Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Phoenix v. Mullen, 174 P.2d 422.

26 citing documents.

  • Alaface v. National Investment Co. 892 P.2d 1375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Alaface v. National Investment Co. 892 P.2d 1375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    (statutory duty to move stalled vehicle off the roadway); , (motor vehicle statute); , (statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person), overruled in part by Ontiveros, , ; , (city ordinance requiring that nothing
  • Windauer v. O'CONNOR 477 P.2d 561 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
  • Windauer v. O'CONNOR 477 P.2d 561 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
    Our Supreme Court also has held subsequent to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1939 that “ ‘A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show.’ ” , , (1946).
  • Hall v. Mertz 480 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
  • Hall v. Mertz 480 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
    P.2d 703 (1962) ; , , ; , ; , , ; , , , Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association, , Pratt & , ; Hidalgo v. Cochise County, 13 Ariz.App.
  • Charron v. Kernan 447 P.2d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Charron v. Kernan 447 P.2d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
    y is not bound my medical testimony as to lack of permanency of such injuries if there is controverting evidence to the contrary: “ * * * Nor is the jury bound by the testimony of a medical expert who testi *491 fies as to lack of permanency of the injury, if there is controverting evidence or testimony from which it may be inferred that the injury is in fact permanent.”
  • Patania v. Silverstone 415 P.2d 139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Patania v. Silverstone 415 P.2d 139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
    our Supreme Court stated: “Whether the injury is permanent need not be proven by medical testimony, nor is the jury bound by the testimony of a medical expert who testifies as to the lack of permanency of the injury, if there is controverting evidence or testimony from which it may be inferred t
  • Stearman v. Miranda 396 P.2d 622 Ariz. 1964
  • Stearman v. Miranda 396 P.2d 622 Ariz. 1964
    See, e. g. Young Candy & Tobacco Company v. Montoya, supra ; , ; , ; , ; , .
  • Young Candy & Tobacco Company v. Montoya 372 P.2d 703 Ariz. 1962
  • Young Candy & Tobacco Company v. Montoya 372 P.2d 703 Ariz. 1962
    424: “We are committed to the doctrine that if the proximate cause of an injury to another is the failure of the driver of the vehicle to comply with the positive directions of the statute relating to the operation of motor vehicles, such failure or violation is negligence per se and actionable ne
  • Hirsh v. Manley 300 P.2d 588 Ariz. 1956
  • Hirsh v. Manley 300 P.2d 588 Ariz. 1956
    *102 But plaintiff responds by citing City of Phoenix v. Mullen, 1946, , , wherein this court held that medical testimony is not required to prove the permanency of subjective injuries “if there is controverting evidence or testimony from which it may be inferred that the injury is in fact permanent”.
  • Henderson v. Breesman 269 P.2d 1059 Ariz. 1954
  • Henderson v. Breesman 269 P.2d 1059 Ariz. 1954
  • Citizens Utilities Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 240 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1952
  • Citizens Utilities Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 240 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1952
    206 P. 589 ; , 243 P. 405 ; Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Berry, , 250 P. 356 ; , ; , ; , ; , ; Valley Transp.
  • In Re McDonnell's Estate 179 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1947
  • Cleveland v. McDonnell 179 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1947
  • Cleveland v. McDonnell 179 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1947
    1 Moore’s Federal Practice, section 8.07.
  • In Re McDonnell's Estate 179 P.2d 238 Ariz. 1947
    1 Moore's Federal Practice, section 8.07.
  • White v. Breedon 175 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1946
  • White v. Breedon 175 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1946
    In our recent case of City of Phœ , , we stated: “We think that from the testimony submitted in this case, and which has already been recited, the jury could infer that plaintiff’s injuries were of a permanent character.