Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ortiz, 639 P.2d 1020.
- State v. Kiles 857 P.2d 1212 Ariz. 1993
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State v. Kiles
857 P.2d 1212
Ariz. 1993
2909, 2934 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (once guilt is determined, additional relevant information may be considered for sentencing) (citation omitted); , (any relevant evidence may be used to rebut defendant’s mitigating circumstances, even if inadmissible at trial).
- State v. Harris 852 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Harris 852 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Medrano 844 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1992
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State v. Medrano
844 P.2d 560
Ariz. 1992
and heinousness focuses on society’s view of the murder as compared to other murders.”
- State v. Atwood 832 P.2d 593 Ariz. 1992
- State v. Atwood 832 P.2d 593 Ariz. 1992
- State v. Cook 821 P.2d 731 Ariz. 1991
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State v. Cook
821 P.2d 731
Ariz. 1991
We have previously held that due process in a § 13-703 hearing requires that the prosecutor give defendant “(1) disclosure of the aggravating circumstances the state *63 will seek to prove; (2) disclosure of the evidence the state will use; and (3) disclosure sufficiently in advance of the hearing that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare rebuttal.” , , cert.
- State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
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State v. Greenway
823 P.2d 22
Ariz. 1991
2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); , cert.
- State v. Lavers 814 P.2d 333 Ariz. 1991
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State v. Lavers
814 P.2d 333
Ariz. 1991
§ 13-604); -10 , -35 (1981) (death of murder victim does not terminate the “commission of the offense” within the meaning of A.R.S.
- State v. White 815 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1991
- State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
- Distinguished State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
- State v. Fulminante 778 P.2d 602 Ariz. 1989
- State v. Fulminante 778 P.2d 602 Ariz. 1989
- State v. Walton 769 P.2d 1017 Ariz. 1989
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State v. Walton
769 P.2d 1017
Ariz. 1989
2988 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977) (death penalty is not cruel and unusual); -84 , -37 (1986) (denial of jury sentencing, burden of proving mitigation on the defendant, no *585 proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravation outweighs mitigation, and inadequate standards to weigh the factors are not unconstitutional); , cert.
- State v. Vickers 768 P.2d 1177 Ariz. 1989
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State v. Vickers
768 P.2d 1177
Ariz. 1989
2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983); , cert.
- State v. Castaneda 724 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1986
- State v. Castaneda 724 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1986
- State v. Smith 707 P.2d 289 Ariz. 1985
- State v. Smith 707 P.2d 289 Ariz. 1985
- State v. Bracy 703 P.2d 464 Ariz. 1985
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State v. Bracy
703 P.2d 464
Ariz. 1985
2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983) (prosecutorial discretion); , cert.
- State v. Poland 698 P.2d 183 Ariz. 1985
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State v. Poland
698 P.2d 183
Ariz. 1985
State v. Lujan, supra; , , , cert.
- State v. Nash 694 P.2d 222 Ariz. 1985
- State v. Nash 694 P.2d 222 Ariz. 1985
- State v. Roscoe 700 P.2d 1312 Ariz. 1984
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State v. Roscoe
700 P.2d 1312
Ariz. 1984
3097 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1983); , cert.
- State v. Rodriquez 700 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
- State v. Rodriquez 700 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
- State v. Asbury 701 P.2d 1189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
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State v. Asbury
701 P.2d 1189
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
Although the confrontation clause, by its terms, applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings, , basic concepts of fairness, justice and impartiality mandate that the defendant be allowed, at an aggravation and mitigation hearing, to cross-examine the victims in order to bring out mitigating circumstances.
- State v. Gillies 691 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1984
- State v. Gillies 691 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1984
- State v. Hauss 688 P.2d 1051 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
- State v. Hauss 688 P.2d 1051 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
- State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
- State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
- State v. Berndt 672 P.2d 1311 Ariz. 1983
- State v. Berndt 672 P.2d 1311 Ariz. 1983
- State v. Villarreal 666 P.2d 1094 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
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State v. Villarreal
666 P.2d 1094
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
The conspiracy section of our new criminal code adopts the “unilateral" concept in place of the traditional “bilateral concept.”
- State v. Richmond 666 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1983