Arizona Constitution, the people of Phoenix have adopted chapter 8 of the city charter, establishing a city court system and providing for the appointment of a chief presiding judge, other full-time judges, and judges pro tempore.
State v. Jacobson 588 P.2d 358 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
State v. Jacobson 588 P.2d 358 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
See, e. g., , 300 P. 1010 (1931)
Shaffer v. Allt 545 P.2d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Shaffer v. Allt 545 P.2d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
§ 9-284(B); , *568 221 P. 228 (1923); , 255 P. 490 (1927); , 297 P. 1037 (1931); , , , Arizona Fence Contractors Ass’n v. City of Phoenix Advisory and Appeals Board, 7 Ariz.App.
Hyland v. City of Mesa 537 P.2d 936 Ariz. 1975
Hyland v. City of Mesa 537 P.2d 936 Ariz. 1975
Town of Gila Bend v. Walled Lake Door Company 490 P.2d 551 Ariz. 1971
Town of Gila Bend v. Walled Lake Door Company 490 P.2d 551 Ariz. 1971
at 220-221] This Court has, on numerous occasions, held that the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 42-303 was to require all counties, municipalities and towns to “pay as they go, to place them on a cash basis”, at 9 , at 603 (1945); , and then “to maintain them so by prohibiting the incurring of any indebtedness in any fiscal year, unless funds had been first provided to meet it.” at 410 , 2
In Re Estate of Morris 488 P.2d 1015 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
In Re Estate of Morris 488 P.2d 1015 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
* * * The director shall not undertake to make any change of existing laws, it being the intention of this section that the director shall in no manner assume to exercise legislative power.’’ (Emphasis added) See Peterson v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., , , State v. Datsi, 11 Ariz.App.
State Ex Rel. Swift v. Tullar 462 P.2d 409 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
State Ex Rel. Swift v. Tullar 462 P.2d 409 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
State v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 307 P.2d 908 Ariz. 1957
State v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 307 P.2d 908 Ariz. 1957
Porter v. Eyer 294 P.2d 661 Ariz. 1956
City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co. 293 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1956
City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co. 293 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1956
Strode v. Sullivan 236 P.2d 48 Ariz. 1951
Strode v. Sullivan 236 P.2d 48 Ariz. 1951
Since the early case of Yuma Gas, Light & Water Co. v. City of Yuma, 1919, , 178 P. 26 , down to and including the late cases of City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 1945, , ; Maxwell v. Fleming, 1946, , ; and City of Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 1948, , , this court has uniformly held that a city charter, when regularly adopted and approved, becomes the organic law of the city and the provisions of the
Gardner v. Industrial Commission 233 P.2d 833 Ariz. 1951
Gardner v. Industrial Commission 233 P.2d 833 Ariz. 1951
ts in the town “and to print and distribute books, pamphlets and maps advertising the advantages of said city or town, and the common council may pay said sum to the chamber of commerce, board of trade, or other commercial organization of said city or town to be expended for the purposes herein enumerated.” For an interpretation of this section, , .
Mayor Common Council of City of Prescott v. Randall 196 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1948
Mayor Common Council of City of Prescott v. Randall 196 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1948
33 , ; , ; Home Owners’ , ; , ; , ; , ; , ; , ; City of Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Inc., , .
City of Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Inc. 195 P.2d 562 Ariz. 1948
City of Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Inc. 195 P.2d 562 Ariz. 1948
Peterson v. Sundt 195 P.2d 158 Ariz. 1948
Peterson v. Sundt 195 P.2d 158 Ariz. 1948
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court of Maricopa County 175 P.2d 811 Ariz. 1946